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A SURVEY OF STATUTORY CHANGES IN
NORTH CAROLINA IN 1949
This article is designed to discuss some of the statutory changes,
effected by the 1949 General Assembly, which are of particular interest
to lawyers. It is not intended to be a complete survey of all new laws.
This article was prepared largely by faculty of the Law School of the
University of North Carolina, with the assistance of William V. Bur-
row, 0. Max Gardner, Jr., Robert D. Larsen and Clark C. Totherow,
student members of the LAW REVIEW staff. Grateful acknowledgment
is made to Mr. Harry W. McGalliard, Research Director, General
Statutes Commission, for preparation of the material dealing with
judicial sales and power of sale, and to L. P. McLendon, Jr., member
of the Greensboro Bar, for preparation of the material on motor carriers.
The abbreviation "C.," unless otherwise indicated, refers to a Chap-
ter of the 1949 Session Laws, and, unless the context otherwise indi-
cates, the abbreviation "G. S." refers to the North Carolina General
Statutes of 1943.
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
C. 1052 establishes a judicial council, to continue on a permanent
basis the work begun by the temporary commission for the improve-
ment of the administration of justice,1 created by the 1947 General
Assembly. The council differs from the commission in three other
particulars :
(1) The membership has been reduced from an unwieldy twenty-
three to a workable twelve, but at the cost of direct representation of
the court clerks, the law schools, the solicitors and the lay public, except
as the two gubernatorial appointments may reflect some of these inter-
ests. The other members are the chief justice or his designate from the
supreme court, the attorney general, two superior court judges, two
legislators, and four practicing lawyers.
(2) The commission had a research director at $5,000 a year. The
council is to have an executive secretary at $3,000. This decrease was
penny-wise and pound-foolish, particularly at a time when nearly all
state officers and employees have had their compensation increased, for
upon the caliber of the executive secretary depends the effectiveness
of the largely ex-officio council.
(3) The commission was set up "for the purpose of making a thor-
1A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1947, 25 N. C. L. REV.
376 (1947).
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ough study of the problems in connection with the administration of
justice."' Its powers were limited to "making recommendations in the
form of proposed legislation for consideration of the 1949 session of
the General Assembly." The council is to make recommendations to
the courts as well as the legislature and is to be concerned with the
"organization, operation or methods of conducting the business of the
courts" in addition to needed changes in the law. The statement of its
duties follows:
"1. To make a continued study of the administration of justice in
this State, and the methods of administration of each and all of the
courts of the State, whether of record or not of record.
"2. To receive reports of criticisms and suggestions pertaining to
the administration of justice in the State.
"3. To recommend to the Legislature, or the courts, such changes
in the law or in the organization, operation or methods of conducting
th" business of the courts, or with respect to any other matter pertain-
ing to the administration of justice, as it may deem desirable.
The statute creating the judicial council follows the bill recom-
mended by the commission,2 save for the amendment reducing the sal-
ary of the executive secretary, above noted.
The commission for the improvement of the administration of jus-
tice did an excellent job. In its thoughtful report,3 it discussed and
submitted fifteen drafts of proposed legislation and five drafts of pro-
posed constitutional amendments. These represented constructive efforts
to improve the institutional and procedural characteristics of the courts.
It is significant that the General Assembly had enough confidence in
the work of the temporary commission to enact a considerable number
of its proposals and to underwrite the continuance of this program for
the systematic improvement of the administration of justice in North
Carolina.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Chiropractors
C. 785 amends the statute relating to the practice of chiropractic,
and includes among the amendments two new grounds for denying or
revoking a license, namely "unethical advertising" and "unprofessional
or dishonorable conduct unworthy of and affecting the practice of his
profession." The latter is taken verbatim from the statute specifying
the grounds for revocation of a physician's license,' "Unethical adver-
2 PoPuLAR GOvERNMENT, Jan., 1949, p. 1, 9.
'Cited supra, note 2.
'G. S. §90-14. The provision was applied in Board of Medical Examiners v.
Gardner, 201 N. C. 123, 159 S. E. 8 (1931).
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tising" would appear to be a standard so broad as to raise some doubt
as to its validity.2
Cosmetologists
C. 505 adds a section1 to the cosmetic art act of 1933 so as to author-
ize the superior court, on the application of various enforcement agencies,
to enjoin violations of the statutes and administrative regulations relat-
ing to the practice of cosmetic art. In substance, the section was copied
from the 19472 act authorizing the injunctive enforcement of the phar-
macy statute. It is broader than that act, however, in that (1) injunction
may be sought by either of five state and local enforcement agencies,
instead of one, and (2) injunction may extend to violations of the ad-
ministrative rules and regulations as well as of the statute.
Because of the health factor, statutes regulating the practice of
cosmetology have been held constitutional 3 Most of the decisions have
grown out of criminal proceedings. Only one case has been found
where injunctive enforcement was involved.4  There, its appropriateness
was assumed though the statute provided only for criminal penalties.5
Embalmers and Funeral Directors
The State Board of Embalmers1 was by C. 951 converted into the
State Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors2 by adding to the
board two members not required to be "licensed and practical" embalm-
ers. The existing board's present power to adopt rules, regulations,
and by-laws whereby the practice of embalming bodies shall be regulated
was extended to include conducting funerals as well as embalming bodies,
but any regulations concerning funerals shall pertain to sanitation only.
License fees were raised, and whereas in order to be licensed as em-
balmers applicants hitherto were required to have a special course in
' The statute specifying the grounds for revocation of licenses of physicians
spells out the kind of advertising which is included as such a ground. G. S.
§90-14. The grounds for revocation of the licenses of dentists include "has by
himself or another, solicited or advertised in any manner for professional busi-
ness." A couple of exceptions are made, but both are concrete. G. S. §90-41.
Both statutes are definite as to what advertising is prohibited.
3G. S. §88-28.1.
2 G. S. §90-85.1 (1947 Supp.), discussed in Note 25 N. C. L. REv. 429 (1947).
State ex rel. Garrison v. Reeve, 104 Fla. 196, 139 So. 817, 79 A. L. R. 1119,
Anno. 1126 (1932); Hoff v. State, 9 Harr. (Del.) 134, 197 Atl. 75 (1938);
People v. Cohen, 255 App. Div. 485, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 70 (1938) ; State ex ret.
Wayman v. Johnson, 156 Kan. 191, 131 P. (2d) 660 (1942); Jeffs v. Board of
Examiners of Barbers, et at., 320 Mich. 78, 30 N. W. (2d) 445 (1948). Compare
State v Cohn, 184 La. 53, 165 So. 449 (1936) (occupational license tax).
'State ex rel. Wayman v. Johnson, supra note 3.
KAN. GEN. STAT. §65-1909 (1935).
2G. S. §§90-203 to 90-210 (1943 and 1947 Supp.).
2 Occupation licensing statutes are discussed in Hanft and Hamrick, Haphazard
Regimentatio, Under Licensing Statutes, 17 N. C. L. Rlv. 1 (1938). Recent de-
velopments in that field are treated in Note, 27 N. C. L. Rlv. (1949).
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embalming in an approved school or two years experience with a licensed
and practical embalmer; hereafter applicants must have both the school-
ing and experience. This was accomplished by changing "or" to "and."
The bad draftsmanship which may become traditional3 in the writing
of North Carolina occupation licensing statutes is again in evidence.
The two new members of the board are to be elected, one for a term of
two years, and one for a term of three, but nothing is said about the
term of office of their successors. However, the portion of the section
which apparently applies to the old members and prescribes a term of
five years could be held to apply to the new members also. A further
eccentricity of the act is that G. S. §90-207 as rewritten provides for
licensing and registration of embalmers, but not funeral directors;
nevertheless registered funeral directors as well as registered embalmers
are to pay an annual fee. Furthermore, G. S. C. 150, applicable to the
state board of embalmers, was not amended to make it applicable to
the state board of embalmers and funeral directors.
Rules and Regulations Filed with Each Clerk
of the Superior Court
Soon after the enactment of the Federal Register Act,' a comparable
state statute was advocated in this LAW REviEW. 2 That act contained
two principal provisions. First, it provided that all rules, regulations
and-orders of federal agencies of general applicability and legal effect
be filed in one place, a division of the National Archives Establishment,
where they would be available for public inspection. Until so filed they
were not valid against any person having no actual knowledge of them.
The second principal provision of the act called for the publication of
these documents in a serial publication designated the "Federal Register."
Publication of the Federal Register ensued and still continues.
G. S. Chapter 143, Article 18,3 enacted in 1943, seems to be a sub-
stitute for that act. It incorporates, generally speaking, the first step
taken in the Federal Register Act but not the second. Filing of Admin-
istrative rules and regulations in one place (with the Secretary of State)
is provided for, but not printing of them all in one publication. Pro-
vision is made for the rules to be made available to any member of the
public at the office of the Secretary of State subject to the usual and
customary fee for certified copies thereof. It has been previously sug-
'See the discussion of the scale mechanics act in A Survey of Statutory
Changes in North Carolina in 1941, 19 N. C. L. REv. 435, 447-449 (1941).
'49 STAT. 500 (1935), 44 U.,S. C. A. 301-314 (1948 Supp.).
'A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1937, 15 N. C. L. REv.
321, 325 (1937).
"This provision is commented on in A Survey of Statutory Changes in North
Carolina in 1943, 21 N. C. L. REv. 323, 328 (1943).
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gested in this LAw REVIEW 4 that this provision accomplishes, for some
purposes, the same end as the publication provision of the Federal
Register Act.
C. 378 seems to move further toward that end. In substance it pro-
vides that in addition to filing all of their rules and regulations with the
Secretary of the State as required by the 1943 statute, every agency
and administrative board of the state created by statute and authorized
to exercise regulatory, administrative, or quasi-judicial functions, shall
within ninety days after March 17, 1949 (date of ratification) file with
the clerk of the superior court of each county, a certified indexed copy
of all general administrative rules and regulations or rules of practice
and procedure, the violation of which would constitute a crime, for-
mulated or adapted by the agency for the performance of its function
or for the exercise of its authority. Amendments and new rules and
regulations are to be so filed within fifteen days of the adoption thereof.
It should be noted that this statute provides for only a part of the
administrative rules and regulations to be maintained as a part of the
records of the clerk's office. But this is a very important part, i.e.,
those rules and regulations the violation of which would constitute a
crime. It is hard to overemphasize the value of this statute in making
these rules and regulations readily available to the public and the law-
yers at convenient places throughout the state. There is nothing in the
act to indicate that members of the public are to be furnished copies by
the clerk's office, but, as previously pointed out, copies are available
under the older statute at the office of the Secretary of the State. Per-
haps the practical administration of these acts will indicate that with
small additional cost the state could take the second step taken by the
Federal Register Act and provide for a single serial publication of all
administrative rules and regulations.
ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES
Bonds
C. 971 amends G. S. §28-34 to permit the clerk of court, in case the
value of the assets of an estate to be administered by the personal repre-
sentative exceeds $100,000.00, to accept a bond in an amount equal to
the value of the assets plus ten per cent thereof. While the word
"assets" is used in the amendment, presumably it refers only to the
personal property belonging to the estate. Although the purpose of the
amendment is not entirely clear, perhaps the broad intent of the legis-
lature in passing it was to reduce the bond1 required for the adminis-
4 Ibid.
1 G. S. §28-34 heretofore has required bond double the value of the personal
property if personal sureties are used, or one and one-fourth the value if the bond
is executed by a duly authorized surety company.
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tration of.large estates and thereby reduce the bond premium for the
administration expense payable out of the estate. As a practical matter,
a person who has accumulated an estate of more than $100,000.00
usually makes a will in which he appoints an executor who is required
to give bond only in exceptional cases.
2
Estates of Missing Persons
In 1947 the legislature enacted a hastily and ineptly drawn statute,
as one in a series of attempts to solve the problem of effectively admin-
istering the estate of a person who has been missing for a considerable
period of time but who is not known to be actually dead. This statute,
which purportedly made provision for the Qriginal administration of a
seven-year absentee's own estate, was not only couched in such loose
and ambiguous language as to make its interpretation and application un-
certain; it was also subject to severe criticism on the ground of its
probable unconstitutionality since it failed to provide (1) for adequate
notice to the absentee whose estate was to be administered and (2) for
the preservation of the absentee's property for a reasonable period of
time pending his possible return.2 If these safeguards are missing even
in special legislation of this sort, the absentee has been deprived of his
property without due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Federal Constitution.3
Perhaps as a result of the criticism levelled at the 1947 act, the
1949 legislature made another attempt at solving the problem by en-
acting a new law, C. 581, 'concerning the administration of estates of
missing persons. Without any specific reference to the 1947 statute,
the new law provides that proceedings for the administration of a per-
son who has been missing for seven years may be begun before the
clerk of the superior court by verified application or petition for probate
of the absentee's will or for letters of administration on his estate. If
it appears to the satisfaction of the clerk that the absentee has been
missing for seven years and" that his whereabouts are unknown, the
clerk shall cause summons and a copy of the petition to be served on
all persons shown therein to be in possession of the missing person's
property and on all known next of kin of the absentee who reside in
this state. More important still, the clerk, by publication as required
by G. S. §1-99, must give notice of such petition, directing the missing
person, his or her spouse, heirs and next of kin to appear before the
clerk within twenty days from service of the notice and answer or
- G. S. §§28-25, 28-38.
'G. S. §28-2.1 (1947 Supp.).See critical comment on this statute in 25 N. C. L. Rv. 423 (1947).
"Cunnius v. Reading School District, 198 U. S. 458 (1904) ; Blinn v. Nelson,
222 U. S. 1 (1911) ; Beckwith v. Bates, 228 Mich. 400, 200 N. W. 151 (1924).
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demur to the petition. Upon failure of the missing person to appear,
the clerk shall appoint a guardian ad litem for the absentee and for the
spouse and child or issue thereof who have failed to appear, and shall
publish notice once a week for four weeks requiring all such missing
and non-appearing persons, if alive, or any person for them to produce
to the clerk evidence of the living existence of such persons. If such
evidence is not produced within twenty days from the service of such
notice, a presumption of death arises and the clerk may so find upon
a hearing of the petition. The statute then provides that "the estate
of the missing person may thereupon be administered as provided
herein and by law."
It will be noted from the above that, for the purpose of notice the
spouse and child or children (also presumably missing or not known)
of the absentee are included. A succeeding section of the statute also
provides that if the petition shows that the spouse of the absentee has
been missing for seven years and does not appear after notice, then the
spouse will be presumed dead. Also if it appears that the missing per-
son had no child at the time of disappearance and that no child has
been heard from within the seven year period, it shall be presumed that
the missing person died without a child or issue thereof surviving, and
the clerk may so find. It will be seen, therefore, that for purposes of
devolution of the absentee's estate the statute is attempting to determine
the existence or non-existence of the spouse and direct lineal descend-
ants of the absentee. As a matter of fact, the next succeeding section
of the statute provides that until set aside on subsequent appearance in
the proceeding by the missing person, spouse, child or issue thereof
such findings by the clerk shall be conclusive, and effective as of the
date thereof, "in the administration of the estate of the missing person,
in subsequent sales or partition of his or her property, and in determina-
tion of any other interest, estate or trust to be vested or contingent upon
the death of such missing person." The exact meaning and effect of
the passage just quoted is not entirely clear and may give rise to future
litigation. To give one example: would a contingent remainder, ex-
pectant upon the life estate of the missing person, be accelerated upon
the clerk's finding of the death of the absentee?
We pause at this point to observe that this new law apparently takes
care of one of the vital constitutional requirements so flagrantly missing
in the 1947 law-that of adequate notice to the missing person whose
estate is to be administered.
Does the statute provide for the preservation of the property of the
absentee for a reasonable time and thus comply with the second require-
ment for its constitutionality as laid down by the United State Supreme
Court? We believe that an examination of its further provisions will
19491
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reveal that it does. First, it is provided that all sales of the absentee's
real property made by any devisee or heir within two years of the
declaration and findings by the clerk shall be void as to the missing
person, his or her spouse and unknown children or issue thereof, but
that such conveyances to bone fide purchasers for value, if made after
the two-year period, shall be valid. Second, it is provided that before
any distribution of property held by, or in trust for the missing person
is made the persons entitled to such distribution shall give bond, with
such sureties as the clerk may require, or secured by the property so
received, conditioned that if the missing person, spouse, children or issue
thereof shall in fact be alive, they will refund the property or amounts
received with interest thereon to the person entitled thereto. The amount
of the bond is not specified, but the inference is that it is left in the
discretion of the clerk. Although interest is required from the dis-
tributees of money, the statute is silent as to whether or not devisees
or heirs of real property will be required to account for rents and profits.
No surety or security is required if the missing person has been absent
or unheard from for twenty-five years. Third, it is further provided
that nothing in the new statute shall bar any action or affect the statute
of limitation applicable thereto, brought by any missing person to re-
cover any property in the possession of an authorized distributee, or to
recover from any distributee the value of any property alienated by
him. However, it is provided that the possession of such distributee
shall be deemed adverse "and the statute of limitation shall begin to run
as against such action by the missing person from the date of the
declaration and findings of the clerk." No specific statutes of limitation
are mentioned, but presumably the legislature intended for the statutes
relating to the adverse possession of real4 and personal propertyr to
apply. However loosely drawn the new statute may be, it would seem
to afford ample protection to the absentee with respect to his property
rights.
The statute wisely protects the personal representative-or other
fiduciary-against any action brought by the absentee for authorized
acts done by the representative pursuant to the findings of the clerk.
Jurisdiction over the proceedings is given to the clerk of the county
of the last known residence of the missing person unless ten years have
elapsed since the absentee's disappearance, in which case the clerk of
any county where the absentee had property or it was held in trust for
him may assume jurisdiction. In such case the required notices must
I G. S. §1-40.
'G. S. §1-52, subsec. 4. But see Pate v. Hazell, 107 N. C. 189, 11 S. E. 1089(1890).
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be published both in the county taking jurisdiction and in the county
where the missing person had a last known residence.
While the new law gives rise to a number of unanswered questions,
it seems to be constitutionally sound. It clearly affords a much more
satisfactory basis for the solution of a troublesome problem than did
the badly drawn and legally questionable legislation extant before its
passage.
Nomination of Administrator
C. 22 amending G. S. §28-6 provides statutory sanction to the ex-
isting judicial recognition of the right of one preferentially entitled to
qualify as administrator in case of intestacy, to renounce his right in
writing and nominate another for appointment.' The amendment pro-
vides that the nominee 'shall be entitled to the same priority of right
to qualify as the person making the nomination provided that the
qualification of the nominee shall be within the discretion of the clerk
of court. The discretion of the clerk of court is presumably limited by
the disqualifications enumerated in G. S. §28-8,2 and those disqualifica-
tions judicially approved such as inability to read or write.3
There is a conflict in authority on whether the right to nominate is
dependent upon the right to administer. In Boynton v. Heartt4 the
court held that in most states the decisions were dependent on the
staututes giving the right to nominate; but that, since North Carolina
had no statute, the better view was that the right to nominate was
dependent on the right to administer.5 The court distinguished Ritchie
v. McAuslinP and Smith v. Munroe7 which had held that an alien and
a non-resident had the right to nominate, and held that these decisions
were no longer authority because of changes in the statutes disqualify-
ing aliens and later disqualifying nonresidents as administrators How-
ever, the court drew a distinction between the disqualifications on account
of nonage and nonresidency, because, in the first the right to administer
continues to exist, while the exercise of the right is suspended during
minority, and in the case of a nonresident, he has never had the right
to administerf Thus the court recognized without affirming W7Zallis v.
'In re Estate of Smith, 210 N. C. 622, 188 S. E. 202 (1936); Williams v.
Neville, 108 N. C. 559, 13 S. E. 240 (1891); Hughes v. Pipkin, 61 N. C. 4 (1866);
Wallis v. Wallis, 60 N. C. 78 (1863); Smith v. Munroe, 23 N. C. 345 (1840);
Ritchie v. McAuslin, 2 N. C. 220 (1795).
2 Cf. In re Estate of Smith, 210 N. C. 622, 624, 188 S. E. 202, 203 (1936).
'it re Saville, 156 N. C. 172, 72 S. E. 220 (1911).
' 158 N. C. 488, 74 S. E. 470 (1912).
Id. at 493.
62 N. C. 220 (1795) (alien nonresident).
723 N. C. 345 (1840) (foreign nonresident).8 Boynton v. Heartt, 158 N. C. 488, 74 S. E. 470 (1912).
OId. at 495.
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Wallis'0 which had held that a minor had the right to nominate. The
amendment dearly designates that the nominee shall be "some other
qualified person," and thus implies that the nominating party shall also
have been qualified to administer. If we recognize that in view of the
decision in Boynton v. Heartt and in the face of the statute, the non-
resident does not have the right to nominate, the rights of a minor still
may be questionable and in need of statutory or judicial clarification.11
It may also be added that prior to the statute the right to nominate
was not superior to the right of an applicant of the same degree as the
person making the nomination,1 2 and absent specific reference thereto
in the amendment, this same limitation presumably will continue.
Publication of Notice to Creditors
In addition to eliminating the requirement that personal represent-
atives publish notices to creditors where their decedents did not own
any real property or interest in real property at the time of their death
and the only asset of the estate consists of proceeds received for wrong-
ful death, as heretofore required by G. S. §28-47, C. 63 also amends
Chapter 28 by adding a new section numbered 28-121.1 which permits
a personal representative of such a decedent to file his final account at
any time within one year after his appointment.
In that proceeds recovered for wrongful death are not assets of the
estate available to creditors, except as to burial expenses of the de-
ceased,' it. would appear that the legislature wisely recognized that,
where such proceeds represent the only assets of an estate, it is unsound
to require a personal representative to go to the needless expense of pub-
lishing notices to creditors whom he may not legally pay or delay his
final account for a period during which changes are impossible.
It should be noted that the exceptions provided by this statute are
restricted to circumstances where two conditions concurrently exist:
.(1) the deceased person did not own any real property or interest in
real property at the time of his death; (2) the only assets of the estate
consist of proceeds received for wrongful death. It is inconceivable
that many victims of wrongful deaths would not own some personal
property at the time of their death. Therefore, it would seem that a
literal interpretation of the term "only" would defeat the purpose for
10 60 N. C. 78 (1863).
"1Cf. In re Estate of Smith, 210 N. C. 622, 624, 188 S. E. 202, 203 (1936)
where the court states that there is a right to nominate "when the person nomi-
nating is himself competent by reason of residence, age (italics ours), and capacity
to act," but cites, among other supporting decisions, Wallis v. Wallis, 60 N. C.
78 (1863).
"
2In re Estate of Smith, 210 N. C. 622, 188 S. E. 202 (1936).
1 Hines v. The Foundation Co. of New York, 196 N. C. 322, 145 S. E. 612
(1928) ; G. S. §28-173 (1943).
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which the statute was enacted while a more liberal construction of the
term would necessitate some degree of arbitrariness.
C. 47 amends G. S. §28-47; relating to publication of notice to
creditors in the administration of an estate, to provide that notice shall
be published once a week for six consecutive weeks. The amendment
further provides that the publication shall be "in a newspaper qualified
to publish legal advertisements, if any such newspaper is published in
the county." This provision merely writes into G. S. 28-47 what was
already established law under G. S. §1-597.
Sale, Lease or Mortgage of Property Given to a Class
In the recent North Carolina case of Cole v. Cole" the personal repre-
sentative of an estate brought suit to secure a declaratory judgment for
the construction of a will as to which some doubt had arisen affecting
the administration of the estate. The difficulty arose out of an item
in the will which devised and bequeathed real and personal property to
the testator's "beloved nephew and any other children who may be born
to Robert and Peg Cole. .. " This was a class gift. The plaintiff, ad-
ministrator c. t. a. contended that the rule of convenience, as applied
to class gifts, would close the class as of the testator's death; but the
Supreme Court held that this rule was inapplicable to defeat the inten-
tion of the testator "to extend his bounty to all members of the described
class which might at any subsequent period be born to Robert and Peg
Cole and that the class membership may not be closed until the possi-
bility of after-born children is extinct through the death of one of these
ancestors." Since this decision allowed the class of beneficiaries to
increase indefinitely, it let in all the inconveniences of administration
described by the plaintiff in his complaint and brief. It was pointed
out that G. S. §41-11-which permits the sale, lease, and mortgage of
contingent remainders limited to unascertained persons-was not appli-
cable to class gifts as such and therefore did not afford any relief in
the present situation. The Court suggested that "if a sufficiently im-
poitant public necessity is involved, the extension of legislative relief
of more general application might be indicated rather than an arbitrary
judicial adjustment."
Undoubtedly, as a result of the foregoing decision the legislature
passed C. 811, which as an amendment to G. S. C. 41, constitutes G. S.
§41-11.1. The opening paragraph states the purpose of the new law
as follows: "Whenever there is a gift, devise, bequest, transfer or con-
veyance of a vested estate or interest in real or personal property, or
both, to persons described as a class, and at the effective date thereof,
one or more members of the class are in esse, and there is a possibility
-229 N. C. 757, 51 S. E. 2d 491 (1948).
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in law that the membership of the class may later be increased by one
or more members not then in esse, a special proceeding may be insti-
tuted in the Superior Court for the sale, lease or mortgage of such real
or personal property or both as provided in this section."
If the sale, lease or mortgage of real property or of both real and
personal property is sought, the petition is filed with the clerk of the
county where a part or all of the real property is situated. If personal
property alone is involved, the petition is filed in the county where any
or all of such property is located.
All members of the class in esse must be made parties to the pro-
ceeding; all who are under a legal disability are represented, as parties,
by their general guardians or by guardians ad litern. For those mem-
bers of the class who are not in esse, the clerk must appoint guardians
ad litem who are made parties to the proceeding. When the clerk finds
that the interests of all members of the class, both those in esse and those
not in esse would be materially promoted by the sale, lease, or mortgage
of any of the property, he makes an order to that effect and appoints a
trustee to carry out that order in the manner most advantageous to the
interests of all members of the class. The sale, lease, or mortgage, to
be valid must be approved and confirmed by the resident judge of the
district, or by the judge holding the courts of the district. Before the
trustee may receive the proceeds of the sale, lease, or mortgage he must
be bonded in the same manner as a guardian for minors.
If the property is sold, the proceeds of the sale are charged with
the same ownership as was the property before the sale. The trustee
may hold, manage, invest and reinvest the proceeds for the benefit of all
members of the class, in being and not in being, until the event occurs
which will finally determine the maximum membership of the class. In-
vestment of such proceeds by the trustee are to be governed by the
North Carolina laws relating to the investment of funds held by guard-
ians of minors. The entire income actually received by the trustee from
such investment must be paid by him periodically, and at least annually,
in equal shares to the living members of the class, or their guardians,
as they are constituted at the time of each such payment. Rentals from
leased property, after payment of expenses for upkeep, taxes, liens, and
encumbrances, are to be distributed in like manner by the trustee. No
legalistic rule of convenience interferes with such distribution of income.
The statute further provides that payment of income to the living
members of the class is not subject to the claims of possible members
who are yet unborn and unascertained. In other words, payment of
income to the living members is a full and final acquittance of the
amounts so paid.
Any member of the class who is of age and not under a legal dis-
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ability may sell or assign his interest (both as to principal and income)
in the funds or investments held by the trustee in case a sale of the
'property has been made under court order. Upon written notice to the
trustee by the class member selling or assigning his interest in the fund
(either as to income or principal) the trustee must recognize the pur-
chaser or assignee as the lawful successor to such interest. However,
the legal title and possession of the trustee of such funds or invest-
ments are not hereby divested nor is his administration of the trusts for
which he was appointed affected.
The statute next enumerates the limited purposes for which the
property may be mortgaged.
The trustee apopinted to serve under this act is required to file with
the clerk an inventory and annual accounts in the same manner as is
now by law required of guardians. The clerk may allow him for his
work such commissions as are now paid to executors, administrators,
and collectors.
The statute is inapplicable to cases "where the instrument creating
the gift, devise, bequest, transfer or conveyance specifically directs, by
means of a trust or otherwise, the manner in which the property shall
be used or disposed of, or contains specific limitations, conditions or
restrictions as to the use, form, investment, leasing, mortgage, or other
disposition of the property."
The statute expressly provides that it does not purport to alter or
affect in any way laws or legal principles heretofore, now, or hereafter
existing relating to the determination of the nature, extent or vesting of
estates or property interests, and of the persons entitled thereto. Con-
sonant with laws and legal principles existing without regard to this new
law, it simply provides procedures which may be utilized for the pur-
pose of promoting the best interests of all members of a class where
some are living and the maximum membership of the class is not yet
ascertained; and, in the language of the .statute: "this section shall be
liberally construed to effectuate this intent." It also provides that the
remedies and procedures herein specified shall not be exclusive but shall
be in addition to, and without prejudice to, all other remedies and pro-
cedures which now or may hereafter exist either by virtue or statute
or by virtue of the inherent powers of any court of competent juris-
diction, or otherwise.
The new law applies to instruments affecting class gifts drawn both
before and after the effective date of the statute.
We believe that the-importance of this statute has warranted this
rather long discussion of it. It seems to be well drawn. Time alone
will reveal whether or not it has any "bugs" in it.
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ADOPTION OF MINORS
In 1947 the General Assembly passed an act rewriting the statute
providing for the adoption of minors.' Because the enacting clause
required by Article II, section 21 of the Constitution was omitted the
North Carolina Supreme Court held in an advisory opinion that the at-
tempted enactment was null and void.2 Nevertheless the 1947 act was
discussed in this LAw REviEw 3 because it was believed that the next
General Assembly would be likely to re-enact the measure, possibly with
changes if changes were needed. This proved to be the case; the 1947
act, with' what the new act terms "clarifying amendments," was passed4
again as C. 300. Inasmuch as the 1947 act was commented upon as
above noted, the present discussion will be confined to the changes
made in it by C. 300. Two of the criticisms made in this LAW REVIEW
of the 1947 act have been eliminated by those changes. G. S. §48-9(a)
as rewriten in 1947 failed to make it clear that the consent of the natural
parent need be only that the child be adopted, and that consent to a
particular adoption by the natural parent is not required. This point
was clarified by specifying in G. S. §4 8-9(a) (1) as it is rewritten by
C. 300. "When the parent, parents, or guardian of the person of the
child, has in writing surrendered the child to a superintendent of public
welfare of a county or to a licensed child-placing agency and at the
same time in writing has consented generally [italics supplied] to the
adoption of the child, the superintendent of public welfare or the execu-
tive head of such agency may give consent to the adoption of the child
by the petitioners." The word "generally" was by C. 300 inserted after
the word "consented," and this together with similar phraseology else-
where in the act 5 should make it plain that the consent required of the
parent is that the child be adopted, and that the consent to the specific
adoption may be given by the superintendent or head of the agency.
Further, what was apparently an inadvertent error in the 1947 act was
cured by providing as above quoted that the superintendent or head of
the agency "may give consent," vhereas the 1947 act read, "shall give
consent."
G. S. §48-9(a) still does not make it entirely clear that the natural
parent giving general consent is bound as a party to the proceeding.
Whether he is or not is important in view of the provision of section
48-28 that after the final order of adoption is signed no party to the
proceeding may question its validity by reason of any defect or irregular-
'Sess. Laws 1947, c. 885.
'lit re Advisory Opinion, 227 N. C. 708, 43 S. E. 2d 73 (1947).
'A Survey of Statutory Changes it North Carolina in 1947, 25 N. C. L. REV.
376, 408-412 (1947).
'With an enacting clause.
' See also G. S. §48-7 as it appears in the new act.
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ity therein. But the parent giving general consent seems to be bound as
a party by language added in section 48-11 as follows, "When the con-
sent of any person or agency is required under the provisions of this
chapter, the filing of such consent with the petition shall be sufficient to
make the consenting person or agency a party of record to the proceed-
ing." Section 48-9(2) (b) requires that the filing of the general consent
with the petition.
An important criticism made of the 1947 act in this LAw REVIEW
is applicable to the 1949 act also, namely, both left out a provision of
the earlier statute which, after providing for succession, added that for
all other purposes whatsoever the child and the adoptive parents shall
be in the same legal position as they would be if the child had been
born to his adoptive parents.6 True, this is implied anyway, but such
an express declaration would have been illuminating as to legislative
attitude, and after all, the new act does expend a considerable number
of words on the subject of legislative purpose.
It is hard to see any legitimate reason for one change made by
C. 300. The 1947 act caused G. S. §48-23 to read that the adopted
child shall be entitled to inherit real and personal property "in accord-
ance with the statutes of descent and distribution." C. 300 inserted
before the above quoted words the following, "from the adoptive par-
ents." This looks like a reversion to the hostile attitude toward
adoptions prevalent in this state prior to the more enlightened legisla-
tion of 1941. 7 Moreover, confusion is introduced into the law, because
G. S. §29-1 as amended in 1947 provides, "An adopted child shall be
entitled by succession or inheritance to any real property by, through,
and from its adoptive parents the same as if it were the natural, legiti-
mate child of the adoptive parents."8  Clearly in this situation the lan-
guage of G. S. §29-1 should govern, because if there was any intention
to change that section by inserting the new words in G. S. §48-23, this
was a most obscure way of going about it. Some other intention must
have been in mind.9
G. S. §48-6.
7 See Hanft, Thwarting Adoptions, 19 N. C. L. Ry. 127 (1941).
'For a comparable provision as to personal property see G. S. §28-149, para-
graph 10 (1947 Supp.).
'A letter from Dan K. Edwards, Chairman of the House Committee on Public
Welfare, dated April 5, 1949, referring to the language inserted in G. S. §48-23
states in part: "The phrase mentioned above was included to distinguish inheri-
tance from natural parents and inheritance from adoptive parents. At all times
the child being adopted would presumably inherit from his natural parents and
it was felt that unless the phrase was included it would not be clear that the child
would also inherit from his adoptive parents as of the time of the final order.
"It was not intended to repeal any part of the Statute of Descent and Dis-
tribution and in including the phrase it was not intended to repeal G. S. 29-1,
rule 14. In fact, it seemed to the committee if the child inherited from the
adoptive parents in accordance wtih the Statute of Descent and Distribution, G. S.
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C. 300 omits a provision' formerly appearing in G. S. §48-610 which
specified that an adopted child And his natural parent could inherit
from each other only t6 prevent an escheat. Since courts tend to take
the view that an adolited child may inhert from his natural parents in
the absence of an express provision altering the laws of inheritance, 1
it would seem -that once again an adopted' child may inherit from his
natural parents as if he had not been adopted.
Specific statutory prOvigions make it clear that an adopted parent
shall be entitled to 'succeed to the personal property,12 real property' 3
and recovery for wrongful death 4 of 'the adopted child in the same
manner as they would succeed to the property" of a natural child. How-
ever, without the omitted piovision which permitted natural parents to
take from the adopted child only- to' prevent escheat, a question is likely
to arise concerning the rights of a natural parent to inherit from an
adopted child wlen the adoptive parent8 predecease the natural parents.
To avoid such inconsistencies and to make our adoption law fulfill
completely ihe social purpose adoptions are designed to serve, there
should be inserted in the adoption statute a provision that adoption shall
have all the effects of a legitimate birth to the adoptive parents at the
time of the adoption, and that such effects shall'not be limited to the
parties" to the adoption nor otherwise limited in purpose or application.
Then future legislation should be enacted with this policy always in
mind. Adoption is a type of legal and social new birth; this is what
the adoptive parents normally intend; this accomplishes the full measure
of benefit to socieiy for which this institution exists. Why should
limitations be imposed, as they usually are imposed, by persons whose
interest in adoptions is not in making any, but in hedging about and
confining those who do? If it be argued that adoptive parents should
have no legal right to bring into the family a full fledged new member
without the consent of the rest of the family the obvious answer is that
natural birth does the same thing. So does marriage, an institution
adoption resembles.
29-1, rule 14 would be one of the statutes which would control the manner and
character of the inheritance."
The view that G. S. §29-1, rule 14 still governs is further confirmed by a letter
dated April 6, 1949, from Harry McMullan, Attorney General of North Carolina,
to Mr. Dan K. Edwards, stating in part, "I am of the opinion that the Statute
of Descent and Distribution found in G. S. 29-1, Rule 14, would control, notwith-
standing the amendment to G. S. 48-23, although I must concede that the in-
sertion of the phrase 'from the adoptive parents' could lead to some question with
regard to that."
The above comments concerning G. S. §29-1 are equally applicable to G. S.
§28-149, rule 10 (1947 Supp.).
"o This provision in G. S. §48-6 passed in 1941.
114 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 411 (1936).
12G. S. §28-149 (6). 13G. S. §29-1 (15).11G. S. §28-149 (11).
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C. 300 adds a new section, 48-32, to the adoption statute and pro-
vides for readoptions. After stating that any minor child may be re-
adopted, the new section proceeds, "All provisions relating to the natural
parent or parents shall apply to the adoptive parent or parents, except
that in no case of readoption shall a natural parent be made a party to
the proceedings nor shall the consent of a natural parent be necessary."
The general idea here is a good one; it recognizes that the adoptive
parents have replaced the natural parents, and when the child is adopted
a second time, the first adoptive parents stand in the second adoption
proceeding where the natural parents stood in the first. It is a little
confusing, however, to use the words "except that" to introduce what
seems to be, not an exception to what had just been provided, but a
logical consequence. The provision that the natural parent is not to
be made a party follows from, and is not an exception to, the statement
that provisions relating to natural parents apply in readoptions to
adoptive parents. A more serious objection to this section on re-
adoptions is found in a failure to relate it to another section. By section
48-7(d) where a step-parent adopts a step-child the natural relation of
the spouse of the petitioner to the child is not disturbed. The child
is then the adopted child of one spouse and the natural child of the
other. But under section 48-32 the consent of the natural parent to a
readoption is dispensed with and no exception is made for this situation.
By and large, however, C. 300 is an improvement on the 1947 act.
Clarifying language has removed ambiguities. Also, some excellent
additions have been made, for example, the provision of new section
48-11 placing a six months' limitation on the time within which consents
may be revoked and a thirty day limitation on revocation of a general
consent given to a superintendent of public welfare or licensed child-
placing agency. This latter enables interested parties to go forward
with reasonable confidence when the thirty days have elapsed.
ATTORNEYS
Form of Certificate of Acknowledgment of Instrument Executed
by Attorney on Fact
C. 66 amending G. S. §47-43 authorizes the signing of an instru-
ment by the attorney or the attorney in fact either in the name of the
principal by the attorney or in the name of the attorney for the prin-
cipal and also validates previous instruments signed in either form al-
though the amendment does not affect pending litigation. In effect, the
amendment gives statutory approval to the judicial intimations that
either form of signature would be valid and would bind the principal.'
'Ramsey v. Davis, 193 N. C. 395, 137 S. E. 322 (1927) ; Cadell v. Allen, 99
N. C. 542, 6 S. E. 399 (1888); Oliver v. Dix, 21 N. C. 158 (1835).
2 Ramsey v. Davis, 193 N. C. 395, 137 S. E. 322 (1927) ; Cadell v. Allen, 99
N. C. 542, 6 S. E. 399 (1888).
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The amendment, however, extends beyond the judicial intimations2
and make the seal of the attorney or attorney in fact sufficient. The
judicial requirement that in order that an instrument be executed
under seal, the power of attorney must have been executed under seal,3
is retained by express provision of the amendment.
The amendatory provisions thus far discussed are clear in their
meaning. A query, however, may be raised as to whether the amend-
ment does in fact change the existing rule which requires that the body
of the instrument should be and purport to be executed in the name of
the principal by the attorney rather than in the name of the attorney for
the principal-the latter form being ineffective to convey the rights of
the principal.4 Confusion results from the change in terminology in
the amendment which commences, "When an instrument purports to
be executed by parties," in contrast with the basic statute which begins,
"When an instrument purports to be signed." As a matter of statutory
construction it could be argued that the amendment was intended to be
broader than the basic statute. The word "execute" while sometimes
used as synonymous with the word "signed" 5 frequently imports all
acts essential to the making of an effective legal document. Conse-
quently, one could reasonably deduce that the provisions of the amend-
ment relative to the signing of the instrument logically should extend
to the provisions in the body of the instrument and thus modify the
present law. On the other hand, inasmuch as the amendment must be
read in conjunction with the basic statute which specifically refers to
the signing of an instrument; and the words, "purports to be executed
by parties acting through another," is -a mere paraphrasing of the lan-
guage in the decisions ;G it is believed that in the final analysis no change
was intended in the present form requirements in the body of the in-
strument, irritating though these may be, and that the amendment was
designed solely to fix by statute an acceptable form of signature.
Appointment of Counsel for Indigent Defendants
Since the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Powell v.
Alabama,' a state court has an inescapable duty to assign counsel to
SCadell v. Allen, 99 N. C. 542, 6 S. E. 399 (1888); Harshaw v. McKesson,
65 N. C. 688 (1871); Kime v. Brooks, 31 N. C. 218 (1848); Delius v. Cawthorn,
13 N. C. 90 (1829).
'Ramsey v. Davis, 193 N. C. 395, 137 S. E. 322 (1927); Rogerson v. Leg-
gett, 145 N. C. 7, 58 S. E. 596 (1907) ; Cadell v. Allen, 99 N. C. 542, 6 S. E. 399
(1888) ; Oliver v. Dix, 21 N. C. 158 (1835).
BALLENTmNE, LAW DicrioxARY 463 (1930).
' "The deed should . . . be and purport to be that of the principal, executed
by his attorney .. ." Cadell v. Allen, 99 N. C. 542, 546, 6 S. E. 399, 401 (1888).
1 287 U. S. 45 (1932).
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an indigent defendant in a capital case.2 This right is guaranteed by
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 And inherent
in this constitutional guarantee is the principle that the accused and his
counsel shall be afforded a reasonable time for preparation of his
defense.4
The application of this "reasonable time" test has resulted in close
cases wherein the court has been forced to decide whether, under the
facts of the particular case, counsel has had an adequate opportunity to
prepare for trial.5 In the recent case of State v. Gibson." the North
Carolina Supreme Court held that in the absence of a showing of
prejudice because of lack of time for preparation, the trial would not
be held violative of due process, even though the elapsed time between
appointment and trial was but slightly more than twenty-four hours.
However, in all future trials of capital cases, by the provisions of
C. 112, "where the appointment of counsel is delayed until the term
of court at which the accused is arraigned, on motion of counsel for
the accused the case shall be continued until the next ensuing term of
criminal court." These provisions appear to be more consistent with
ordered justice and should relieve the court of further unhappy
dilemmas in this type of case.7
BANKS AND BANKING
Checks on Out-of-State Banks for Bidders' Deposits
An amendment, C. 257,' which concerns local bankers slightly but
was not sponsored by the North Carolina Bankers' Association is one
which enables bidders for State contracts and business to deposit their
2% guaranty of good faith by certified check on any bank covered by
federal deposit insurance instead of on one authorized to do business in
2 State v. Hedgebeth, 228 N. C. 259, 45 S. E. 2d 563 (1947) ; State v. Farrell,
223 N. C. 321, 26 S. E. 2d 322 (1943).
' Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 70 (1932).
' State v. Farrell, 223 N. C. 321, 26 S. E. 2d 322 (1943) ; State v. Whitfield,
206 N. C. 696, 175 S. E. 93 (1934).
' In State v. Farrell, supra three and one-half days from appointment to trial
was held inadequate for preparation of defense of insanity and violative of due
process. But cf. State v. Whitfield, supra where, under the facts of the case,
two days was held sufficient.
0229 N. C. 497, 50 S. E. 2d 520 (1948).
"C. 112 also provides a new procedure for the appointment of counsel. "When
any person is bound over to the Superior Court to await trial for an offense for
which the punishment may be death, the clerk of the Superior Court in the county
shall, if he believes that the accused may be unable to employ counsel, within
five days notify the resident judge of the district or any Superior Court judge
holding the courts of the district and request the immediate appointment of
counsel to represent the accused. If the judge is satisfied that the accused is
unable to employ counsel, he shall appoint counsel to represent the accused as
soon as may be practicable. He may appoint counsel at any time regardless of
whether notified by the clerk and before preliminary examination'
To G. S. §143-129, par. 12.
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North Carolina. Without more this only serves to make the statute
consistent with itself since the deposit required in the next paragraph as
a guaranty of faithful execution of contracts obtained has no express
limitation to banks doing business in North Carolina. But on that
basis the amendment would introduce a new inconsistency since this
second paragraph makes no requirement of federal insurance. Probably
the check required in the second paragraph means one on a bank of the
kind approved in the first paragraph. If so, a check certified by a
North Carolina bank not a member of the F.D.I.C. would not do for
either purpose. "
IDeferred Posting
In a day when all processes are being speeded up it is news to hear
of something being slowed down.2 Banks have speeded collections and
final settlements by 24 hour transit departments, by sending to one bank
for credit at another, by sending direct to drawee, using air mail, etc.
Now comes deferred posting as an adjunct to amended Federal Reserve
Regulation 3 which permits payor banks to return items until midnight
the next day after, instead of on, the day of receipt. This means not
deferred credit or settlement but deferred certainty-and one day de-
layed statements.
An American Bankers' Association press release dated April 19,
1949, stated that thirty-two states have some sort of deferred posting
statute, about equally divided between individual acts and the Asso-
ciation sponsored act. North Carolina, after consideration, adopted the
Virginia Act, it being thought the more simple and direct of the two.
Several states, however, which had their own form of legislation have
scrapped it this year in favor of the Association sponsored act. No
adequate study of this development and these statutes can here be at-
tempted. The most notable difference between the North Carolina and
the Association Act seems to be that ours relates only to checks and
theirs to demand items "payable by, at or through" a bank. The A.B.A.
act specifically validates notice of dishonor given on the next day; ours
leaves that to inference. Their act expressly makes each branch or
office of a bank a separate bank, a rule probably applicable without
statutory declaration in North Carolina. Neither statute undertakes to
determine priorities as between these tardily charged up and returnable
items and other incoming paper, stop payment orders or garnishment
" The Rand McNally Banker's Directory lists one important non-member
bank in this state, Cabarrus Bank and Trust Company, Concord, with deposits
of 28 millions.
I2 Of course labor sometimes resists a speed-up and it is interesting to note that
one of the stated advantages of deferred posting is that "work pressure is relieved
and staff morale improved." A.B.A. circular letter to member banks, Dec. 17,
1948.
'Effectii'e Jan. 1, 1949, 13 Fed. Reg. 7296 (Nov. 30, 1948).
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proceedings. That question, of when a check is "paid" is dealt with in
the proposed Commercial Code.4
Regulation of Certain Bank Charges
The charges of banks have not generally been regulated. Yet the
resemblance of banks to insurance companies and even other public
utilities is evident. A citizen cannot embark upon the banking business
at his pleasure any more than he can become an insurer or start a bus
line. He, or they, must have the permission of the public authorities. 5
In the past, when bankers earned their keep largely by interest on loans,
selection of which entailed a fine sense of business judgment, often not
exercised or possessed, the regulation of their charges for all services
was evidently not considered desirable. There were of course the self-
regulation days of the N.R.A. when the charges the banks.proposed for
themselves "brought a blow-up from" the administrator, General Hugh
S. Johnson, in the interest of the public.6 But that was a passing -base.
In recent years, however, the earnings of banks have come increasingly
from government bonds and other standard investments and from routine
services of a bookkeeping sort. Even the loans made have many of
them been guaranteed in large part by the government. With the risks
thus largely removed, the business is reduced to much more of a mechan-
ical process, and considering the partial monopoly which the banks enjoy,
arguments for regulation take on new force.
These observations are provoked by the title of C. ,1183 "An Act
to Regulate Charges Banks May Make," etc.7 What that act in fact
does is hardly to impose new regulations but to allow state banks to
make certain charges for issuing cashier's checks to deputy collectors of
revenue to remit state money which heretofore they have been required
to transmit without fee as a part of the quid pro quo to the state for the
privilege of being a bank.
When things are done free that is one thing; when charges are
allowed and the question of amount arises, it is impossible to avoid
thinking of what the services are worth and ought to cost. Add that to
a title about regulation of bank charges and the bankers in getting a
little new revenue may have started something.
'Sec. 3-629. "Obligation of Payor Bank.
"(1) Subject to the payor bank's right to charge the items received in a
single day in any order convenient to it, an item properly payable when received
takes priority for payment over all subsequent stop-orders, notices, or legal
process."
G. S. §§55-2, 53-4. Only corporations can now be authorized.
'Time, Jan. 8, 1934, p. 51. During the late 0. P. A. days banks stood out in
the business world among the few who were able to charge what the traffic would
bear.
" In full: "An Act to Regulate Charges Banks May Make for Issuing Cashiers'
Checks as a Medium for the Transmission of Funds by Deputy Collectors of
Revenue to the Commissioner of Revenue."
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Moreover the allowed charges themselves are peculiar-twenty cents
for a cashier's check up to $1000, one tenth of one per cent for the
amount over $1000. 8 That seems to make the second thousand cost
five times the first. Such a basis resembles the reputed pricing scheme
of the Korean merchant-one pair of shoes $10, two $25. Since the
labor of issuing large checks is no more than that of writing small ones
and especially considering that a cashier's check is simply the bank's
draft on itself requiring collection from it9 and giving the bank the use
of the funds for the period consumed in the collection, it is hard to
understand why the larger checks should come proportionately higher.
Indeed the absurdity is the more strikingly evident when it is noted
that the deputy collector with $2000 to remit would have to pay $1.20
for one check but seemingly could demand two checks of $1000 each
(with their added labor, at issuance and on collection) at a cost of
40 cents. In the case of postal money orders, for example, the fees run
the other way.
Industrial Banks
The ever expanding powers of these banks10 are dealt with in C. 952.
There is prefixed to the first of the amended subsections a new power
"to discount and negotiate" the common forms of commercial paper.
Before this amendment the powers were to make secured loans and "to
discount or purchase" commercial paper and choses in action." Here
we have the word discount used in its two opposite meanings in one
sentence. The bank is now clearly authorized to be on the selling as
well as on the buying end. It could only have been authorized to sell
in the past from the old language of this subsection 12 by emphasis on
the conjunction "or" as evidence of opposite intended meanings for the
word "discount" and the word "purchase," a, doubtful argument at best.
Clarity, however, would be better served by now making these con-
junctions uniform. One other unnecessary lack of uniformity is in the
detailed designation of the paper to be "discounted." It is listed in the
margin. 3 Since no difference seems to have been intended, the drafts-
man could have done better.
' An amendment seems to have gotten into the bill at one stage to authorize
different rates of charge on items under $1000. But even in that form the bill
had the defect here pointed out. In some communities national banks might hav(
to be patronized at figures not subject to state control.
' If the paper to be issued were a draft on the bank's reserve correspondent,
which is one sort of cashier's check, not usually so called and certainly not one
demanded by the statute, a greater degree of service would be rendered the State,
but there would still seem to be no reason for the increasing percentage cost in
the higher figures.
10 See annotations to G. S. §53-141, the section here amended.
Italics supplied in both quotations.
12 It might have been held an implied power generally or to raise needed money,
or, at least, as to its dealings with federal banking agencies under the power con-
ferred in paragraph 5.
"3 Sell, "promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange and other evidence of in-
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The other amendment does away with past authority for the bank
to sell its own certificates of indebtedness or investment 14 and substitutes
a quite different matter, the privilege of deducting in advance interest
at the rate of 6o per annum to maturity on an installment loan. This
is a privilege already given to commercial banks.'5 The delay in ex-
pressly giving it to industrial banks must have been an oversight since
commercial banks did not until recently deign to handle industrial type
installment small loans.
Escheat of Deposits
Two possible devices for preventing the escheat of bank deposits
of absentees which have long been apparent in the language of the act'0
have now been rendered inoperative by C. 1069.
Debits of service charges or intangible taxes are no longer to be
debits ("debts," in the language of the code supplement) which will
keep the account active and out of reach of the University. On the
other hand the crediting of interest is still left untouched for legal
reasons.' 7 Another blow at banker resistance to surrender of these un-
claimed funds is found in the new test of when a bank cannot locate the
depositor-present address unknown and mail returned undelivered at
the record address. Since there is no requirement that any mail be sent
perhaps this addition will be unproductive.
BILLS, NOTES AND CHECKS
Fictitious Payee
An agent authorized to sign checks draws one to the order of Charles
Niemann,' there being no such person, or, as is more likely, though
there exists a person of that name, the agent never intended the check
to get into his hands. Such a check is by legal definition payable to
bearer and the forgery of the "payee's" name by the agent or his con-
federate will not prevent the creation of rights against the drawer by
its delivery.2 Change the agent from a signing agent to one who only
fills in the check for the principal's or an officer's signature and the rule
under the uniform N. I. L. was otherwise. The knowledge and intent
debtedness"; buy, "notes, bills of exchange, acceptances or other choses in action."
Corporate bonds are evidences of indebtedness; chose in action is a still broader
term. Both, however, may be limited by the narrower terms that preceed them.
"4 The power cannot fairly be found in the "discount and negotiate" provisions
already discussed as that language evidently refers to the obligations of others
owned by the bank.
" G. S. §55-43, subsec. 6(a).
"o "All bank deposits in connection with which no debts or credits have been
entered within a period of five years." G. S. (1947 Supp.) §116-24. See A Sur-
vey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1937, 15 N. C. L. REV. 350 (1937).Q' Ps. A7T'y GEN. (May 31, 1946).
'The name used in the well known case of Snyder v. Corn Exch. Nat. Bk. of
Phila., 221 Pa. 599, 70 A. 876 (1908). Its approximation to the German
"niemand" may have been no accident.2 N. I. L. §9(3); Snyder case, supra, note 1.
19491
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
of the signer controlled 8 Well known doctrines of agency law argued
something for charging the principal with responsibility for not only his
signing officer's acts but for schemes of his subordinate agents which
induced the signing. The American Bankers' Association amendment
to N. I. L. Sec. 9 has been adopted by Ch. 953 to accomplish that object
in North Carolina. The knowledge of the agent "who supplies the name
of such payee" 4 now controls to make the paper payable to bearer,
though the actual practice will of course be to take the unnecessary
indorsement of the "payee" on the assumption that the paper is legally
order paper. 5
Lost Paper-Photographic Copies
Commercial paper lost in the process of collection has always given
trouble.6 Efforts to deal with the problem have culminated in some
original local legislation.7 It is made possible by the fact that micro-
film is now widely used in banking, so that facsimiles are commonly
hvailable for use. The gist of the act is (1) that this photostatic copy
of a lost or destroyed negotiable instrument payable at a bank8 may be
sent forward for payment in place of the original and must be dealt
with as the original by banks subsequent in the collection chain and by
the drawee bank; (2) that the bank which last handled the original
will be solely liable for its payment to any holder in due course who
may turn up with it.9
The Bank Collection part of Article IV of the proposed Code of
Commercial Law undertakes to deal with the same matter.10 It gives
the photographic facsimile the same effect when accompanied by a state-
' Countersignature cases presented a complication usually resolved against the
drawer. BRANNAN, N. I. L. 327 (7th ed. 1948) ; BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES, 711
(1943).
' As so stated the rule would not apply to indorsements. Cf. however, BrT-
ToN, BILLS AND NOTES, 696 (1943). "Supplying" the name has recently been
held to include a case where the dishonest agent "supplies" the name to the
signer for him to "supply" in the instrument, as well as one where the agent
"supplies" the name in the check itself. (Italics supplied.) Even Mr. Paton's
Digest of Opinions hardly seems to have had this broad interpretation in mind
but those who sponsored the act will be gratified by it. Citizens L. & S. Co. v.
Trust Co. of Ga., 53 S. E. (2d) 179 (Ga. App. 1949).
'That such is the practice seems confirmed by the cases. BRANNAN, Op. cit.
supra, note 3, at 334.
'Cf. Taft v. Quinsigamond Nat. Bk., 172 Mass. 363, 52 N. E. 387 (1899),
where the depository bank was the loser, with the deposit slip recitals now in
common use: the collecting bank "may charge back any item . . . whether re-
turned or not"; "items lost in transit may be charged back pending receipt of
duplicates"; "will not be liable for loss in the mails," etc.
7 C. 818.
' This qualification is not directly stated. See note 14, infra.
' This novel liability of the forwarding bank as drawee was not in the bill as
introduced.
10 PROPOSED CODE OF COmmERCIAL LAW (tent. draft, A. L. I. 1948) 56, §749,
extensively revised as §3-639 and now in mimeograph form. That section also
gives similar effect to transcripts of lost items not having a bank as payor.
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ment by "one or more banks" that it is the facsimile of a lost item and,
where endorsements are not shown on the copy forwarded, that the
item was not then payable to bearer. Liability is imposed on the bank
for losses from any misstatement'- and not as in our act, on the paper
itself as if the forwarding bank were drawee. Since practically all
such paper is endorsed to a bank the possibility of claims on the original
by a holder in due course are remote. This makes less startling the
idea in our act of forcing such a holder to treat the forwarding bank
which lost the instrument, a bank perhaps unknown to him as a party-
solely liable for payment to him. The situation contemplated is loss or
destruction in the mails or course of collection. Of course a blank
endorsed instrument might be stolen from a depository bank before it
is endorsed and if a photographic copy had been made (which seems
unlikely) it could be sent through and we would have a possible holder
in due course of the original after the copy had been paid.
Presumably a drawee which refused payment of the copy would be
liable to its drawer for breach of contract, 12 though till experience with
the law becomes widespread probably the drawer would be more sur-
prised to hear that his bank had paid a mere picture of his check and
to receive it with his cancelled vouchers, than he would to learn that
they had turned it down. If it was returned unpaid, nothing in the
act says that a holder of the original before its loss who now has the
copy "returned" to him can recover from the drawer on the copy.
Our act is narrower than the proposed section of the commercial
code in two respects, (1) in relating only to negotiable paper 13 and (2)
in being apparently limited to items drawn on a bank, though there is
some seeming contradiction within the act itself on this point.14  The
present act, despite some rather obvious uncertainties, promises substan-
tial relief from practical difficulties and is likely to play a part in the
shaping of the uniform act and other independent groping experiments.
"The accompanying comment to §3-639 says the bank's certificate as to the
loss "operates as a bond of indemnity in case the item subsequently turns up."
12 Rather than for slander of credit if the reason given was that they did not
pay copies of genuine orders. Presumably also the rule of Price v. Neal would
apply to payment on a forged drawing, which might be even more difficult to
detect in a photographic reproduction.
13 Their term is "item" which is defined as "any negotiable or non-negotiable
instrument for the payment of money."
"The first phraseology is "checks, notes or other negotiable instruments" but
later the act speaks of "the bank on which the same are drawn." A note payable
at a bank might fit that category with the aid of 'N. I. L. §87, G. S. §25-94.
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CIVIL PROCEDURE
Pre-Trial Hearings
North Carolina has through C. 419 followed the lead of many state
courts and the federal courts1 by providing for pre-trial hearings in
civil cases.
After issue has been joined, upon written request of counsel for
either party, filed with the clerk and served upon counsel for all other
parties, and not less than ten days prior to the term at which the case is
to be tried; or, in the discretion of the judge holding court in the dis-
trict or the presiding judge, civil cases shall be placed on the pre-trial
docket required by the statute to be kept by the clerk of court.2  The
statute, however, excludes from its operation uncontested divorce cases
and proceedings after judgment by default. It applies to special pro-
ceedings only after transfer to the civil issue docket. Except by order
of the presiding judge, no case on this pre-trial docket shall be tried
until a pre-trial order has been entered, but any case may be calendared
for trial prior to the pre-trial hearing.
Although the impetus for a pre-trial hearing may originate with
counsel; in the final analysis, the presiding judge through his power to
order a case to trial without a pre-trial order, actually determines in his
discretion which cases shall have a pre-trial hearing3 The favorable
operation of pre-trial procedure demands the intelligent and careful exer-
cise of that discretion. However, without the sympathetic interest of
the judge, pre-trial procedure will never work.4 With reference to
which cases should be called for pre-trial, one authority has maintained
that the most successful operation of the procedure demands systematic
pre-trial of virtually every type of civil case which comes before the
court.5
The statute provides that pre-trial hearings are to be held the first
day of every term of superior court for the trial of civil cases only;
preference being given to those cases on the docket which are calen-
dared for trial at the same term. The clerk of superior court is directed
to determine whether it is probable that the pre-trial docket and other
matters not requiring the -intervention of a jury will consume the first
day of the term and in accordance with such determination shall direct
the sheriff to summon the jurors for 'the first or second day of the term.
The presiding judge may devote any additional days to pre-trial hear-
ings as he may find necessary or desirable. Where both civil and crim-
'FED. R. Civ. P., 16.
2 Establishment of a pre-trial calendar is discretionary with the court under
Federal Rule 16.
, Federal Rule 16 makes pre-trial hearings discretionary wtih the court.
1 F. R. D. 371, 377 (1940).
1 F. R. D. 397, 404 (1940).
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inal matters are to be heard at the same term, the pre-trial docket shall
be the order of business after the criminal docket has been disposed of
or it may be considered earlier in the discretion of the presiding judge.
Upon agreement of counsel for all parties, the resident judge or the
regular judge holding the courts in the district may hold pre-trial hear-
ings out of term and in or out of the county or district.
The statute specifically enumerates that at the pri-trial hearing the
parties shall consider:
1. Motions to amend or supplement any pleading.
2. The settling of issues.
3. The advisability or necessity of a reference of the case either
in whole or in part.
4. The possibility of obtaining admissions of facts and documents
which will avoid unnecessary proof.
5. Facts of which the court is to asked to take judicial notice.
6. The determination of any other matters which may aid in the
disposition of the case.
7. In the discretion of the presiding judge, the hearing and de-
termination of any motion, or the entry of any order, judgment
or decree, which the presiding judge is authorized to hear, deter-
mine, or enter at term.
With very few exceptions the enumeration of the subjects for con-
sideration closely parallels the specific provisions of Federal Rule 16 or
gives recognition to its effect in practice. The ultimate test of appro-
priate matter for pre-trial consideration is that the matter may "aid in
the disposition of the case." Judge Dobie has described a similar pro-
vision in Federal Rule 16 as "an ominum gatherum clause of the very
broadest generality."6 Accordingly, there apparently is no limit to the
subject matter for consideration. Desirability of a jury trial, the limita-
tion of the number of expert witnesses, aids to discovery, rulings on
defenses and jurisdictional questions are a few of the many other mat-
ters that might aid in the disposition of the case.
Following the hearing, the statute provides that the presiding judge
shall enter an order reciting the stipulations made and the action taken.
Such order shall control the subsequent course of the case unless in the
discretion of the trial judge the ends of justice require its modification.
After the entry of the pre-trial order, the case shall stand for trial and
may be tried at the same term in which the pre-trial hearing is held or
at a subsequent term, as ordered by the judge.
Although the act was designed primarily to govern pre-trial pro-
cedure in the superior courts, it also provides that the judges of other
courts having jurisdiction to try civil cases beyond the jurisdiction of a
'1 F. R. D. 371, 375 (1940).
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justice of the peace may, in their discretion; or, shall, on request of
counsel, order a pre-trial hearing upon not less than five days' notice.
For pufposes of permitting pre-trial hearings by agreement of coun-
sel out of term, the act was effective upon ratification. With respect
to pre-trial hearings during term, the act is effective as to cases in
which issue is joined on or after October 1, 1949, except that judges
of courts other than superior courts are authorized effective October 1,
1949, to order pre-trial hearings on cases in which the issue was joined
prior to October 1.
Effective use of the pre-trial statute will require a high degree of
cooperation by both the bench and the bar.7 Through this cooperative
effort courts can be relieved of congestion, hearings can be accelerated,
expense of litigation can be reduced, settlements can be expedited, and
the element of surprise largely removed from the trial of cases.
Service of Complaint
Effective July 1, 1949, C. 1113, which amends G. S. §§1-121 and
1-125, provides a procedure for subsequent service of the complaint
when, because time for filing complaint has been extended, it has not
been served with the summons. The general plan envisoned by the new
chapter may be summarized as follows: (1) When the complaint is filed,
the clerk "shall" order the sheriff to serve it, by delivering a copy, on
each defendaflt. (2) The sheriff is to attempt service and make his
return (on the clerk's order) within ten days. (3) If the sheriff's
return shows that any defendant is not to be found in the county in
which he was served with summons (thus implying that the clerk's order
is to be issued to the sheriff of that county), and plaintiff files an affi-
davit showing that such defendant cannot, after due diligence, be found
in the state, no further attempt to serve the complaint on that defendant
is necessary. (4) A defendant served under this chapter may answer
within thirty days from the date of the service or thirty days from the
final date on which the complaint could have been filed, whichever is the
longer period; and a defendant not served may answer within thirty
days from the date of the sheriff's return or thirty days from the final
date on which the complaint could have been filed, whichever is the
longer.
It may probably be assumed that, if it is held that the statute has not
been complied with, plaintiff will not be entitled to default judgment;
and that if default judgment is nevertheless entered it will be at least
irregular. However, the draftsmanship of the amending statute leaves
' Said Judge Dobie, "I think the potential territory of pre-trial practice is
bounded on the North and South only by the purposeful ingenuity of the judge, on
the East and West only by the co-operative capacity of counsel." 1 F. R. D. 371,
376 (1940).
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much to be desired; and at least the following questions lurk in it for
future resolution by the courts:
(1) The amendment eliminates the part of G. S. §1-121 which re-
quires plaintiff to file one' copy of the complaint and authorizes the
clerk to require filing of additional copies. Presumably it is not in-
tended by this to put on the clerk the burden of having copies prepared.
But, assuming that plaintiff has such burden, if he fails to file enough
copies to go around, should the clerk order him to furnish them? And,
if a defendant is not served due to shortage of copies, may he move to
dismiss ?
(2) What happens if the sheriff, due to the press of other work or
a defendant's temporary absence from the county, fails to effect service
within the ten days? It should be remembered that we are not dealing
here with process (though the draftsman of the amendment seemed to
have a partial parallel with process in mind), and that considerations
which apply to keeping up a chain of alias and pluries summonses need
not apply. Nevertheless, it would seem the safer policy, until the matter
is clarified, to get an alias order from the clerk.
(3) What happens if the sheriff effects service, or finds that the
defendant is permanently outside the county, within the ten-day period,
but does not make his return until after that period?
(4) What of the patent discrimination against non-resident defend-
ants? If their address is known, are they less entitled to a copy of
the complaint than residents?
(5) What is the procedure when defendant is not to be found within
the county of original service, but is known to be in another county in
the state? By implication, he must be served in the latter county and
his time to answer will not begin to run until such service is made.
(6) When must the plaintiff file his affidavit that defendant is not
to be found within the state? Is such filing a prerequisite to the begin-
ning of the thirty-day period for answer? What is the consequence if
the sheriff makes his return that defendant is not to be found, but no
affidavit is filed until thirty-one days after such return, at which time
it is accompanied by entry of default judgment?
Some effort to see that defendants receive a copy of the complaint,
without having to take the initiative themselves, is praiseworthy.- But
to make the effort by a procedure which is cumbersome, costly, and
subject to technical pitfalls seems very questionable. It is suggested
that the next session of the General Assembly would be well advised
to repeal this new statute and substitute a simple provision that, when
the complaint is filed after an extension of time, plaintiff shall file with
'Cf. Wilson v. Thaggard, 225 N. C. 348, 34 S. E. 2d 140 (1945).
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it an affidavit that he has mailed a copy to each defendant at his last
known address. If no address has ever been known for a defendant,
that fact could be stated as a valid excuse for non-mailing. It should
further be provided that non-receipt of the complaint will not excuse
failure to answer within thirty days after the final date the complaint
could have been filed.
This would, as a practical matter, insure receipt of copies in the
overwhelming majority of cases, eliminate the wholly useless burden
placed on the clerk and sheriff by C. 1113, and largely eliminate the
technical snares possibly embedded in that chapter.
Demurrers and Motions to Strike
Two new amendments uhdertake to expedite the framing of issues
prior to trial. C. 146 amends G. S. §1-153 to permit "any . . . motion
to strike any matter out of any pleading" and C. 147 amends G. S.
§1-1291 to permit any demurrer to be heard out of term by the resident
judge or by the judge regularly assigned to hold the courts of the dis-
trict upon 10 days' notice to the adverse party. The amendments do
not apply to special or emergency judges since they may not constitu-
tionally be given "in chambers" or "vacation" jurisdiction.2 G. S.
§1-129 provides that if there be no agreement between the parties as to
the time and place of hearing of the demurrer, it can be heard only by
the judge holding the next term of court and at that term. Under this
provision either party is presented with an opportunity to delay the
hearing by mere failure to agree. The demurrer could not then be
heard until the next term of court, and the case would necessarily go
over to the following term before a trial upon issues of fact could be
had. Apparently C. 147 provides a method in which notice to the ad-
verse party forces a hearing on the demurrer within 10 days.
Time to Answer or Amend After Demurrer
Heretofore G. S. §1-125 has provided that defendant may answer
at any time within thirty days after final judgment overruling a de-
murrer. On the other hand, G. S. §1-131 has provided that "if the
demurrer is overruled the answer shall be filed within ten days after
the receipt of the judgment, if there is no appeal, or within ten days
after the receipt of the certificate of the supreme court, if there is an
appeal." C. 972 resolves this conflict by amending G. S. §1-131 to
specify thirty days, also. And, since G. S. §1-131 fixes with more
precision the day from which the thirty-day period is to be counted, it
appears that it will control in that respect.
' For history of previous amendments affecting this section, see McIntosh,
Changes in North Carolina Procedure, 1 N. C. L. REv. 7, 13 (1922).
2 CONST., Art. IV, §11; Shepard v. Leonard, 223 N. C. 110, 25 S. E. 2d 445(1943).
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C. 972 also changed "ten" to "thirty" elsewhere in G. S. §1-131,
with the result that plaintiff now has thirty days after a demurrer is
sustained in which to move for permission to amend.
Exceptions to Rulings on the Admission of Evidence
The prevailing practice under which an attorney takes exceptions
to adverse rulings on the admission of evidence will be rendered un-
necessary by C. 150, which provides that, in any trial or hearing (crim-
inal or civil), from and after July 1, 1949, an objection to the admission
of evidence shall be deemed to imply an exception by the party against
whom the ruling is made. It should be noted that this statute only
relates to the mechanics of entering an exception at the trial stage and
in no manner changes any existing rules of appellate procedure. This
statute was proposed by the Commission for the Improvement of Jus-
tice and is in line with the modern trend as exemplified by the American
Law Institute Model Code of Evidence, Rule 5 and the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, Rule 46.
Judge's Charge
C. 107 amends and rewrites G. S. §1-180. That section which has
provided that the trial judge shall not express an opinion on the facts
but shall state the evidence given in the case and explain the law arising
thereon has remained substantially unchanged from the time of its
original enactment in 1796 until the present amendment. The statute
has been the source of frequent litigation and has given rise to a vast
body of case law. The present amendment bids well to produce a sub-
stantial addition to the present stockpile of judicial utterances constru-
ing the statute.
The 1949 revision does not alter the provision prohibiting a trial
judge from stating his opinion on the facts. It does, however, mate-
rially change the language of the latter part of the act. Whereas the
statute as in force prior to 1949 provided that the judge, ". . . shall
state in a plain and correct manner the evidence given in the case and
declare and explain the law arising thereon," the new act provides that
the judge, "... shall declare and explain the law arising on the evidence
given in the case. He shall not be required to state such evidence
except to the extent necessary to explain the application of the law
thereto; provided the judge shall give equal stress to the contentions of
the plaintiff and defendant in civil action and to the State and defend-
ant in criminal action."
The provision in the new act to the effect that the judge need only
state the evidence to the extent necessary to explain the application of
the law thereto may be considered a codification of established case law
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for it has been repeatedly held under the old act that the court need not
recapitulate all the evidence but only that which is essential to a proper
understanding of the case by the jury.'
Under the previous act the court was not obliged to state the con-
tentions of either party. However, if the judge did state the contentions
of one he was compelled to state the contentions of the other.2 Under
the new statute the judge is to give equal stress to the contentions of
both parties. Leaving aside for a moment the matter of "equal stress"
we are at the outset confronted with the question of whether it is now
mandatory on the judge to state the contentions of the parties. Or does
the statute simply mean that if the judge states the contentions of the
parties he must do so with equal stress?
In any event we are faced with the problem of defining "equal
stress." Does it mean that the court must devote the same amount of
space in his charge to the contentions of both sides? Or is space not
the deciding factor but rather the manner in which the contentions are
stated controlling? Must the court state the contentions of both parties
with the same "warmth and vigor ?" Heretofore, it has been held that
if a trial judge devotes two thirds of a page to the contentions of one
party and two pages to the contentions of another, the party receiving
the lesser consideration could not obtain a reversal in the absence of
requesting the trial judge to make a more detailed exposition of his
contentions.4
This leads to the further question of whether or not deficiencies
under the court's charge under the present act may be taken advantage
of on appeal without counsel having called the same to the attention of
the judge at the trial or is the statute to be deemed so mandatory in
regard to the requirement of stating the contentions with equal stress
that failure of the trial judge to do so may be taken advantage of on
appeal irrespective of whether or not the matter was called to his atten-
tion at the trial? Under existing case law a party was not required to
request the court to state his contentions if the court had wholly failed
to do so while stating the contentions of the other side.5 However, if
the court did state the contentions of both parties and one of the parties
deemed the court had improperly or inadequately stated his contentions
he could not raise such deficiency as a basis for reversal unless he had
'State v. Fleming, 202 N. C. 512, 163 S. E. 453 (1932); Boone v. Murphy,
108 N. C. 187, 12 S. E. 1032 (1891).2-it re Will of West, 227 N. C. 204, 41 S. E. 2d 838 (1947).
See Bailey v. Hayman, 220 N. C. 402, 17 S. E. 2d 520 (1941) where the
Supreme Court found that the trial judge had violated G. S. §1-180 because the
warmth and vigor with which he stated the contentions of the defendant indicated
his opinion on the facts.
'Albritton v. Albritton, 210 N. C. 111, 185 S. E. 762 (1936).5 In re Will of West, 227 N. C. 204, 41 S. E. 2d 838 (1947) ; Messick v. Hick-
ory, 211 N. C. 531, 191 S. E. 43 (1937).
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called the matter to the attention of the trial judge at the time and that
gentleman had failed to remedy the deficiency.0
Much ink has been spilled on the so-called "broadside exception."
The Justices of the Supreme Court have not been in agreement as to the
validity of an exception which simply stated that the trial judge had
erred in that he failed to declare and explain the law arising on the
evidence as required by G. S. §1-180. The majority have upheld such
an exception, the minority have attacked it as inadequate because of
alleged broadsidedness. 7 The majority have held that the appellant
could sit quiet at the trial and observe the court's failure to comply
with G. S. §1-180 and then reverse him for such failure on appeal.
The minority have thought counsel should not be able to sit quiet but
should call deficiencies of the judge to his attention at the trial.8 The
present act makes no reference to the duty of counsel to call deficiencies
of the court in failing to comply with G. S §1-180 to his attention at
the trial if the same are to be urged as ground for reversal.
Just as the Supreme Court has divided on this issue in the past so
may we expect it to divide in the future. And just as members of the
Supreme Court have differed on the question of whether or not the trial
judge has expressed an opinion on the facts by reason of the warmth
and vigor which he accorded the contentions of one of the parties as
against those of the other so may we expect the Supreme Court Jus-
tices to differ on the question of whether or not the trial judge stated
the contentions of the opposing parties with "equal stress."
G. S. § 1-180 which at one time was attacked by Justice Clarkson as
being, "... . hoary with age-dead in the federal courts and discarded
in most states and a crippled germ in others,"9 is due for renewed atten-
tion by both the bench and bar as a result of C. 107. Perhaps the new
statute will lead to such further litigation and divided opinions on the
part of the Supreme Court that the legislature at a future date will see
fit to discard it in its entirety and adopt the federal practice under which
the trial judge may state his opinion on the facts and counsel shall not
be permitted to sit in silence as he hears the court inadequately charge
the jury but must call such deficiency to the attention of the trial judge
at the time if he wishes to urge the same later as a ground for reversal.10
'Wilson v. Casualty Co., 210 N. C. 585, 188 S. E. 102 (1936).7 For an interesting chronological survey of the attitude of the Supreme Court
to the "broadside exception" in so far as it relates to G. S. §1-180 see Spencer
v. Brown, 214 N. C. 114, 197 S. E. 549 (1938); Smith v. Bus Co., 216 N. C. 22,
3 S. E. 2d 362 (1939); Arnold v. Trust Co., 218 N. C. 433, 11 S. E. 2d 307(1940); Ryals v. Contracting Co., 219 N. C. 479, 14 S. E. 2d 531 (1941); and
Smith v. Kappas, 219 N. C. 850, 15 S. E. 2d 375 (1941).
'See note 7 supra.9 See Justice Clarkson's dissent in Ryals v. Contracting Co., note 7 supra.
" Meadows v. United States, 144 F. 2d 751 (C. C. A. 4th 1944) ; FED. R. Civ.
P., 51.
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Procedure on Death of a Party to an Action
When a party to an action in the superior court dies pending the
action, his death may be suggested to the clerk of the court where the
action is pending, during vacation. The clerk must then issue a sum-
mons to the party who succeeds to the rights or liabilities of the deceased
defendant. Under G. S. §1-75, which provides for this procedure,
the summons commanded the party to appear before the clerk "on a
day named in the summons, which must be at least twenty days after its
service." Effective July 1, 1949 C. 46(a) amends this procedure by
providing that the summoned party must appear before the clerk "within
thirty days after the service of the summons." If the clerk finds it
necessary to summons a party as plaintiff, and the plaintiff files an
amended complaint, the defendant now has thirty days after the notice
in which to file answer. Under G. S. § 1-75, before amended by C. 46(b)
he hid only twenty days.
C. 46(c) authorizes the clerk to extend the time of filing the answer
to a day certain "for good causes shown." This may be done only once,
and only for 20 days except with the consent of the parties.
Venue
C. 676 gives judges in any court of the state power to dismiss any
civil action without prejudice when the cause of action arose out of the
state and both the plaintiff and defendant are non-residents of this state.
In addition to giving the judges power to decline jurisdiction in their
discretion, this section gives non-resident defendants an opportunity to
request dismissal on the ground of inconvenient forum. Although G. S.
§1-83 makes provision for a change of venue when the convenience of
witnesses and the ends of justice would "be promoted by the change,
non-resident defendants in many instances would benefit little by trans-
ferring the place of trial from one county to another in the state.
CONDITIONAL SALE
Deficiency Judgment After Exercise of Power of Sale
in a Conditional Sale
C. 856 provides for recovery of a deficiency after exercise of a
power of sale contained in a conditional sale or granted by statute with
respect to conditional sales.2 The new act would seem to preclude a
'Most of the language of C. 856 follows verbatim the Uniform Conditional
Sales Act, section 22.2 Such a statutory power of sale is provided in the case of conditional sales
by G. S. (1943) §45-24. C. 856 does not quite fit this existing statute, because
the latter authorizes the application of the proceeds of the sale to the debt and
interest, and costs of foreclosure, whereas C. 856 authorizes recovery of a de-
ficiency above the expenses of the sale, the balance due upon the price, and the
expenses of'retaking, keeping and storing the goods. Unless the expenses of
retaking, keeping, and storing the goods are "costs of foreclosure," §45-24 does
not authorize application of the proceeds of the sale to such expenses.
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holding that retaking the goods is inconsistent with an action for a
deficiency.3  But since the supreme court of the state holds that in this
state conditional sales are chattel mortgages4 separate statutes relating
to conditional sales would appear to be unnecessary. But the view of
the court is ill advised5 and has probably escaped correction by the legis-
lature because it has been ignored in practice. If, for example, con-
ditional vendors in large numbers were 'to assert their right to possession
as mortgagees3 of automobiles although the buyers were not in default,
there is little doubt that the law would be promptly changed. The pres-
ent statute is an indication that the legislature does not consider a con-
ditional sale to be a chattel mortgage, notwithstanding the view of the
court.
Recordation of Conditional Sales Agreement
The status of personal property sold under conditional sales agree-
ment or otherwise encumbered in another state and then removed into
this state is the subject of further treatment by C. 1129.1 The act pro-
vides that, "No mortgage, deed of trust, or other encumbrance2 created
upon personal property while such property is located in another state
is or shall be a valid encumbrance upon said property which has been,
or may be, removed into this state as to purchasers for valuable con-
sideration without notice (and as) 3 to creditors, unless and until such
mortgage, deed of trust, or other encumbrance is or was actually regis-
tered or filed for registration in the proper office in the state from which
the same was removed."
The statute is apparently designed to get away from the rule laid
down by the Supreme Court in 1947 in General Finance & Thrift Cor-
poration v. Guthrie.4  In that case the court held that a conditional
'For such holdings, criticism thereof, and authority contra, see VOLD, SALES
291 (1931).
' "By the express terms of the law, therefore, and under various decisions
construing the same, these conditional sales are to be regarded in this jurisdiction
as chattel mortgages... ." Observer Co. v. Little, 175 N. C. 42, 43, 94 S. E.
526, 527 (1917) ; Note, 21 N. C. L. REv. 387 (1943).
'Note, 21 N. C. L. REv. 387 (1943).
* Ibid.
1 North Carolina has adopted the majority view that under principles of
comity a conditional sales agreement, or chattel mortgage valid in the state where
the property was sold and delivered is valid in this state without subsequent
registration; Truck Corporation v. Wilkins, 219 N. C. 327, 13 S. E. 2d 529 (1941);
and Carriage Co. v. Dowd, 155 N. C. 307, 71 S. E. 721 (1911).
1 While the statute does not expressly use the words "conditional sale" the law
is well settled in this state that such a title retaining contract is in effect a chattel
mortgage and an encumbrance on the property and consequently is within the
purvue of the statute. See Observer Co. v. Little, 175 N. C. 42, 94 S. E. 526
(1918) ; State v. Stinnett, 203 N. C. 829, 167 S. E. 63 (1932), 11 N. C. L. REV.
321.
' The words in parentheses do not appear in the statute but would seem to be
an obvious omission.
'227 N. C. 431, 42 S. E. 2d 601 (1947), Note in 26 N. C. L. REv. 173.
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vendor of an automobile sold in Georgia was not entitled to a peremp-
tory instruction as against a purchaser of the car in North Carolina if
it appeared that the car was removed to North Carolina prior to the
recordation of the conditional sales agreement in Georgia. Under the
Guthrie case recording of the conditional sales agreement in Georgia
after the removal of property to North Carolina would be of no effect
in this state. Under ,the new statute the subsequent recording in the
state of sale would be effective from the date thereof.
CORPORATIONS
Pending a complete and needed revision of the corporation law,
studies for which are now in progress by the Statutes Revision Com-
mission, that act is a favorite for tinkering at each session both in the
interest of improvement and of lawyers with some specific ailment to
cure. In C. 917 we abandon the long standing policy1 of requiring
directors to be stockholders though such a requirement may still be put
in the articles or by-laws. We thus go over toward the present English
view of a paid directorate. The idea that directors should have a stake2
in the business has long been a dead letter in light of the accepted prac-
tice of issuing "directors' qualifying shares," often paid for by others
and then blank endorsed. This amendment recognizes things as they
are. If, on the other hand, the incorporators put a shareholding require-
ment in the charter, they are more likely to make the requirement mean
something.
C. 950 does away with the necessity of publishing in case of a de-
crease of capital stock and of course with the concomitant penalty on
directors and stockholders for failure to publish.3 Newspaper repre-
sentatives must have been asleep when this subtraction from their rev-
enues went through; or perhaps, it was too small to be worth resisting.
The requirement of public filing4 is left untouched.
Under C. 929 a majority of voting shares instead of the two-thirds
now required, may by resolution authorize the issuance of non-par shares
and fix their status. The serious question of how far such determina-
tions are subject to judicial control to prevent unfairness to one or an-
other stockholder group6 is left untouched, as perhaps it should be,
'Heretofore in G. S. §55-48 and dating back to P. L. 1901, C. 2, §44.
2 See Archer's Case [1892], L. R. 1 Ch. Div. 322; BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS,
377 (1927).
'G. S. §55-66. In its original form as H. B. 660 it would have prevented the
decrease of capital stock by the device of reducing par value. Since that is one
of the simplest methods of dealing with a capital impairment and has other
advantages that privilege was well left in the corporation law as the bill finally
went through.
"G. S. §55-31. r G. S. §55-73.
See Atlantic Refining Company v. Hodgman, 13 F. 2d 781 (C. C. A. 3rd(1926).
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though the need of some control is evident enough.
Stock transfers are facilitated and established practices are sanctioned
by an amendment" allowing facsimile signatures of corporate officers
where an established transfer agent, usually a bank or trust company,
and registrar sign on behalf of the corporation. The slight practical
importance of officers' signatures where transfer agents are employed is
further recognized by declaring valid a certificate issued, and so adopted,
by the corporation notwithstanding the previous death or resignation of
the signing officer (or the one whose engraved signature was affixed).
United States paper currency is the best known example of this general
principle.
Corporate chattel security transactions are dealt with in two ways
by C. 1224. An amendment to the conditional sale contract section8
makes it specifically relate also to chattel mortgages and chattel deeds of
trust (trust receipts?), and thus validates such paper signed by a prin-
cipal officer with an acknowledgment, for which a form is provided in
the same act as an amendment to a section of the chapter on probate and
registration.9
Corporate conveyances of real property also get attention-attention
in fact so specific as to suggest that the oxygen tank was being wheeled
in for a badly ailing particular transaction. The committee substitute for
H. B. 910 validates a conveyance of North Carolina realty by a foreign
corporation since dissolved, notwithstanding some particularly described
formal defects in attestation by the then officers. This bill became an
independent act not in terms annexed to any section of the corporation
law. It could properly have gone onto G. S. §55-41.
COURTS
Domestic Relations Court
Heretofore, G. S. §7-110 has provided that, upon establishment of a
domestic relations court under Article 13 of G. S. Chapter 7, all cases
pending in superior court which are within the jurisdiction of the new
court are to be transferred to the latter. C. 600 amends G. S. §7-110
with the obvious intent to provide that all such actions pending in in-
ferior courts in the county shall likewise be transferred. It probably
accomplishes this purpose, but because it fails to insert new language
at one of three appropriate places, a literal interpretation of the amended
section would render the amendment ineffective.
This Article is also affected by C. 420, which amends G. S. §7-101
To G. S. §55-67 by C. 809.8 G. S. §55-43, still entitled only Conditional Sales Contracts. A misprint
makes the added language read "Sales or personal property."
o G. S. §47-41. Corporate conveyances.
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to permit a domestic relations court to be established by the county com-
nissioners in a county having a population of 85,000 or more, even
though the population of the county seat does not equal or exceed 25,000
(the latter being a requirement under the prior law).
Justices of the Peace
C. 1091 would enable 26 counties, at the option of the board of
county commissioners, to limit the number of justices of the peace in
accordance with need, to put them on a salary instead of a fee basis of
compensation, and to have them appointed for two-year terms by the
resident judge of the superior court, subject to removal by him for
cause. Interim vacancies would be filled by appointment of the clerk
of the superior court. Each justice would have county-wide jurisdiction
and would sit in such places and quarters as were designated and pro-
vided by the board of county commissioners. So far, the new statute
i a laudable step in the improvement of the administration of justice
at this level,' though it is regrettable that the act was made inapplicable
to 74 of the 100 counties in the state.
There are four serious questions raised by the terms of the act.
(1) It may be unconstitutional as a local or special law relating to
the appointment of justices of the peace.2 True, in In re Harris,8 under
another provision of the constitutional ban on local and special legisla-
tion, the Supreme Court in 1922 upheld a law establishing recorders
courts in 56 counties, 44 being excepted; and in 1919 in an advisory
opinion 4 upheld the "oinnibus bill" for legislative appointment of jus-
tices of the peace. The present situation, however, is distinguishable
on the facts and the justification.
(2) The act becomes effective November 1, 1950. The county boards
are authorized to act on the first Monday in March, 1950, or any other
even numbered year thereafter, for the term beginning the first Mon-
day of the following December. Would a county board resolution in
March, 1950, with its consequences of expiration of old terms and
judicial appointments for new terms, be valid 8 months before the act
becomes a law?
(3) Once a county has adopted the new, law, on the first Monday
in March, the terms of office of all justices of the peace in that county,
other than those appointed by the judge of the superior court, will ex-
' See Battle, North Carolina Magistrates, 6 N. C. L. Rav. 349 (1928);
-Winslow, reviewing The Court of Justice of the Peace for North Carolina, 19
N. C. L. Rav. 272 (1941) ; and the addresses, committee reports and discussions
in the following Reports of the N. C. Bar Ass'n: Vol. 32, page 194 (1930), Vol.
40, page 115 (1938), Vol. 41, page 152 (1939).
IN. C. CoNsT. Art. II, §29.
:183 N. C. 633, 112 S. E. 425 (1922).
'227 N. C. 717, rendered Feb. 27, 1919, published 1947. See EdsalU, The
Advisory Opinion in North Carolina, 27 N. C. L. Rav. 297, 315 (1949).
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pire one week later, on the second Monday in March. But the new
appointees will not take office until the next December. Is the county
to be without any justice of the peace for 9 months? Or would the
incumbents hold over until their successors have qualified?
(4) The act unqualifiedly repeals G. S. §7-113, providing for town-
ship elections of justices of the peace, §7-115, providing for their appoint-
ment by the governor, and a part of §7-114, providing for the filling
of vacancies. Presumably, these repeals would become effective Novem-
ber 1, 1950, in only the 26 counties where the act is applicable. But
nothing here depends upon county board adoption. Does this mean
that in all of those 26 counties, even if none or only a few adopt the
necessary resolution, selection of justices of the peace henceforth is con-
fined to legislative appointments?
These difficulties appear to be inadvertant by-products of the piece-
meal amendments of what was originally a mandatory, state-wide meas-
ure. Fortunately, the 1951 General Assembly can revise the law 10
weeks after it goes into effect. That, however, may come too late,
except for curative legislation, for counties which may have attempted
to take advantage of the law in March, 1950.
Juvenile Courts
C. 976 amends G. S. §110-40 so as to regulate in some detail the
procedure for appeals from the juvenile courts' to the superior court.
Formerly, this section merely provided that "such appeal shall be taken
in the manner provided for appeals to the superior court." The new
provisions relate to the preparation of and exceptions to the statement
of the case on appeal, the ruling on questions of law by the resident or
regular judge of the superior court, and the trial of issues of fact. Time
limits are designed to assure promptness in the completion of appeals
and in rulings on questions of law, and trials of issues of fact are given
a limited priority.
Most of the appellate litigation concerning the juvenile courts has
involved their jurisdiction over the custody of children, as compared
with that of the superior court on habeas corpus.2  The new statute
appears to have no relation to that problem.
Rather, it is understood that the bill for this act was drafted by the
commission to study the statutes relating to domestic relations, and spon-
sored by the state department of public welfare, for the purpose of
speeding appeals from the juvenile courts. County superintendents of
ISee generally, SANDERS, JUVENILE COURTS IN NORTH CAROLINA (1948).
' On appeal from the juvenile court: Winner v. Brice, 212 N. C. 294, 193
S. E. 400 (1937); In re Prevatt, 223 N. C. 833, 28 S. E. 2d 564 (1944). On
habeas corpus in the superior court: In- re Thompson, 228 N. C. 74, 44 S. E. 2d
475 (1947) ; Phipps v. Vannoy, 229 N. C. 629, 50 S. E. 2d 906 (1948).
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public welfare had found that when, on occasion, a juvenile court ordered
a child removed from his own home because of unwholesome home con-
ditions, the parents would appeal and one way or another delay the
final disposition of the case for many months. Meanwhile, the child
remained under conditions that had been determined to be contrary to
his welfare.
Superior Courts
C. 393 submits to the voters at the November 7, 1950, general elec-
tion a proposed revision of Article IV, section 10 of the state constitu-
tion, reading as follows: "Judicial Districts for Superior Courts. The
General Assembly shall divide the State into a number of judicial dis-
tricts which number may be increased or reduced and shall provide for
the election of one or more Superior Court judges for each district.
There shall be a Superior Court in each county at least twice in each
year to continue for such time in each county as may be prescribed by
law."
This was one of the recommendations of the commission for the
improvement of the administration of justice,1 created by the 1947 Gen-
eral Assembly. In its report,2 the commission thus discusses this par-
ticular proposal:
"The new draft of Section 10 proposed by us offers a simple solu-
tion of a problem which has often given the General Assembly much
difficulty-the problem of securing sufficient judicial manpower. We
propose that Section 10 be so rewritten as to permit the General Assem-
bly, whenever it thinks such action wise, to provide for the 'election of
one or more Superior Court judges for each district.' The other features
of this section are retained. The General Assembly is left with power
over judicial districts and the guarantee of two terms of Superior Court
a year to each county is repeated. The entire substance of the change
we proposed is found in the words 'one or more.'
"As indicated before, our object here is to make easily available addi-
tional judicial manpower when and where it is needed. Under the Con-
stitution as it now stands there are two ways, neither entirely satis-
factory, of meeting this problem. The state may be redistricted or the
appointment by the Governor of Special Judges may be authorized. The
difficulties of redistricting are well-known. Inevitably, it involves, for
a time at least, great inconvenience and confusion. Moreover, any
redistricting bill is almost certain to collide with serious political ob-
stacles. These considerations aside, redistricting can never solve the
'A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1947, 25 N. C. L. REv.
376 (1947).
'The full report of the commission may be found in Popular Government,
Jan., 1949, p. 1. That part of the report here quoted is at pages 2-3.
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problem when a single city requires two judges-a possibility perhaps
not too remote in North Carolina. The Special judge solution has much
to recommend it in some situations. However, so long as it stands
alone and is not utilized simply as a part of a broader solution, it leaves
much to be desired. It does not relieve the regularly elected resident
judges of any of the burdens of the chambers work in their districts.
In our more heavily populated areas, this type of work is making in-
creasingly heavy demands on the time of the judges. Yet, regardless
of the number of Special Judges, the regularly elected judges can not
share with them many responsibilities which are enormously burdensome.
"The desirability of the change we propose becomes apparent when
the situation in the 14th Judicial District is considered. In this District,
there are regularly over 100 weeks of court a year. This means that
there are practically always two judges holding court in this District at
one time, and sometimes, three. Of course, this is possible only because
of the relief afforded by the Special Judge system. But this system
affords little relief to the resident judge in the discharge of his out-of-
court duties although these duties are correspondingly as heavy as the
court schedule. In such a situation, it seems apparent to us that the
proper remedy is not to throw the whole State into turmoil by redis-
tricting or to add Special Judges. What is needed is another regularly
elected judge from the 14th District. Quite plainly, there is more than
enough work for two judges in that district. Under our proposal, the
General Assembly could provide for this second judge, or a third if he
should ever be needed. Relief could be directed to the exact locality
in which it was needed.
"Two questions will arise about the workings of such a plan. First,
how will it fit into the rotation system? Our thought is that in any dis-
trict which has two regular judges, a judge rotating into that district
will remain a year rather than six months as at present. The Courts
of the district would be divided into two schedules. Six months would
be spent on each schedule and, at the expiration of every six months
period, one judge would leave the district. Perhaps a simple way of
stating the result would be to say that a judge would take two steps in
passing through a district rather than one.
"The second question is: How will the plan affect the existing Spe-
cial Judge system? Our answer is that there will still be need for the
Special Judges. We are justified, we believe, in thinking that the Gen-
eral Assembly will not authorize the election of an additional judge in
a district unless there is clearly enough work for two judges to do. But
there will be many districts, as now, where there is not such an amount
of work but still more than a single judge can meet. So long as such a
situation prevails, we must have Special Judges. Our plan only leads
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to a situation where this number might be reduced, but it in no way
contemplates the abandonment of the system. The plan has the merit
of simplicity and we support it unanimously."
C. 775 submits to the voters at the November 7, 1950, general election
a proposed revision of Article IV, section 11 of the state constitution,
reading as follows: "Judicial Districts; Rotation; Special Superior Court
Judges; Assignment of Superior Court Judges by Chief Justice. Each
judge of the Superior Court shall reside in the district for which he is
elected. The General Assembly may divide the state into a number of
judicial divisions. The judges shall preside in the courts of the differ-
ent districts within a division successively; but no judge shall hold all
the courts in the same district oftener than once in four years. The
General Assembly may provide by general laws for the selection or
appointment of Special or Emergency Superior Court Judges not
assigned to any judicial district, who may be designated from time to
time by the Chief Justice to hold court in any district or districts within
the state; and the General Assembly shall define their jurisdiction and
shall provide for their reasonable compensation. The Chief Justice,
when in his opinion the public interest so requires, may assign any
Superior Court Judge to hold one or more terms of Superior Court in
any district."
This was one of the recommendations of the commission for the
improvement of the administration of justice. In its report the com-
mission thus discusses this particular proposal:
"The redraft of Section 11 which we are presenting has three prin-
cipal objects. They are: (1) The transfer to the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the authority now exercised by the Governor in
respect to the assignment of judges. (2) A grant of authority to the
General Assembly to define the jurisdiction of the Special and Emer-
gency Superior Court judges. (3) The elimination from the Constitution
of the requirement that judges rotate and making such rotation a matter
of legislative discretion. 4
"Without intending any criticism of the manner in which our Gov-
ernors have exercised the authority vested in them to assign judges, we
believe that in our form of government such authority properly belongs
to the judicial department. The problem of which judge to assign to
'Id. at pp. 3-5.
'The third part of the proposal was recommended by a majority of the 23
members of the commission; a minority of 7 thought the present constitutional
requirement of rotation should be retained. The General Assembly agreed with
the minority. Thus the proposed revision of sec. 11 does not contain any pro-
vision authorizing the General Assembly to modify the rotation system, or to
abolish it. That part of the commission's report has been omitted here. CoInpare
Bobbitt, The Rotation of Superior Court Judges, 26 N. C. L. Rav. 335 (1948)
Paschal, The Rotation of Superior Court Judges, 27 N. C. L. Rav. 181 (1949).
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hold a particular term of court may involve a keen appreciation of
judicial skills. It seems to us reasonable to suppose that the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court is the officer in our government likely,
year in and year out, to discharge these functions most successfully.
By training and experience, he will be able readily to assess the needs
of a particular county and to know the judge best fitted to meet those
needs.
"We urge that the Chief Justice be given these powers for another
reason. It is our belief that the successful administration of justice,
like any great labor, requires unified direction. Obvously, the Chief
Justice of our Supreme Court is the public officer who can best be
expected to supply this unity. But he cannot do so if the administrative
direction of the judicial system is in other hands. Our proposal is a
beginning towards making the office of Chief Justice the decisive one
in the administration of justice in this State. We contemplate that
through this and other measures, the Chief Justice will be not only the
presiding officer of our highest court but the chief judicial officer of
the entire State to whom all others in the judicial department will be
responsible. He would inform himielf of the needs of the various sec-
tions of the State, of how the task of administering justice is being
performed and of the proper measures to take or recommend to others
for improvement. And the people of the state could hold him responsible
for the performance of such duties. When difficulties arose, the people
would know to whom to turn for remedial action.
"Of course, we do not expect the Chief Justice to assume the admin-
istrative responsibility of the entire judicial system unless he is furnished
the necessary assistance. But for the fact that any such recommendation
would be premature before our amendment is accepted, we would in
this report urge the establishment of the Office of Administrative
Assistant to the Chief Justice. Such an office would perform for the
judicial system of North Carolina a work comparable to that now done
for the United States Courts by the federal Administrative Office in
Washington. It would collect and publish' quarterly a set of judicial
statistics which would enable one to know the status of the administra-
tion of justice anywhere in the State. If such statistics should demon-
strate the need for more courts in a particular locality, they could be
provided. If they revealed in certain areas a marked prevalence of
particular types of cases, the Chief Justice could assign to those areas
the judges most skillful in the trial of such cases. In short, such an
office would make possible an administration of justice based on valid
information rather than conjecture. The business of our courts is much
too enormous and affects the lives of our people in too many ways for
us not to supply it with the most excellent administrative supervision
1949]
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at our command. It seems to us that the Chief Justice is the one whom
we may expect to discharge this task most successfully. We therefore
unanimously urge that this beginning be made in giving him the author-
ity to do the job.
"The part of our redraft of Section 11 which proposes that the
General Assembly be given authority to define th5 jurisdiction of the
Special and Emergency Judges is a much less complex question. The
Constitution as it now stands says that such judges 'shall have the power
and authority of regular judges of the Superior Courts, in the courts
which they are ... appointed to hold.' Our Supreme Court has inter-
preted this language to mean that a Special or Emergency Judge has no
out-of-court jurisdiction. His powers are wholly dependent on his com-
mission from the Governor to hold a term of court. This results in
some confusion and much inconvenience. Special Judges are unable to
act in many matters which they could settle to the satisfaction of all
parties concerned.
"To remedy this situation, we propose simply that the General
Assembly be given authority to define the jurisdiction of the Special
Judges. The desirability of such an amendment can hardly be ques-
tioned and we endorse it without reservation."
Special Judges
The authority of the Governor to appoint from four to eight special
judges of the Superior Court is renewed by C. 681, the provisions of
which are identical, except as to dates, with present G. S. §§7-54 through
7-61.
CRIMINAL LAW
Larceny and Receiving Stolen Goods
Heretofore, the offense of receiving stolen goods has been classified
a misdemeanor by the terms of G. S. §14-71. Section 1 of C. 145
amends this section by substituting the words "criminal offense" for
the word "misdemeanor."
The effect of this change is made apparent when it is considered in
conjunction with another change made by section 4 of the same chapter.
This section provides that wherever the offenses of larceny and receiv-
ing stolen goods are declared "misdemeanors" by Article 16, Sub-
Chapter V, Chapter 14 of the General Statutes, as amended, they shall
be "petty misdemeanors" and that jurisdiction over them is vested in
all courts which now possess jurisdiction of misdemeanors which are
punishable in the discretion of the court. The purpose of these changes
then is to diffuse to the "local" courts of the state jurisdiction over
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those various statutory offenses of larceny formerly classified as "mis-
demeanors" by Article 16, while retaining in the superior courts ex-
clusive jurisdiction over larceny the felony and receiving goods whose
taking constituted a felony, since the latter offense is now denominated
a "criminal offense."
C. 145 further amends the jurisdictional aspect of the offenses of
larceny and receiving by raising the dividing line drawn by G. S. §14-72
between larceny the misdemeanor and larceny the felony from fifty to
one hundred dollars. As amended, section 14-72 provides that larceny
or receiving stolen goods when either involves property valued at one
hundred dollars or less is a petty misdemeanor punishable in the dis-
cretion of the court.
G. S. §14-73 is similarly amended, so that now the exclusive orig-
inal jurisdiction of the superior courts is over such offenses involving
property of the value of more than one hundred dollars.
Life Imprisonment in Capital Cases
A proposal by the Commission for the Improvement of Justice' that
a recommendation of mercy by the jury in all capital cases automatic-
ally carry with it a life sentence was partially enacted into law by C.
299, amending G. S. §14-17 (murder); G. S. §14-52 (burglary); G. S.
§14-58 (arson) and G. S. §14-21 (rape), by inserting the phrase "pro-
vided, if the jury, at the time of rendering the verdict in open court,
shall so recommend, the punishment shall be imprisonment for life in
the State's prison, and the court shall so instruct the jury." This pro-
vision was, in effect, already the law in burglary and arson cases.
The bill proposed by the Commission provided for the life sentence
proviso in all capital cases. However, although the substitute bill en-
acted must certainly have intended to cover all such cases, there remain
on the books at least two statutes providing the death penalty which are
not, by its terms, included. G. S. §14-20 provides that the survivor in
a duel where his adversary is killed shall suffer death. G. S. §14-278
provides that where by reason of the commission of any of the offenses
of malicious injury to property of railroads enumerated therein, any
engine or car shall be displaced from the track, or shall be stopped,
hindered or delayed so that anyone thereby is killed, 'the party so
offending, his counselors, aiders and abettors, on conviction shall suffer
death.
It is submitted that the existence of these two statutes, unamended,
though not likely to be invoked to support a conviction, do represent
inconsistency in the state's policy as expressed in C. 299 and that
appropriate action, removing this inconsistency, should be forthcoming.
' See Report of the Commission for the Improvement of Justice, PoPrU.A
GovERxMENT, Jan. 1949, p. 13, col. 3.
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Punishment for Assault
C. 298 accomplishes a general structural clean-up of G. S. §14-33,
which was clumsily constructed, by rewriting it in outline form. It
makes one change of substance: hereafter an assault by a defendant
over 18 years of age upon a person under 12 years of age where no
deadly weapon is used nor serious damage done is punishable by fine
and/or imprisonment in the court's discretion. Heretofore no such dis-
tinction based on age of the parties was made, and conviction in such
a case would have carried a maximum punishment of fifty dollars or
thirty days. Parents, teachers and others in loco parentis are specifically
excluded from operation of the act.
Weapons
Heretofore, conviction of carrying concealed a pistol or gun resulted
in a different punishment from that following conviction of carrying any
of the other types of deadly weapons specified in G. S. §14-269: fifty
to two hundred dollars or thirty days to two years instead of fine or
imprisonment in the court's discretion. C. 1217 abolishes this differ-
ence by amending G. S. §14-269 so that hereafter punishment for this
offense will be fine or imprisonment in the court's discretion regardless
of the type weapon involved.
Hereafter, pistols and guns involved in cases of carrying concealed
weapons where convictions result will not, as formerly, be either de-
stroyed or turned over to their rightful owners other than the defend-
ant, but will either (1) go to their owners other than the defendant, (2)
be sold at public auction by the clerk of superior court, or (3) be re-
turned to the defendant "when the facts so justify" by order of the
presiding judge.
The act also provides specifically, and differently from the original
statute, that the prohibited action is to "wilfully and intentionally carry
concealed. . . ." This apparently adds nothing of substance to pre-
existent law, since the cases have consistently required that both the
carrying1 and concealment 2 be intentional, although the intent was not
required in terms by the statute.
Prior to amendment by this act, G. S. §14-269 provided that mere
possession of a deadly weapon about one's person while not on his own
land constituted prima facie evidence of concealment thereof, which
placed the burden of rebutting this presumption on the defendant. This
legal presumption was removed from the statute by this act.
Finally the act corrects what was certainly an oversight by provid-
ing that the statute shall not apply to personnel of the "Armed Forces"
'E.g., State v. Reams, 121 N. C. 556, 27 S. E. 1004 (1897).
,E.g., State v. Brown, 125 N. C. 104, 34 S. E. 549 (1899).
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rather than just to personnel of the "U. S. Army" carrying weapons
under orders.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Calendar of Cases
C. 169 requires a calendar of cases for all terms of the superior
court for the trial of criminal cases. At least one week before the be-
ginning of any term of the superior court for the trial of criminal cases
the solicitor is required to file with the clerk of the court a calendar of
the cases he intends to call for trial at that term. The calendar fixes a
day for the trial of each case included therein. All cases which require
consideration by the grand jury may be placed on the calendar for the
first day of the term, without obligation on the part of the solicitor to
call such cases for trial that day. The solicitor cannot call a case for
trial before the day set on the calendar except by consent or by the
order of the court. Cases docketed after the calendar has been fixed
and filed may be placed on the calendar at the solicitor's discretion.
Witnesses are to be subpoenaed to appear on the day listed for the trial
of the case in which they are witnesses.
Warrants
C. 168 amends G. S. §15-22 to allow a warrant issued by a justice
of the peace or the chief officer of a city or town to be executed in any
county of the state without having been indorsed by a resident magis-
trate when there is attached thereto a certificate of the clerk of supe-
rior court of the county where issued certifying that (1) the issuing
officer is a justice of the peace or the chief officer of a city or town in
the county and (2) the warrant bears such official's genuine signature.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Abandonment of the Family
C. 810 amends G. S. §14-322 to make a mother, as well as a father,
guilty of a misdemeanor for wilful abandonment of children under 18
years of age without providing adequate support, and to make such
abandonment by a mother a continuing offense. Furthermore, both
parents are made liable for abandonment of adopted children as well as
natural children, in line with the revisions to G. S. C. 48 giving adopted
children greater rights and privileges with respect to their adopted
parents.
Annulment-Service by Publication
C. 85 by adding a new section to G. S. §1-98 provides for service
of summons by publication of a notice, under the general provisions of
1949]
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G. S. §1-98, where the action is for an annulment of marriage. Prior
to this amendment, where the action was for the annulment of marriage,
service of summons was required under G. S. §1-88.
C. 256 amends G. S. §1-108 by including annulment within the
exception that where a defendant in a divorce or annulment action is
served by publication, the defendant is not allowed to defend after judg-
ment has been rendered by the court. In some other instances of sub-
stituted service, notably motor vehicles, the defendant may defend after
judgment.
Thus these two amendments, together, provide for service by pub-
lication where the action is for annulment of marriage, and a defendant
so served cannot enter a defense after judgment.
Custody of Children
The juvenile court is given exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases wherein the custody of children under 16 years of age is in con-
troversy,' but the superior court has jurisdiction in those cases where
the custody of a child is in controversy between its parents. G. S.
§17-39 permits adjudication under a writ of habeas corpus of the custody
of a child born of the marriage when the parents are living in a state
of separation without being divorced; G. S. §50-13 gives custody juris-
diction to the superior court in any action for divorce, in which a com-
plaint has been filed, pending in this state, and the same statute provides
for determination of custody of children of parents divorced in another
state by a special proceeding in the superior court. Both of these stat-
utes require a controversy between the parents. Some doubt has existed
over jurisdiction in controversies between one parent and a third party
until in the case of Phipps v. Vannoy,2 it was held that the superior
court did not have jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings to deter-
mine custody between a father and the child's maternal grandparents
when the mother had secured custody in the divorce action but was
now dead. Original jurisdiction was held to lie in the juvenile court.3
C. 1010 intends to overrule this case and give the superior court
jurisdiction in all cases where one of the parents is seeking custody.
It amends G. S. §50-13 to provide that controversies respecting the
custody of children not provided for in G. S. §50-13 and G. S. §17-39
may be determined in a special proceeding instituted by either of the
parents, or by the surviving parent if the other be dead, in the superior
court of the county wherein the petitioner, or the respondent or child
:G. S. §110-21(3).229 N. C. 629, 50 S. E. 2d 906 (1948).
'In re Hamilton, 182 N. C. 44, 108 S. E. 305. Cf. In re TenHoopen, 202
N. C. 223, 162 S. E. 619.
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at the time of filing said petition, is a resident.4 The determination is
to be made by the resident judge in the manner now provided in G. S.
§50-13 for determining custody of children of parents who have been
divorced outside of North Carolina.
Divorce
C. 264 amends G. S. §§50-5, 50-6, 50-8 by providing that the resi-
dence requirement of six months in North Carolina before bringing an
action for divorce is satisfied by such residence of the plaintiff or the
defendant. Provided, that if the plaintiff is a non-resident, the action
shall be brought in the county of the defendant's residence and summons
shall be personally served upon the defendant.
C. 264 eliminates the former provision of G. S. §50-5 which re-
quired the testimony of a psychiatrist who had no connection with the
institution in which the insane spouse was confined where the divorce
is sought on the ground of incurable insanity.
Marriage, Protection of Offspring of Parents Under
Sixteen Years of Age
The result of legislation passed by the 1947 General Assembly has
been to permit the legal n1tarriage of a child under 16 years of age only in
the case of an unmarried female who is pregnant or has borne a child,
provided the required consent is given.1 By amendment to G. S. §51-3,
all marriages by females as well as males under the age of 16 may be
"declared void."' 2 This legislation has not protected children of mar-
riages where one of the parents is less than 16 from the taint of
illegitimacy after the marriage has been annulled, unless at least one of
the parents is dead at the time the action to annul is brought.3 C. 1022
remedies this situation by adding another proviso to G. S. §51-3 stating
that no marriage by persons either of whom is under 16 years of age
and otherwise competent to marry shall be declared void when the girl
'It is doubtful that this statute will be held applicable in actions brought by
the parent of an illegitimate child. The court held in In re McGraw, 228 N. C.
46, 44 S. E. 2d 349 (1948), that G. S. §17-39 and G. S. §50-13 refer only to
children of married persons and not to illegitimate children.
'Sess. Laws 1947, c. 383; G. S. §14-319; G. S. §51-2; G. S. §51-3.
2 Sess. Laws 1947, c. 383. Judicial decisions in this state hold that the only
marriages void ab initi are those between whites and Indians or Negroes and
those which are bigamous. All others are merely voidable and an action to annul
must be brought. Sawyer v. Slack, 196 N. C. 697, 146 S. E. 864 (1929) ; Watters
v. Watters, 168 N. C. 411, 84 S. E. 703 (1915) ; see Parks v. Parks, 218 N. C.
245, 10 S. E. 2d 807 (1940).
' In the absence of legislative provisions to the contrary, annulment of a mar-
riage renders the issue of the union illegitimate, because the marriage becomes
null and void. A proviso to G. S. §51-3 prevents the court from declaring void a
marriage where there has been issue and one of the parents is dead. Baity v.
Cranfill, 91 N. C. 293, 49 Am. Rep. 641 (1884); Setzer v. Setzer, 97 N. C. 252(1887).
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shall be pregnant or when a child shall have been born to the parties
unless such child is dead at the time of the action to annul.
ELECTIONS
Local Bond and Special Tax Elections
Undisturbed since 1868, Article VII, Section 7, North Carolina
Constitution, was amended in 1948 to read as follows: "No county,
city, town or other municipal corporation shall contract any debt,
pledge its faith or loan its credit, nor shall any tax be levied or collected
by any officers of the same except f9r the necessary expenses thereof,
unless approved by a majority of those who shall vote thereon in an
election held for such purpose." The italicized clause formerly read
".. . unless by a vote of the majority of the qualified voters therein,"
had been consistently interpreted as requiring a vote "against the regis-
tration," and was reiterated in a series of statutes on the books when
the 1949 General Assembly convened.
C. 497, c. 358, c. 918, c. 1033, and c. 880 seek, in the language of
their captions, to make these special election statutes "harmonize" or
"conform" with the amended Constitution. These acts were designed
to change particular statutes or groups of statutes,1 and while each
carries a general repealing clause, only c. 497 purports to amend all
public, public-local, private and special acts which require that a bond
issue, a tax levy, or "any other proposition" of any "county, municipality,
school district, or other political subdivision" be approved by the vote
1 C. 497 amends the following statutes to change references to majority of
registered or qualified voters to majority of those voting or some similar expres-
sion: G. S. §153-92 (County Finance Act); G. S. §160-387 (Municipal Finance
Act) ; and G. S. §131-126.23(c) (1947 Act providing additional authority for gov-
ernmental subdivisions to acquire, construct, improve and equip hospitals through
bond issues).
C. 358 makes similar amendments to the following sections of the County
Hospital Act of 1945: G. S. §131-282 (election on question of county assuming
an existing public hospital's indebtedness); G. S. §131-28.4 (election on issuance
of county bonds for erecting, remodeling, enlarging or purchasing hospitals, land
and equipment) ; and G. S. §131-28.5 (election on levy of a tax for maintenance of
county hospital).
C. 880 amends the following sections ot the same effect: G. S. §130-46 (election
in sanitary district on issuance of bonds); and G. S. §§130-58, 130-59, 130-60
(elections on the formation, enlargement, and abolition of special-tax sanitary
district).
C. 918 amends the following sections of the public school law to the same effect:
G. S. §115-189 (election on local tax in district or administrative unit) ; G. S. §115-
191 (frequency of such elections) ; G. S. §115-192 (election on enlargement of local
tax school district) ; G. S. §115-193 (election on abolition of local tax school
district) ; G. S. §115-196 (election on enlarging local tax school district within
a municipality) ; G. S. §115-198 (election on incorporating school district created
from parts of two or more counties); and G. S. §115-361 (local supplemet.t
elections).
C. 1033 amends the following sections of the public school laws to the same
effect: G. S. §115-204 (election on tax in special school taxing district) ; G. S.§115-209 (election on county supplement in which part of local taxes may be re-
tained) ; and G. S. §115-65 (election on establishing a kindergarten).
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of a majority of the registered voters of the voting unit.2  Whether or
not demanded in the interests of harmony with the Constitution, the
effect of this general amending clause is to supplant former majority
requirements in all such statutes with a provision to the effect that an
affirmative majority of the voters voting in the election is sufficient to
carry the issue submitted. These provisions are made specifically
applicable to every such election held subsequent to the Act's ratification
(March 22, 1949) even if some or a part of the procedures required
for the election were taken prior to that date.
With respect to elections on county bond orders and municipal bond
ordinances held between November 24, 1948, and March 22, 1949, c.
497 provides that if a majority of those voting approved, the order or
ordinance is to be effective "notwithstanding the provision of any gen-
eral, public-local, private or special law in force at the time of such
election requiring" approval by a majority of the qualified voters. This
language touches only county and municipal bond elections. Certainly
this difference in language warrants questioning whether, for example,
a school supplement election or sanitary district bond election held dur-
ing the period and in which only the smaller majority was obtained
would be covered by the retroactive provisions of the Act.
New Political Parties
C. 671 rewrites the statutes defining a political party and what one
must do to get its candidates on the ballot and how to retain its status.'
The Act raises from three to ten the percentage of the total vote cast
that a party must receive in order to retain its recognition as such,
but specifically provides that until the 1952 general election is held any
group of voters who polled three per cent of the total vote cast in the
state for presidential electors in 1948 is to be deemed a party for pur-
poses of the primary and general election laws. The remaining pro-
visions are concerned largely with writing into the statute a number of
administrative regulations adopted by the State Board of Elections in
1948, some of which were found to be repugnant to the intention of
the law as then written.2  Perhaps the most interesting of the new re-
quirements is one to the effect that petitions for the formation of a new
2 C. 1033, however, carries a general amending clause of a similar nature for
all portions of G. S. c. 115 and "any other statute, general, public or local" in
which the levy of a tax, issuance of bonds, or the change of any boundary 'of a
school taxing district is made to depend upon the vote of a majority of the quali-
fiedor registered voters. The provision specifically states that its purpose is to
make such statutes correspond to the requirements of Art. VII, Sec. 7, North
Carolina Constitution.
1G. S. §163-1 and G. S. §163-144.
2 States' Rights Democratic Party v. Board of Elections, 229 N. C. 179,
S. E. - (1948).
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party must declare that the signers intend to vote for the nominees of
the party they seek to establish.
Registration
C. 916 repeals the machinery set up for the state-wide registration
called in 19393 and substitutes a new procedure. The multi-book regis-
tration system is abolished; separate party primary and general election
registration books are to be superseded in each precinct by a single
registration book for use in both primaries and general elections. Be-
fore the 1950 primary county boards of elections are required either to
call a new registration in the new book or purge the existing books and
copy the names left, including party preferences where indicated, into
the new volume.
Violations and Prohibitions
C. 504 adds a new section to the election laws to empower the judge
presiding at the conviction of a public official for a violation of the
Corrupt Practices Act or other election laws,4 in his discretion, to
remove the official from office. This removal is to be in addition to any
other punishment permitted. Once removed, an official convicted of an
election offense classed as a felony is ineligible to hold any public office
until his citizenship is restored; if removed after conviction of a mis-
demeanor, he is ineligible to hold public office for a period of two years.
C. 672 prohibits members of county boards of elections from serv-
ing as county managers for candidates in primary or general elections.
C. 916 extends to precinct registrars the criminal liability for wilful
and knowing failure or refusal to comply with the state-wide registra-
tion law already applicable to chairmen of county boards of elections.6
Voting Machines
C. 301 authorizes counties and municipalities to purchase :or lease such
* automatic voting machines as are approved by the State Board of Elec-
tions, and to use them at all primaries or elections held within their
borders.
EVIDENCE
Blood Tests
Since 1945 our statute has provided that in bastardy proceedings,
upon.motion of the defendant, the court shall direct that the defendant,
the mother and the child submit to blood grouping tests and that the
results of the tests shall be admitted in evidence when offered by a
licensed practicing physician or other qualified witness.1 While this is
G. S. §163-43 through G. S. §163-49.
'G. S. c. 163, art. 21 and art. 22. - G. S. §163-51.
1 G. S. §49-7. See 23 N. C. L. RFv. 343, 344 (1945).
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not expressly repealed, it would seem to be superseded by C. 51 which:
(1) contains virtually identical provisions applicable to "any criminal
action or proceedings in which the question of paternity arises"; and
(2) extends legislative approval of use of the blood grouping evidence
to "any civil action" (presumably, of course, in which evidence of
paternity is relevant). In civil cases the motion may be made by either
party and the court shall direct that the defendant, the plaintiff, the
mother, and the child submit to-the tests (presumably, as to plaintiff
and defendant, .only if a parent or putative parent of the child).
Apparently the purpose of the new chapter is to broaden the rule
heretofore applicable in bastardy cases into a rule of general application.
This seems entirely appropriate, though the number of cases to which
the statute is now for the first time made applicable may not be very
large. The court has recently foreclosed the possibility of a civil action
for support by an illegitimate child against his putative father.2
Two comments may be in order: (1) The statute in terms is not
broad enough to authorize an order for a test of the blood group of a
putative father who is not a party. (2) While the new statute, in com-
mon with the pre-existing bastardy statute, ostensibly directs that the
results of the tests "shall" be admitted in evidence regardless of what
those results are, it is very doubtful that such results are relevant except
when offered to prove that a particular person is not the father of the
child.3
GUARDIAN AND WARD
Appointment of Ancillary Guardian for Incompetent Non-Resident
Owner of Real Property Located in North Carlina
C. 986 amends G. S. C. 35 by adding a section to G. S. §35-3 to
permit the appointment by the clerk of an ancillary guardian for an
incompetent non-resident owner of real property located in North Car,
olina when by petition and proof to the satisfaction of any clerk of the
superior court of this state it appears that: (1) a non-resident owns
an interest or estate in real property situated in that clerk's county; (2)
that the non-resident is insane or incompetent and a guardian has been
appointed and is still serving for the incompetent in the latter's state
of residence; and (3) that the incompetent has no guardian in this state.
When appointed, the ancillary guardian shall have all the powers,
dtuties, and responsibilities with respect to the estate of the incompetent
person in North Carolina as guardians otherwise appointed now have.
The statute requires such ancillary guardian to make an annual account-
ing to the court in this state and to remit to the guardian in the state
-Allen v. Hunnicutt, 230 N. C. 49, 52 S. E. 2d 18 (1949).
'STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE §86 (1946).
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of the ward's residence any net rents of the real estate or any proceeds
from .the sale thereof. Upon the appointment of an ancillary guardian
in this state, the clerk must notify the clerk of the superior court of
the county of the ward's residence and also notify the ward's foreign
guardian.
This statute should serve a good purpose in the administration of a
foreign incompetent's estate since obviously the foreign guardian has
no control over his ward's realty located in this state.
Sales of Real Estate by Guardians
Section 33-31 of the 1947 Supplement to the General Statutes re-
quires, for the sale or mortgage of a ward's land located in a county
other than that of the guardian's appointment, that the guardian make
a showing that such a sale or mortgage "is necessary." C. 724 amends
this section by gdding the words : "cdr that! the interest of his ward would
be materially promoted thereby." The findings of the clerk, upon a
hearing of the application of the guardian for the sale or mortgage of
such realty, must also, if the circumstances require it, include this lan-
guage. The section is further amended by a provision to the effect that
such findings and orders shall not become effective until they are
approved by the judge holding the courts of the district or by the
resident judge. These amendments with respect to the sale or mort-
gage of out-of-the-county realty place such activity on practically the
same procedural basis as is required by G. S. §33-31 with reference to
the guardian's sale or mortgage of in-the-county realty belong to his
ward.
Removal of Ward's Personal Property from State
by Foreign Guardian
G. S. §33-49 requires a foreign guardian, who seeks to remove the
personal property of the ward from this state, to exhibit to the clerk of
court a copy of his appointment as guardian and of the bond duly
authenticated, and he must prove to the court that the bond is sufficient,
both as to the financial responsibility of the sureties and as to the sum
involved, to secure all the estate of the ward wherever situated. C. 253
amends this section to permit a foreign banking institution, which has
qualified as a guardian of any person or infant in a state which does
not require any bond or sureties in such case, to remove the ward's
personal property from this state without the clerk's finding with ref-
erence to sureties. The finding of the clerk that the foreign bank has
thus qualified as guardian under the laws of its state of residence is
sufficient for the purposes of G. S. §33-49 concerning the removal of
the ward's personal property.
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INSURANCE
Assigned Risks
The Motor Vehicle Safety and Responsibility Act of 19471 requires
the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles to suspend the license of any per-
son who has failed to satisfy, within 60 days, a judgment of more than
$50 damages arising out of the ownership, use or operation of an auto-
mobile. For purpose of the act, a judgment is deemed satisfied when
payment of the amounts covered by the ordinary automobile liability
policy has been made thereon, ie., up to $5,000 for death or injury of
any one person, with a maximum of $10,000 for the injury or death of
several persons in one accident and $1,000 property damage.
Before reinstatement of any license suspended or revoked under the
Act or under the Uniform Drivers License Act, the license holder must
show and thereafter maintain proof of his financial responsibility. The
customary way to prove such financial responsibility is the applicant's
showing that he is insured under a public liability policy with the
usual limits.
The Act provides for what are known as "assigned risks. '"2 A per-
son whose license has been suspended as the result of any accident and
who has failed to satisfy a judgment against him, may have difficulty
in securing insurance on the open market. His record as a driver may
make him a bad moral risk, and insurance companies may refuse to
cover him. Unless there is some way of compelling an insurance com-
pany to insure such a person, he may be unable to establish financial
responsibility under the Act and thus will not be able to have his license
reinstated. The chief purpose of the Act being to protect the public
against financially irresponsible automobile owners and operators, and
not necessarily to protect the public against reckless or drunken drivers,
a method is provided to compel insurance companies to insure these poor
risks.
Comparison may be made to "assigned risks" under the Workmens'
Compensation Law.3 Similar provisions deal with those employers
whose accident record is bad and who cannot obtain workmens' com-
pensation insurance on the market. The purpose of the Workmens'
Compensation Act Would be destroyed if employers with the poorest
accident records were not insured, as their employees would have no
protection in case of injury sustained during employment. Under proper
regulations, these poor risks are assigned to insurance carriers. Accept-
ance of such assigned risks is necessary if the insurance company to
which a risk has been assigned expects to continue in business in North1 G. S. (1947 Supp.) §§20-224 to 20-279; N. C. Sess. Laws 1947, c. 1006.
'G. S. (1947 Supp.) §20-276.3 G. S. §97-103.
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Carolina. Similar provisions now apply to the automobile driver or
owner, who cannot obtain automobile liability insurance because of his
previous bad record, which has resulted in the suspension of his driver's
or operator's license.
Ch. 1209 is an addition to the section of the Safety Responsibility
Act dealing with assigned risks.4 It provides that when application is
made to the Commissioner of Insurance to have a risk assigned, the
application shall have attached a statement from the Motor Vehicle De-
partment that the suspension of the applicant's license will be no longer
in effect after the date noted therein. The Commissioner, upon receipt
of the application, shall immediately assign the risk to an insurance
carrier. In other words, whenever the Department of Motor Vehicles
will reinstate a license which was suspended, the Commissioner of In-
surance must assign the risk, upon application properly made. There is
no discretion in the Insurance Commissioner to deny insurance to any
person, if the Department of Motor Vehicles will lift the suspension
of license. Most cases will involve drivers whose licenses are suspended
or revoked for reckless or drunken driving. There will probably be few
cases where failure to pay a judgment is the basis of suspension or
revocation. Thus the assigned risk provisions of the statute mean that
we have compulsory automobile liability insurance for a group of driv-
ers whose licenses have been suspended or revoked. This may be a
good thing for the protection of the public but it may mean higher rates
for the average driver who does not get into trouble.
Public Hearings on Rate Filings
C. 1079 is a very important change in the procedure for making
insurance rates in North Carolina. Hitherto, any statutory or licensed
rating bureau or any insurance company making its own rate filings had
to submit all rating schedules or changes to the Commissioner for
approval. The Commissioner had authority to investigate the necessity
for a reduction or increase in rates, and following such investigation, to
issue orders for a reduction or increase in rates based upon his findings.
If not disapproved by him in writing within sixty days after submis-
sion, the rates were deemed approved.'
C. 1079 provides for public hearings before the Commissioner or
his deputy prior to the Commissioner's approval of any rating schedule.
The Insurance Advisory Board is directed to promulgate rules and regu-
lations to provide for the holding of public hearings. The new statute
'G. S. (1947 Supp.) §20-276.
'Wettach, The 1945 Revision of the Insurance Laws of North Carolina, 23
N. C. L. REv. 283, 286-290 (1945). G. S. §§58-125 to 58-131.9 (fire insurance rates
and automobile collision); G. S. §§58-131.10 to 58-131.25 (casualty, fidelity and
surety rates) ; G. S. §§58-131.26 to 58-131.33 (miscellaneous lines) ; G. S. §§58-246
to 58-248 (automobile bodily injury and property damage).
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is in addition to the existing law governing the making of insurance
rates and should prove to be a useful means of reconciling the conflicting
interests of the insurance companies and the public. North Carolina
is a pioneer among the several states in providing for such public hear-
ings. The success of this new procedure in providing greater protection
to the insurance buying public will depend not only on first-class admin-
istration, but on the extent to which the new rules and regulations make
effective administration possible.
Regulation 6f Unlicensed Insurance Agents
As in the case of other licensed trades and professions, there are
those who in fact engage in a trade or profession, usually as a side-line
to some other business, without regard to the licensing requirements.
The unauthorized practices in the insurance field by persons not licensed
as insurance agents are listed in C. 1120, as follows: "to solicit insurance,
negotiate for, collect or transmit a premium for a contract of insurance
or to act in any way in the negotiation for any contract or policy of
insurance." This describes the usual work of an insurance agent. If
persons, who are not licensed as agents, carry on these activities, then
those who are licensed and submit to the requirements of the regulatory
statutes are at a real disadvantage. Licensed insurance agents are thus
subject to a kind of unfair competition.
To control these practices by persons not licensed as insurance
agents, C. 1120 provides that no insurance company, nor any agent of
any insurance company shall on behalf of such company or agent "know-
ingly permit any person not licensed as an insurance agent" to engage
in the unauthorized practices as listed above. A proviso excepts those
who make and transmit deductions for premiums under pay-roll deduc-
tion plans.
Thus, the Department of Insurance will be better able to deal with
a growing number of persons, engaged for the most part in other busi-
nesses, who act as insurance agents on the side without being licensed.
By being in a position to deal directly with companies and agents per-
mitting these practices, the Department may be able to prevent them.
Unfair Trade Practices
The Southeastern Underwriters Case1 was decided in 1944. The
next year, Congress passed the McCarran Act 2 (frequently referred to
as Public Law 15, 79th Congress) for the purpose of defining the re-
spective areas of state and federal control over the insurance business
of the nation. Both in its declaration of policy and in its provisions,
the Act affirms the power of the states to regulate and tax the business
1U. S. v. Southeastern Underwriters Assoc., 322 U. S. 533 (1944).
-15 U. S. C. A. §§1011-1015.
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of insurance. There is a proviso that after January 1, 1948, the Sher-
man and Clayton Acts and the Federal Trade Commission Act "shall
be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business
is not regulated by state law."13
The responsibility of each state to provide effective regulation of
the insurance business within its borders was promptly recognized by
the Governor of North Carolina, who appointed a Commission in 1944
to study the insurance laws of North Carolina and submit recommenda-
tions to the next General Assembly. The 1945 General Assembly, fol-
lowing recommendations of the Commission, made a fairly complete
revision of the state's insurance laws. 4 The 1947 General Assembly
carried forward the 1945 revision.5
The State Insurance Commissioners, after a thorough study, ap-
proved a statute6 which would do in each state for the insurance business
what the Sherman and Clayton Acts and the Federal Trade Commission
Act do for business generally. By the McCarran Act, these federal
statutes are applicable to the insurance business in the absence of
adequate state regulation. The 1949 General Assembly enacted the
statute recommended by the Insurance Commissioners. Ch. 1112 is a
state unfair practices law limited to the business of insurance.
Ch. 1112 defines various unfair methods of competition and unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in the business of insurance, such as (1)
misrepresentation and false advertising of policy contracts, (2) false
information and advertising generally, (3) defamation, (4) boycott, co-
ercion and intimidation, (5) false financial statements, (6) stock opera-
tions, (7) unfair discrimination and (8) rebates. Procedure for
enforcement of the act, similar to that of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, is provided. The Commissioner of Insurance is authorized to in-
vestigate unfair trade practices and hold hearings to determine whether
an insurer is engaged in any of the unfair trade practices defined in
the act. If the Commissioner finds such unfair practices to exist, he
shall issue a cease and desist order, which is subject to review in the
Superior Court of Wake County. Findings of the Commissioner as to
the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. A
catch-all section enables the Commissioner to proceed against persons
engaged in the business of insurance whose conduct involves unfair
methods of competition and unfair trade practices not defined in the act.
If the several states can prevent unfair trade practices in the in-
315 U. S. C. A. §1012(b).
'Wettach, The 1945 Revision of the Insurance Laws of North Carolina, 23
N. CG L. REv. 283 (1945).
A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1947, 25 N. C. L. Rzv.
376, 429-443 (1947).
n See 1947 Report of Proceedings of National Convention of Insurance Com-
missioners.
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surance business within their respective borders, it will not be necessary
to resort to the controlling federal statutes. North Carolina, by adopt-
ing Ch. 1112, reaffirms its confidence in adequate state regulation of
the insurance industry. The success of state regulation under the Un-
fair Trade Practices Acts depends upon good administration and en-
forcement by state insurance departments throughout the United States.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS
Beer and Wine
C. 974, by adding a new section to G. S. Chapter 18, Article 8 and
amending two sections of G. S. Chapter 18, Article 4 accomplishes three
main objectives in that it: (1) transfers from the Commissioner of
Revenue to the State Board of Alcoholic Control the ultimate respon-
sibility for state regulation of the manufacture, bottling and sale of
malt beverages, (2) broadens the state powers of regulation in this
field and (3) provides for more effective enforcement of regulations
promulgated by the state authority charged with responsibility in this
field.
The chief regulatory device will be the issuance, revocation and
suspension of state permits. All resident manufacturers, bottlers, whole-
salers and retailers of beer are required to procure permits from the
State Board by written application setting out certain information speci-
fied in the act. These permits are in addition to the state, county and
city licenses already required, and the acquisition of a permit is a con-
dition precedent to and also a guarantee of receiving such licenses.
Revocation or suspension of permits by the State Board automatically
entails corresponding effect on all licenses, and revocation or suspension
of licenses by county or city authorities automatically entails correspond-
ing effect on all other licenses and the permit. Persons holding licenses
on the date of ratification, April 14, 1949, are deemed to have permits
and may therefore be issued renewal licenses upon expiration of their
present ones on April 30, 1949, without having obtained permits. How-
ever, they must apply for state permits by June 30, 1949. Both refusal
to grant permits and revocation or suspension of permits by the State
Board must be preceded by the giving of ten days notice and oppor-
tunity to be heard to the affected party.
The Board is given express power to make rules and regulations for
carrying out the provisions of the act.
Actual administration of the act will be carried out by a Malt Bev-
erage Division, operating within the Board and consisting of a chief,
two assistants and at leat fifteen field inspectors. These inspectors will
be sworn as peace officers and are charged by the act with detailed in-
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spection and enforcement duties with respect to beer licencees' premises.
This delegation of regulatory powers to the State Board necessitated
amendments to two other sections under which the Commissioner of
Revenue had formerly exercised less sweeping but nevertheless con-
flicting powers of control. G. S. §18-78, which gave the Commissioner
power to promulgate regulations for carrying out the provisions of the
Beverage Control Act of 1939 and to revoke or suspend state licenses,
was amended to transfer these powers expressly to the State Board-
although the Board's revocation of state licenses will actually be through
revocation of the permits. G. S. §18-78.1 formerly set out certain pro-
hibited acts the doing of which was to entail revocation or suspension of
state licenses by the Commissioner and prescribed the procedure for
hearings before the Commissioner necessary to such revocation. This
statute is amended to strike out all that portion dealing with the hearing
procedure. The prohibitions remain, however, and apparently will still
furnish specific grounds for revocation or suspension of permits by the
State Board, though this is not expressly stated.
G. S. §18-105, which prohibited the sale of beer and/or wine after
11:30 P.M., is implicitly repealed as to the sale of beer by a provision
that beer may not be sold after 11:00 P.M. Nothing in the act, however,
purports to change the hours of permissible on premises consumption
of beer, which are set by G. S. §18-106 at 7:00 A.M. to 12:00 midnight.
In 1945 the General Assembly gave the State Board of Alcoholic
Control wide regulatory powers with respect to the conduct of places
where wine was sold and to the quality of wine sold. Four years have
evidently indicated that state control must be supplemented by on-the-
spot local regulation to achieve the ends envisoned at that time.
C. 1251 authorizes local A.B.C. Boards to (1) revoke or suspend
state wine permits on finding that the permittee or his place is not
"suitable" or that the number of permits should be reduced, (2) to
confine-the sale of wine to A.B.C. stores exclusively, and (3) to restrict
the days and hours of permissible sale of wine in their territories more
narrowly than the restrictions imposed by State Board regulations. No
specific provision is made for notice and hearing prior to such action
as is done in the 1945 Act with respect to action by the State Board.
Governing bodies of counties or cities having A.B.C. stores are
authorized to revoke or suspend the retail wine license of any person in
their jurisdictions for the violation of any existing law or regulation of
the State Board of Alcoholic Control respecting wine sale after due
notice and opportunity to be heard.
Revocation of a wine license by any county or city governing body,
or of a permit by the State Board or a local A.B.C. Board will auto-
matically revoke all other licenses and permits held by the affected party.
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All officers, inspectors and investigators appointed by the State
Board or by local A.B.C. Boards will be sworn as peace officers and are
authorized to inspect the premises of wine licensees, examine the books
of licencees, procure evidence relative to violations of the act and per-
form other duties as directed by the State Board. Refusal to admit
such an officer to licensed premises is cause for revocation of permits.
All A.B.C. officers may be used by either the State or local Boards as
inspectors in counties and cities with A.B.C. stores.
The act also amends G. S. §18-32(3) to lower from 3 gallons to 1
gallon the amount of wine whose possession at any one time in one or
more places constitutes prima facie evidence of illegal possession for
sale, and adds to G. S. Chapter 18 a new section which makes it illegal
for "any person other than a manufacturer, distributor or bottler to
buy, or to sell at retail to any one person, more than 1 gallon at any
one time whether in one or more places."
Liquor
Local legislation at this session established a new trend in the state's
liquor control policy by opening the way for autonomous control of
sales by units smaller than the county, which heretofore has been the
exclusive "local option" unit. Twenty-two cities and towns were ac-
corded the right to vote for controlled sale within their boundaries
and under their control, provided their respective counties do not call
county-wide elections on the subject within sixty days after ratification
of the various acts.
LABOR
C. 673 amends G. S. §95-36 to forbid administrative or judicial
tribunals ot compel officers or employees of the conciliation service of
the state department of labor to disclose, except in criminal cases, in-
formation acquired in the course of conciliation proceedings. Documents
similarly obtained are not to be subject to subpoena, in any case.
The purpose of the statute is to assure frankness between unions,
employers and conciliators in the settlement of labor disputes, in reliance
upon the confidential character of their communications. Wigmore
thought statements to conciliators should be regarded as privileged,'
but he relied mainly on statutes.
In contrast with this statute, the rules and regulations of the Fed-
eral Mediation and Conciliation Service2 and of the National Labor
Relations Board3 make the availability of the testimony and records de-
pendent upon the written consent of the head of the agency. Quaere,
18 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE (3d ed., 1940), §2376, note 3.
229 CoDE FED. REGs. §1405.2 (1947 Supp.).
'N.L.R.B., Rules and Regulations, August 18, 1948, §203.90.
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in a case where the withholding of the information or documents would
result in disproportionate hardship to a litigant, 4 could the commissioner
"of labor waive the immunity provided by the new statute? This and
the exception extend only to compulsion; the statute does not say, as
others do,5 that such evidence shall not be admissible.
This statute probably does not apply to the "qualified and public
spirited citizens who will serve as arbitrators" in the arbitration service
established by G. S. (1947 Supp.) §§95-36.1 to 7, enacted in 1945. This
is apparent from the terminology and arrangement of the statutes re-
lating to the two services and from the fact that these arbitrators are
not employees of the state. Usually, they are chosen and compensated
bv the companies and unions involved on a per diem basis. Even when
designated and paid by the commissioner, they are independent con-
tractors. Should one of these be asked to testify or to furnish docu-
ments as to matters that developed during the arbitration proceedings,
he probably could decline on the ground of privilege, unless both parties
to the arbitration consented.0
LANDLORD AND TENANT
C. 193 adds a new section, G. S. §42-22.1, to the statutes pertaining
to Landlord and Tenant. It provides that "Any tenant or share cropper
having possession of a tobacco marketing card issued by any agency of
the State or Federal Government who sells tobacco authorized to be sold
thereby and fails to account to his landlord, to the extent of the net
proceeds of such sale or sales, for all liens, rents, advances, or other
claims held by his landlord against the tobacco or the proceeds of the
sale of such tobacco, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon con-
viction, shall be punished by a fine or imprisonment in the discretion
of the court."
This statute supplements the present laws making it a misdeameanor
for a tenant to abandon a crop, upon which he has secured advances,
with intent to defraud the landlord1 or to refuse to cultivate such crops
with like intent.2  The former of these statutes was held unconstitu-
tional in State v. Williams3 as contravening the constitutional provision
that "there shall be no imprisonment for debt in this State, except in
" Compare Haydock, Some Evidentiary Problems Posed by Atomic Energy
Security Requirements, 61 HARv. L. REv. 468 (1948).
E.g., N. H. REv. LAws c. 210 §18 (1942) (proceedings of board of conciliation
and arbitration) ; 49 U. S. C. A., §581 (reports to the Civil Aeronautics Board of
causes of airplane crashes).
' See Code of Ethics for Arbitrators, American Arbitration Association, 1
Aim. J. (N. S.) 206, 214 (1946).
1 G. S. §14-358 (1947 Supp.). 2 G. S. §14-359 (1947 Supp.).150 N. C. 802, 63 S. E. 949 (1909) ; accord, Minton v. Early, 183 N. C. 199,
111 S. E. 347 (1922).
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cases of fraud."' 4  As a result of this decision the element of intent to
defraud was added to both statutes by amendment in 1945. 5 And, if
this new statute were, as it might appear to be, an attempt to make
the failure to pay a debt a misdemeanor, then the rationale of State v.
Williams would require that the indictment include an averment of fraud.
G. S. §42-15 provides that all crops raised under such a tenancy or
cropper arrangement are deemed to be in possession of the lessor until
all rents are paid and until "all stipulations contained in the lease or
agreement are performed." Lessor and lessee are joint owners of the
crop, and a sale by one party for his own benefit constitutes a breach
of trust as at common law.0 Thus since it is the breach of trust, rather
than the failure to pay the debt, that G. S. §42-22.1 makes a crime, it
appears unobjectionable from the standpoint of constitutionality. 7
MOTOR CARRIERS
North Carolina Bus Act of 19491
Known by the short title of the Bus Act of 1949, C. 1132 is an
exhaustive new regulatory statute which replaces the hodgepodge of
statutes regulating passenger bus carriers as codified in G. S. Chapter 62,
Article 6.
The drafters of the act, seeking uniformity of state and federal
law on the subject of motor carriers of passengers and property and
seeking to ease the problem of interpretation of so voluminous an act,
drew heavily on (1) the North Carolina Truck Act of 1947,2 (2) the
'N. C. CONsT. Art. 1, §16.
Sess. Laws 1945, c. 635. As a result of this amendment G. S. §14-359 now
makes it a misdemeanor to "negligently . . . abandon (such crops) . . . with
intent to defraud the landlord," presenting an anomalous inconsistency in the ele-
ments of the crime.
'See State v. Keith, 126 N. C. 1114, 1115, 36 S. E. 167, 170 (1900) (where the
landlord sold the crop and refused to pay the tenant his share no prosecution for
embezzlement would lie since no statute made such breach of trust a crime).
7The reasoning of State v. Torrence, 127 N. C. 550, 37 S. E. 268 (1900),
holding constitutional G. S. §14-105, which makes it a misdemeanor to fail to apply
promised properties to advances secured thereby, should control this statute's con-
stitutionality. There the court said it is not the failure to pay the debt which
is made indictable, but the failure to apply the pledged property, and on this
ground it is constitutional.
'The Bus Act was introduced as House Bill No. 384. The abbreviation "C,"
unless otherwise indicated refers to a chapter of the North Carolina Session Laws
of 1949.
The terms "carrier" or "motor carrier" refer to a motor vehicle carrier of
passengers, i.e., bus carrier, unless otherwise indicated.
The term "act" refers to the Bus Act of 1949.2 G. S. c. 62, art. 6 B.
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Federal Motor Carrier Act3 (from which the Truck Act was in large
measure drawn), and (3) the Virginia act regulating motor carriers.4
A few sections of the new act are copied verbatim, in whole or part,
from old Article 6 of Chapter 82. It was strongly felt that basic con-
siderations of due process in administrative procedure demanded that
rather extensive requirements as to notice and hearing be incorporated
in the act. For this reason considerable reliance was placed upon the
Federal Administrative Procedure Act 5 and the Model State Admin-
istrative Procedure Act 6 for the procedural aspects of the act.
The extensive scope of the act limits this comment to a passing com-
mentary on the major changes wrought in the law applicable to motor
carriers of passengers. In brief they are as follows:
1. Section 4 of C. 1132 defines a "contract carrier" and for the first
time in North Carolina brings such a motor carrier under control of
the Utilities Commission. The act clearly differentiates between contract
carriers and common carriers as to rates, methods of granting operating
privileges, extent of operating priviliges, etc.7  A grandfather clause
provides that all bona fide contract carriers operating on October 1,
1948, and continuously since that time shall be granted a permit by
simple application.
2. The term "restricted common carrier" as incorporated in the old
law is omitted, but a provision found in C. 1132 that the Commission
may grant certificates and place therein certain restrictions, such as re-
quiring closed door operation over a certain route, in effect continues
the classification of common carrier and restricted common carrier.
3. Section 5 covers exemptions from the act, and one part thereof
is intended to clear up a matter pointed up recently by the case of City
Coach Company, Inc. v. Gastonia Transit Company,8 i.e., whether the
Utilities Commission or a municipality has jurisdiction over local bus
service. This case held that operations extending 7/8ths of a mile
beyond the city limits were subject to Commission regulations. Section
5 of C. 1132 provides that "transportation . . . within a town or
municipality or within contiguous towns or municipalities," and within
a zone adjacent, as determined by the Commission, is exempt from the
'49 STAT. 543 (1935), as amended, 49 U. S. C. A. §301 (1948 Supp.).
'VA. CODE ANN. (1942) §4097m et seq.
'60 STAT. 237 (1936), as amended, 5 U. S. C. A. §1001 et seq. (1948 Supp.).
'This act was prepared by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws and adopted by it October 1946. It was made available to
state legislatures as an aid in revising state administrative procedure.
' The law has long been settled that a mere legislative fiat attempting to classify
contract carriers as common carriers is unconstitutional. See Note, 11 N. C. L.
REV. 355-358. Equally bad is an attempt to subject contract carriers to the same
regulations as common carriers. See Frost and Frost Trucking Co. v. R. R.
Commission of California, 271 U. S. 583 (1926) where such a statute was held
to be unconstitutional.
' 227 N. C. 291, 42 S. E. 2d 86 (1947).
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act. As originally drafted this exemption provision stopped at this
point. But in the legislative course of events an amendment added a
sentence to this effect: But the Commission shall retain jurisdiction to
fix rates and to hear and determine controversies with respect to ex-
tensions and services. This added language seems to leave the question
of jurisdiction over local bus service more debatable than ever. It
would appear that the cities and towns now retain only police power
and the right to grant or withhold franchises as to local operators.
Apparently all controversies regarding operating rights between local
operators or between local authority and an operator, as well as the
matter of rates, are to be decided by the Commission under such rules
of procedure as it may lawfully adopt.
4. A procedural improvement suggested by the practice followed
by the Interstate Commerce Commission is to be found in a provision
that the Commission shall maintain a "Docket of Pending Proceedings"
for the purpose of recording the title and a brief description of all
pending proceedings. Likewise, the Commission is required to maintain
a "Register," open for public inspection, in which all "general orders,
rules, regulations, and requirements shall be recorded. . . ." Authority
is granted to the Commission to have printed for public distribution
all of its general orders, rules, regulations, etc.
5. Prior to C. 1132 the question of notice and hearing as to pro-
ceedings before the Commission were determined almost entirely by
rules adopted by the Commission. Typical requirements -now spelled
out in the act are these: (1) Twenty-day notice of any proposed order,
rule, etc., directed specifically against any carrier and opportunity for
hearing is required before such order, rule, etc., may become effective.
(2) Proposed general orders, rules, regulations, etc., not directed against
any certain carrier by name must be published in a Raleigh newspaper
for four consecutive weeks and written notice sent to each motor carrier
operating in the state, together with notice of the time and place when
the Commission will hear any objections to the proposed rule or order.
6. All presently certified common or restricted common carriers are
automatically granted certificates under the act. Any motor carrier
opposing the issuance of a certificate (issued to common carriers) or
permit (issued to contract carriers) for new service must file a protest
with the Commission in order to become a party to the proceeding.
Formerly under G. S. §62-105, no written protest was required; thus,
any opposition to the granting of a franchise was often not revealed
until the actual hearing before the Commission.
7. A new provision gives to the Commission authority to grant
temporary certificates or permits "with or without a hearing" to any
owner of a licensed vehicle upon the finding of an emergency; however,
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opportunity to provide the emergency must first be extended to the fran-
chise carriers in the territory.
8. Under the law as formerly written, it was declared that "the
Commission ny refuse" to grant duplication of service by a competitive
carrier. This loose language left the Commission free to grant de-
structive competitive operations over the same highways if it so desired-
a situation bitterly opposed by the large established carriers. As orig-
inally drafted, C. 1132 provided that no certificate could be granted a
carrier proposing to operate in a "territory" already served by a cer-
tificate holder without a finding that the certificate holder was rendering
"inadequate" service and an offer to such holder to remedy such in-
adequacy. Opposition to this broad language, i.e., "territory," by the
short line operators effected a compromise in the form of the substitu-
tion of the word "route" for "territory." It remains to be seen whether
the court will narrowly interpret "route" to mean the actual highways
covered by an existing certified carrier.
9. Formerly, all rate regulations governing public utilities (except
railroad freight carriers) were codified in G. S. Chapter 62, Article 7.
Some of these were adopted more than fifty years ago. C. 1132 wisely
restates and incorporates detailed standards and procedure for the estab-
lishment of fair and reasonable rates for motor carriers. Where feasible
the language of the Truck Act of 1947 was followed.
10. An interesting procedural provision as to the burden of proof
in rate proceedings is incorporated in the act. Section 22 provides that
the burden of proof shall be upon the carrier to show that any proposed
change in rates, charges, etc., is just and reasonable. C. 989 ratified a
week earlier than C. 1132, and commonly known as the North Carolina
Utilities Commission Procedure Act of 1949, enlarges the picture by
providing that where the rate, charge, etc., of any carrier (including
carriers under C. 1132) is under investigation, the burden shall be on
the utility to show that the same is just and reasonable. This latter
provision was meant to cure a long-standing complaint of the Commis-
sion; i.e., that where rates were under attack by motion of a private
party or on the Commission's own motion, it was nearly an impossibility
for the complainant to produce the vast amount of technical evidence
required to prove unreasonableness; whereas, the large utilities could
easily assume the burden of showing reasonableness by virtue of their
maintenance of large staffs of rate experts, accountants and a wealth of
facts and figures concerning rates. It therefore appears that C. 1132
in conjunction with the referred to provision of C. 989 places the bur-
den on a carrier of proving reasonableness in any rate controversy,
regardless of whether the carrier appears as petitioner or respondent.
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MOTOR VEHICLES
Inspections
C. 675 requires that any vehicle which has been registered or licensed
for use in any other state or foreign country must be inspected by the
State Highway Patrol before it can be registered in this State. The
Patrol must do the inspecting free of charge and certify that the vehicle
is in such mechanical condition as to comply with the laws of this
State. The necessity for this law arose out of the repeal' of the 1947
Motor Vehicle Inspection Law,2 and is to prevent the State from be-
coming a dumping ground for vehicles that cannot pass the vehicle in-
spection laws of other states.
Jurisdiction Over Violations by Minors
G. S. §20-218.1 enacted in 1943 along with an act' reducing from
sixteen to fifteen years the age of persons who could be licensed as
motor vehicle drivers, took away juvenile court jurisdiction over viola-
tion of the motor vehicle laws by persons over fifteen, but under six-
teen, and placed it in the courts that already had jurisdiction over such
cases involving persons over sixteen years of age. C. 163 repeals this
section and returns to the juvenile courts jurisdiction over violations
of the motor vehicle laws by persons in this age group.
Restoration of Operators' Licenses
As a result of the 1947 law requiring re-examination of drivers every
four years,1 C. 1032 was enacted to integrate with the re-examination
schedule the restoration of licenses that have been suspended, cancelled
or revoked. It provides, by adding a new paragraph to G. S. §20-231,
that a license suspended, cancelled or revoked under the provisions of
G. S. §§20-16 or 20-17 may be restored or reissued to the licensee if
the license would still have been valid at the time of restoration except
for the suspension, cancellation or revocation. It provides further that
a licensee who has not been re-examined since July 1, 1947, must be
re-examined before reissuance or restoration if his last name begins with
a letter which would have made him subject to re-examination had his
license not been taken away.2
G. S. §20-16 subsection (b) is also amended by C. 1032. The latter
rewrites the second sentence of the subsection so that it provides that
upon the hearing on the suspension of a license, the agents of the De-
partment of Motor Vehicles "may, except as provided in Section 20-231
1 Sess. Laws 1949, c. 164.
2 Sess. Laws 1947, c. 1067 and G. S. §§20-183.2 to 20-183.8.
1 Sess. Laws 1943, c. 346 (by its terms this act expired March 1, 1945).
'G. S. §§20-7(d) and (f).
- Sess. Laws 1949, c. 826.
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[see preceding paragraph] require a re-examination of the licensee."
Previously there had been no qualification on the authority to require
a re-examination.
G. S. §§20-230 and 20-231, requiring proof of financial responsibility
before a license may be reissued or restored to a person whose license
has been suspended or revoked under G. S. Chapter 20, Article 2, is
amended by C. 977, which provides that such person shall not be re-
quired to maintain proof of financial responsibility for more than two
years after reissuance or restoration of his license. Other sections re-
quiring proof of financial responsibility before reissuance of a license
remain unchanged.
Suspension of Licenses Pending Appeals
C. 373 inserts a new subsection in G. S. §20-16 which reads: "Pend-
ing an appeal from a conviction of any violation of the motor vehicle
laws of this State, no driver's or chauffeur's license shall be suspended
by the Department of Motor Vehicles because of such conviction or
because of evidence of the commission of the offense for which the con-
viction has been had." (Italics supplied.) The first part of this sub-
section (preceding the italics) is clear, since in G. S. §20-16(a) the
department is given authority to suspend licenses upon a showing that
the licensee has been convicted of certain offenses mentioned therein.
For example, the department can suspend the license of a person who
"has been convicted of illegal transportation of intoxicating liquors" I
The first part of the new subsection would clearly prohibit suspension
of the license pending an appeal by the licensee from the conviction
therefor.
The italicized portion of the new subsection is not so clear. G. S.
§20-16(a) gives the department power to suspend a license upon a
showing that the licensee has committed an offense mentioned therein.
For example, the department can suspend a license "upon a showing by
its records or other satisfactory evidence that the licensee: 1. Has com-
mitted an offense for which mandatory revocation is required upon
conviction." The use of the word "committed" in contradistinction to
the word "convicted" would seem to authorize the department in this case
to suspend a license on satisfactory evidence that the licensee had com-
mitted such an offense, before the licensee had been tried for the offense
in court or even if the licensee is never tried for the offense. Reading
the italicized portion of the new subsection against this background, the
interpretation would seem to be that the power of the department to
suspend a license in such a case is curtailed only during the period fol-
lowing a conviction for the offense committed. This results from the
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use of the words "for which the conviction has been had,"1 and so
seems not to apply to the case where there has been as yet no conviction.
Consequently, it appears that the department can still suspend licenses
upon a showing by its records or other satisfactory evidence that the
licensee has committed an offense for which suspension is authorized,
provided the suspension takes effect before the licensee has been con-
victed of the same offense.
C. 373 also repeals G. S. §20-24(d), relative to the suspension of
licenses pending appeal on recommendation of the court from which the
appeal is taken. This section was repealed for it would have been in
conflict with the first portion of the new subsection added to G. S.
§20-16.
Speed Limit in Residential Districts
The 1947 General Assembly raised the speed limit on streets and
highways in residential sections from 25 to 35 miles per hour,' without
changing other provisions in the law which: (a) forbade municipalities
to reduce speed limits within their corporate areas except at intersec-
tions;2 (b) left the State Highway and Public Works Commission
helpless to reduce speed limits except "at any intersection or other place
upon any part of a highway" (italics supplied) ;3 and thus (c) left no
power in any agency to reduce such maximum limits on hazardous por-
tions of residential district streets which happen to be within municipal-
ities and not a part of the state's highway system.4
C. 947 fills this gap by amending G. S. §20-141 so as to grant power
to "local authorities" to "fix by ordinance such speed limits in resi-
dential districts as to them seem safe and proper, but no speed limit
so fixed . . . " shall be less than 25 miles per hour. The Act also
amends G. S. §20-169 so as to harmonize it with the changes to G. S.
§20-141.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
Jails
Since McLin v. New Bern' was decided in 1874, no question has
been raised as to municipal power to build jails. If there remained
any doubt on this point, C. 938 should completely eliminate it, for it
adds express power to "establish, erect, repair, maintain and operate a
city or town jail or guardhouse, and to raise by taxation the money
therefor," to the list of corporate powers contained in G. S. §160-2.
'G. S. §20-16(a)8.
Sess. Laws 1947, c. 1067; G. S. §20-141 (b) (2).
" G. S. §20-141(f), (g). 3 G. S. §20-141(d).
'POPULAR GOVERNMENT, 1947 Legislative Summary (May, 1947).
'70 N. C. 12 (1874).
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Smoke Control
Municipalities in North Carolina have long had the power, under
present G. S. §160-55, to "pass laws for abating or preventing nuisances
of any kind, and for preserving the health of the citizens." The Munic-
ipal Corporation Act of 1917 added the specific power "to regulate the
emission of smoke within the city," G. S. §160-200(32). C. 594 adds
a proviso to section 160-55 to the effect that "it shall not be a nuisance
for an employee or servant of a railroad company to make necessary
smoke when stoking or operating a coal burning locomotive"; and
whittles down the power granted by section 160-200(32), making it
read: "To regulate the emission of smoke within the city, but no regu-
lation relative to the emission of smoke shall extend to the acts of an
employee or servant of a railroad company in making necessary smoke
when stoking or operating a coal burning locomotive." The effect of
C. 594 on existing smoke control ordinances will depend on the inter-
pretation placed upon the words "necessary smoke."
Tort Liability: State-Maintained Streets and Bridges
Under the Road Act of 19211 it was provided that the State High-
way Commission should "assume full and exclusive responsibility
for the maintenance of all roads other than streets in towns and cities,
forming a part of the State highway system. . . ." In Pickett v. Caro-
lina and Northwestern Railway2 the court considered the statutes under
-which the State took over maintenance of streets and bridges in munic-
ipalities, and answered in the negative the question whether municipal-
ities were thereby relieved from all liability for negligent maintenance
resulting in injuries to persons using such streets and bridges. C. 862
seems to have been intended to eliminate this rule, for it amends G. S.
§160-54 (which sets forth the duty of municipal governing bodies to
"provide for keeping in repair the streets and bridges in the town")
by adding the proviso that "so long as the maintenance of any streets
and/or bridges within the corporate limits of any town be taken over
by the State Highway and Public Works Commission, such town shall
not be responsible for the maintenance thereof and shall not be liable
for injuries to persons or property resulting from the failure to main-
tain guch streets and bridges."
Apparently, persons injured through neglect of maintenance on state
highways within municipalities are now in the same position as those
injured on highways outside of town in that only two possible but
dubious remedies from the practical standpoint are available; submission
of a claim to the General Assembly, or suing the individuals respon-
sible, if responsibility can be determined.
'Pub. Laws 1921, c. 2, §10(g); G. S. §136-18(g).
2200 N. C. 750, 158 S. E. 398 (1931).
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REAL PROPERTY
Foreign Deeds Withozut Seals Validated
C. 87 validates deeds to lands in North Carolina executed prior to
January 1, 1919, without a seal attached to the maker's name where
such deeds were acknowledged in another state not requiring a seal for
the validity of the conveyance, and where such deeds were duly recorded
in North Carolina. Validity of a deed to land depends upon the law
of the state in which the land lies,: and a seal is an essential requisite
of a deed in North Carolina. 2 The present act thus validates certain
deeds otherwise invalid under the previous law. Although this is a
validating act, it could also serve as an entering wedge for subsequent
legislative action to abolish the formal requirement of a seal for the
validity of deeds executed in North Carolina with reference to land
located within, the state. This would be in line with statutory enact-
ments in a number of states which have obviated the necessity of a
seal for the validity of conveyances of land.
Lis Pendens
C. 260 amends G. S. §1-116 in providing that a party may file with
the clerk of the county in which property is situated a notice of the
pendency of an action (lis pendens) at-the time of issuing the sum-
mons. In the past the notice of lis pendens could not be filed until the
complaint was filed. The new act moves up the notice period from the
filing of the complaint to the issuing of the summons. If the plaintiff
follows this course of action he must first obtain from the clerk a
written order extending the date of filing the complaint; this order and
the notice of lis pendens must be served on the defendant when the
summons is served. If the complaint is not filed within the time pre-
scribed by the order, then the lis pendens becomes inoperative and of
no effect. The interested party may apply for cancellation if the com-
plaint is not filed within that time, and the clerk may cancel the notice
by marginal entries. If the action is instituted in one county, and
application for cancellation is made in another county, the interested
party must present a certificate over the hand and seal of the clerk of
the county where the action was instituted. The fees of the clerk are
recoverable against the plaintiff and his surety.
Partition Proceedings for Sale of Standing Timber
G. S. §46-25 relating to partition proceedings for the sale of stand-
ing timber, separate from the land, is amended by C. 34 to include
'Joiner v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 6 F. Supp. 103 (M. D. N. C. 1934).
- Willis v. Anderson, 188 N. C. 479, 124 S. E. 834 (1924) ; Bullock v. Bullock,
161 N. C. 387, 77 S. E. 300 (1913); Morton v. Lumber Co., 154 N. C. 336, 70
S. E. 623 (1911); Strain v. Fitzgerald, 128 N. C. 396, 38 S. E. 929 (1901)
Pickens v. Rymer, 90 N. C. 282 (1884).
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the situation "where one or more persons own a remainder or reversion-
ary interest in a tract of land, subject to a life estate." This amendment
by broadening the scope of the statute, enables a single remainderman,
whose interest is subject to a life estate, or the life tenant, when there
is only a single remainderman, to petition for sale of the standing tim-
ber.1 The exclusion of single remaindermen from the prior provisions
of G. S. §46-25 seems to have been an illogical omission and this
amendment a proper one.
REGISTER OF DEEDS
Appointment of Assistant Registers
G. S. §161-6 authorizes the appointment of deputies by the registers
of deeds of the various counties and further makes valid the acts of such
deputies and holds the registers of deeds officially responsible therefor.
This section is amended by C. 261 to authorize each register of deeds,
in his discretion, to appoint an assistant register of deeds, "who, in
addition to his other powers and duties," shall have authority "to reg-
ister and sign instruments and documents in the name and under the
title of the Register of Deeds, by himself as assistant." Instruments so
registered and signed by the assistant are given the same force and
effect as if they had been registered and signed by the register of deeds
personally. The certificate of appointment of the assistant must be filed
by the register with the clerk of the superior court who in turn must
record such certificate.
The statute authorizing the appointment of the assistant register of
deeds does not make clear what is meant by the phrase, "his other
powers and duties"-in addition to which the power to register instru-
ments is given. Does it mean simply the routine, clerical duties such
as copying instruments and indexing them-ministerial acts which the
register may delegate without legislative sanction? Does the addition
of the authority to register instruments-which is perhaps the most im-
portant function of the register of deeds himself-mean to imply that
the assistant register of deeds may now, in the name of his principal,
do anything that the register himself is by law authorized to do? The
statute is not at all clear on these points. Nor does the new law indi-
cate whether or not the assistant register may participate in the dis-
charge and release of record of mortgages and deeds of trust. Under
G. S. §45-37 these instruments may be cancelled of record by the reg-
'A tenancy by the entireties may exist in lands held in remainder or reversion.
See Davis v. Bass, 188 N. C. 200, 209, 124 S. E. 566, 571 (1924). The broader
language of the amendment serves to extend the statute to the situation not
formerly included where tenants by the entirety own a remainder or reversion
subject to a life estate. See Bruce v. Nicholson, 109 N. C. 202, 204 13 S. E. 790,
791 (1891) ; McKinnon v. Caulk, 167 N. C. 411, 412, 83 S. E. 559, 560 (1914).
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ister of deeds "or his deputy." It may be reasoned that the assistant
register is, in a larger sense, a deputy of the register of deeds and
hence, along with a mere deputy, should have the authority to cancel
instruments. Evidently the legislature had this in mind.
The new act does not specifically make the register of deeds offi-
cially responsible for the acts of his assistant-as does G. S. §161-6 in
the case of his deputies-but a like responsibility would seem to be
imposed.
It is submitted that the amending act should have been more specific
in spelling out the duties and responsibilities of the assistant register of
deeds since the stability of real estate titles is largely dependent upon
the recordation of instruments by the properly constituted authorities.
REMOVAL OF CASES FROM STATE TO FEDERAL COURT
Prior to September 1, 1948, the effective date of the New Federal
Judicial Code,1 the proper procedure in the removal of actions from a
state to a federal court with some exceptions 2 required the defendant
or defendants to file a petition for removal in the state court from
which the case was removed.-' G. S. §1-584 required motions for re-
moval to be made before the clerk of superior court. An appeal could
be made from the clerk's ruling to the judge of the superior court who
would hear the motion de novo. If the petition was denied, the peti-
tioner had three choices: (1) appeal to the North Carolina Supreme
Court ;4 (2) remove the suit to the federal court despite the ruling of
the state court but with the risk of being bound by subsequent proceed-
ings in the state court if the federal court determined it did not have
jurisdiction ;5 (3) proceed in both courts at the same time.6
The New Federal Judicial Code simplified removal procedure by
providing for the filing of all removal petitions with the United States
district court for the district within which the action is pending,7 thereby
depriving the state courts of an opportunity to pass on removal peti-
tions. Under present federal law the removal is completed when the
defendant or defendants (1) file the removal petition as required by
28 U. S. C. §1446(a) ; (2) give bond in cases where such is required;
(3) give notice in writing to all adverse parties of the removal and
(4) file a copy of the petition with the clerk of the state court.8 After
'Pub. L. No. 772, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 25, 1948).236 STAT. 1097 (1911) as amended 39 STAT. 532, 28 U. S. C. §76; 36 STAT.
1098 (1911), 28 U. S. C. §77.
'36 STAT. 1095 (1911), 28 U. S. C. §72.
'Kerley v. Oil Company, 224 N. C. 465, 31 S. E. 2d 438 (1944).
'Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 312 U. S. 563 (1941).0 Ibid.
'Title 28 U. S. Code Congressional Service (West Publishing Company, Ed-
wards Broughton Co.) §1446(a).8 Id. at 1446(e).
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these steps have been taken the federal statutes provide that the state
court "shall proceed no further therein unless the case is remanded."9
C. 808 amends G. S. §1-584 to comply with the intent and purpose
of the new federal provisions for the removal of cases to the federal
courts. When the state court is notified of the filing of the removal
petition in the federal court (presumably by the filing of a certified
copy with the clerk of the state court) the state court either on its
own motion or on the motion of a party to the action or proceeding
may order that there be no further proceedings in the state court unless
a remand order is filed with the clerk of the state court. C. 808 makes
it clear that failure to enter such order by the state court shall not
entitle it o" any party to proceed. Since only the federal court now
has the power to determine the propriety of removal, it should be much
easier for defendants desiring removal to get the question of remov-
ability determined. Moreover, possible grounds for friction between
the state and federal courts in this connection should no longer exist.10
C. 808 also amends G. S. §1-125 by giving a party thirty days after
the filing in the state court of a certified copy of a remand order to file
motions or demur, answer or otherwise plead.
STATUTES
C. 45 makes the 1945 and 1947 supplements to the General Statutes
"prima facie evidence of the laws" contained therein. A 1945 statute"
made the same declaration as to all past and future supplements. Thus
the new enactment was not only unnecessary; by limiting its effect to
the supplements of 1945 and 1947, it raises doubt as to the effect of
the more general 1945 law upon the 1949 and later supplements.
What does "prima facie evidence of the laws" mean? Presumably,
this status will facilitate proof of the North Carolina laws in the courts
of other states,2 where the General Statutes and supplements may be
more readily available than recent volumes of session laws. However,
in our own or other courts, the supplements will have to yield to con-
flicting session laws.3 And it is doubtful if the prima facie status
would permit4 a legislative amendment of a provision in one of' the
0 Ibid.
10 Note, 20 N. C. L. REv. 438 (1942).
1 Sess. Laws 1945, C. 863, now G. S. (1947 Supp.) §164-11(a).
'Compare G. S. (1943), §8-3, with Charnock v. Taylor, 223 N. C. 360, 26 S. E.
2d 911 (1943) and Miller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 154 N. C. 441, 70 S. E.
838 (1911) (proof v. judicial notice).
' See 1 U. S. C. A. §204(a) ; Lee and Beaman, Legal Status of the New Fed-
eral Code, 12 A. B. A. J. 833 (1926) ; Murrell v. W. U. Tel. Co., 160 F. 2d 787(C. C. A. 5, 1947); Stephan v. United States, 319 U. S. 423 (1943).
'See 1 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (3rd ed., 1943), §1909, Notes
20-21. Compare P. L. 1933, C. 443 (validating 1933 acts amending N. C. CODE,
Michie 1931).
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supplements as distinguished from an amendment of a chapter of the
original session laws.
SALE
Judicial Sales, Execution Sales, and Sales Under a Power of Sale
C. 719 and C. 720, effective January 1, 1950, are companion Acts
which substantially rewrite Article 29 of Chapter 1 of the General
Statutes, relating to Judicial and Execution Sales, and a portion of
Chapter 45 of the General Statutes, relating to sales under a power of
sale contained in a mortgage or deed of trust. These Acts were pre-
pared by the Revisor of Statutes working under the supervision of the
General Statutes Commission.
The purpose of the two laws is to achieve uniformity in the various
sales procedures, except where differences in the character of the sales
make differences in procedure desirable, and to describe such procedures
with as much completeness and as great clarity as possible. To this end,
many North Carolina Supreme Court decisions have been written into
the revisions. To illustrate, G. S. §1-339.7 provides that a sheriff hold-
ing an execution sale of personal property shall have the property
physically present at the place of sale. According to the opinion in
Alston v. Morphew,' the decisions have uniformly been to this effect
since the principle was first enunciated in Blount v. Mitchell.
2
The new G. S. §45-21.11 also is illustrative of an instance where a
court decision has been written into the statute.3 This section pro-
vides: "When a series of notes maturing at different times is secured
by a mortgage, deed of trust or conditional sale contract and the exer-
cise of the power of sale for the satisfaction of one or more of the
notes is barred by the statute of limitations, that fact does not bar the
exercise of the power of sale for the satisfaction of indebtedness repre-
sented by other notes of the series not so barred."
Various gaps in procedure, where the statutes have heretofore been
silent, have been supplied. To illustrate, a section (G. S. §45-21.21) has
been included, which sets forth procedure for making a necessary post-
ponement of a sale under a power of sale contained in a mortgage or
deed of trust. In Ferebee v. Sawyer,4 it was stated that G. S. §1-334,
prescribing the manner in which execution sales and judicial sales may
be postponed, was not applicable to a sale under a power of sale con-
tained in a mortgage. The court stated: "While we decide that a sale
1113 N. C. 460, 18 S. E. 335 (1893).
1 N. C. 85 (1798).
'Based on Meadows Co. v. Bryan, 195 N. C. 398, 142 S. E. 487 (1928). See
also Dental v. Tart, 221 N. C. 106, 19 S. E. 2d 130 (1942) ; M'f'g. Co. v. Jeffer-
son, 216 N. C. 230, 4 S. E. 2d 434 (1939).
'167 N. C. 199, 83 S. E. 17 (1914).
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of this character may be postponed and, unless the statute or some
stipulation of the contract otherwise provides, that a reasonable notice
of the postponement may suffice, we do not think that the notice at-
tempted in this present case can be upheld."
For convenience and clarity, the new postponement section was
drafted in conformity with the postponement sections in the judicialo
and execution7 sales articles.
Under the new judicial Sales Article, a judge of the superior court
continues to have the same latitude in prescribing the procedure for
judicial sales which he now has, although the bill does set out detailed
procedure which such judge may follow, and which a clerk of the
superior court must follow.8
Some changes in procedure are made in the sense that different pro-
cedures are conformed to some one procedure in order to achieve uni-
formity. To illustrate, all three articles now provide for a notice of sale
of personal property to be posted at the courthouse door for ten days
(except when the terms of a mortgage or other security instrument con-
taining a power of sale provides otherwise).9
Among the substantive changes made in existing procedure of law,
aside from those designed to achieve uniformity, are provisions which
require notice of sale of personal property to be posted only at the
courthouse; require a minimum increase of $25.00 when an upset bid
on real property is made; permit clerk of the superior court to require
bidder at resale to furnish same compliance bond as person making
upset bid; make more specific authority to sell unlisted securities at a
private sale pursuant to court order; provide that when a sale pursuant
to an execution is commenced before being barred by the statute of
limitations, all procedure with respect to such sale, including resales,
may be had thereafter; grant same statutory power of sale with respect
to chattel mortgages and chattel deeds of trust as now exists with respect
to conditional sale contracts; permit sale of remainder of mortgaged
property when sale of only a part fails to satisfy obligation secured by
mortgage.
Space will not permit a lengthy analysis of these changes, but a
brief comment on the last item listed in the preceding paragraph will
illustrate the reasoning motivating some of the substantive changes. In
Layden v. Layden,10 the court stated: "It often occurs that a mortgagee
elects to sell only so much of the security pledged as may be necessary
to satisfy his debt, even though he is not so restricted by the mortgage
5 Id. at 202. - G. S. §1-339.20.
G. S. §1-339.58. 8 G. S. §1-339.3.
o Judicial sales, G. S. §1-339.18; execution sales, G. S. §1-339.53; sales under a
power of sales, G. S. §45-21.18.10228 N. C. 5, 8, 44 S. E. 2d 340 (1947).
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or deed of trust. Such an election releases the remainder of the pledged
property from the lien of the foreclosed instrument. And where a
party elects to sell only a part of the security, pursuant to the power
of sale contained in his mortgage or deed of trust, he cannot thereafter
assert any right under such power, even though the secured debt may
not have been satisfied in full." Under this holding, a mortgagee who
attempts to protect a mortgagor by not subjecting all of the mortgaged
property to a forced sale is penalized if he sells too little. Under such
circumstances, a sale of only a part of the mortgaged property is dis-
couraged. It would seem to be in the best interests of all parties to
encourage the sale of only so much property as may be necessary to
satisfy a mortgage obligation, and this the new statute accomplishes by
permitting the mortgagee to proceed to sell more of the mortgaged
property if he underestimates the amount needed to be sold at the first
sale.
TAXATION
Schedule B, License and Chain Store Tax
License Tax. Catching up with new developments the General
Assembly adds a tax on drive-in movies, with rates graduated according
to car capacity, size of nearby towns, etc.' The act is roughly com-
parable to the earlier movie and vaudeville house tax act2 including the
right of cities and towns to tax according to a graduated schedule3 when
the outdoor theater is actually within their limits. Another instance of
"catching-up" is found in the addition of self service laundries to those
already required to pay license taxes graduated according to town size.4
Chain Stores. Whether a chain store tax, i.e., one graduated with
reference to the number of stores operated is economically or socially
desirable has long been the subject of dispute.5 For a good many years
we appear to have thought so, though we failed to carry out the prin-
ciple with logic, good sense or much equity when we stopped the calcula-
tions with the state line-ignoring the chain benefits from out-of-the-state
stores. The chain store people seem finally to have prevailed and the
Assembly has cut out the graduations entirely.6 On every store in the
state after one the tax is $65. This still appears in the Revenue Act
as a chain store tax but it bears little resemblance to the tax usually so
'C. 392, §B, §1, subsec. (a). - G. S. §105-37.
'G. S. §105-37(e) (1947 Supp.). Subsection (b) has also been amended in
respect of theaters exclusively for colored people. The minimum town size has
been reduced from 10,000 to 2,500.
' C. 392, §B, §1, subsec. (c) amending G. S. §105-85.
'Becker and Hess, The Chain Store License Tax and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 7 N. C. L. REv. 115 (1929); cf. Quimby, The New Feudalism and the
Country Lawyer, 1 Mo. BAR J. 5 (Nov. 1930).
' C. 392, amendment to G. S. §105-98.
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entitled. It is in effect a flat license on the operating of stores with
an exemption of one. This returns the law to its state in 19317 except
that the rate is $15 higher.
Schedule C, Franchise Tax
The chief amendment here is that which gives a portion of the state's
gross receipts tax on the principal utilities to the various municipalities
in which they operate.8 The rate is 3Y4 of 1% on the amount of the
local gross business. This bounty, however, is obtained only at a cost:
Municipal franchise, privilege and license taxes are fixed at the January
1, 1947 level. Any city which levied high utility taxes on the base date
seems to have its advantage over other municipalities in the revenue
struggle perpetuated by this act. The percent paid to cities on local
telephone company receipts is the same as for other utilities but it is
complicated somewhat by the provision of Section 120, which gives a
credit on the state tax for any tax paid the municipality.' 0
Schedule D, Income Tax
Important substantive law amendments this session fall under two
general heads: changes in taxable income and in allowed deductions.
The first of these comes as the fruition of widespread attack on the
alleged favored position taxwise of cooperatives and their vast expan-
sion with the aid of these favors.:" It has two prongs which stick
respectively the cooperative association itself and the member-patrons.
Undistributed net income is taxable to the entity-though distribution
which will avoid the tax may be by "stock, certificates or in some other
manner that discloses to each patron the amount of his patronage re-
fund."' 2  Correspondingly income distributed "in cash or credit" must
be returned for taxation by the patrons and members themselves.' 3 The
7 P. L. 1931, C. 427, §162.
C. 392, §B, §2.
o That level, moreover, would have been the same as that of a decade earlier
had it not been for the omission of the word "franchise" from the prohibiting
clause of the act now amended, P. L. 1939, C. 158, §203, and the significance
attached to that omission by the decision in Duke Power Co. v. Bowles, Treas.
of the City of Greensboro, 229 N. C. 143, 48 S. E. 2d 287 (1948). The city, in
other words, could then, as now, not raise the privilege and license taxes but was
not prohibited from upping the franchise tax, as hereafter it is.
o G. S. §105-120(2). The gross receipts on which the city's distributive share
is calculated include no part of long distance tolls.
"
1See, e.g., the literature of the National Tax Equality Ass'n, 231 S. La Salle
St., Chicago 4.12Amendment to G. S. §105-138(9). An exception is made in favor of agri-
cultural, stabilizing, pool-marketing organizations.
3Amendments to G. S. (1947 Supp.) §105-142, adding a subsection which
apparently will be numbered 6. There would seem to be good reason for putting
this into §105-141 as it relates to inclusions in gross income. Patronage refunds,
both to member and non-member patrons, of purchasing cooperatives, though often
thought of as amounting only to a delayed reduction in the purchase price of
things bought, are expressly included in gross income. This goes a good way.
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word "credit" here presumably refers to the non-cash type of distribu-
tion, stock, certificates, etc., mentioned above.
Deductions from gross income hereafter will include for individuals
and corporations alike the full amount of contributions to the state and
its political subdivisions and their "institutions, instrumentalities or
agencies."' 14 This contrasts with the deductions earlier allowed for
other charitable gifts on which top percentage limitations were placed.
Deductions will also now include alimony and separation agreement
payments up to $1,000 annually between the man and woman either
way, with multiplied allowances in case of more than one spouse receiv-
ing payments from the same taxpayer.15 Suitable provision is made
for people on the accrual basis but no prolonged or greater deduction
is allowed for lump sum settlements. It might be tax economy for
divorcees to unlump them hereafter.
Other amendments raise the dependent exemption from $200 to
$30010 and make some administrative changes prescribing the action to
be taken by the taxpayer and the Commissioner of Revenue after ad-
justments in net income have been made by federal officials."7 One of
those restores the provision striken in 1947 which tolls the statute of
limitations when the taxpayer fails to notify the Commissioner of sig-
nificant changes at the federal level.' 8
Two amendments to the income tax article move in the direction of
greater conformity with the federal law.
(1) C. 1173, amending G. S. §105-149, grants an exemption of
$1,000, in addition to all other exemptions, to a person who is "totally
blind." It is to be expected that the amount would be $1,000, instead
of the federal $600, as the former is the state and the latter the federal
basic personal exemption.' 9 However, in all other respects the state's
new provision is less liberal than the federal provision. The latter de-
fines blindness in such a way as to grant the exemption to persons who
closely approach blindness, though they are not totally blind. C. 1173, as
originally introduced, conformed to the federal law in this respect, but it
was amended to eliminate this feature. Further, the new state law does
not adopt the federal provision granting a taxpayer an additional ex-
emption for a blind spouse. Any taxpayer claiming the new exemption
" Amendment to G. S. (1947 Supp.) §105-147 by adding a subsection numbered
914 Why this was not made 93/4 so as to follow subsection 9 governing chari-
tabe gifts does not appear.1 Amendment to G. S. (1947 Supp.) §105-147 by adding a subsection numbered
14.
18 Amendment to G. S. (1947 Supp.) §105-149.
' Amendment to G. S. (1947 Supp.) §105-159.
18A corresponding amendment is made in §160 where the statute of limitations
is set at 5 years.
1" INT. REv. CODE §25(b) (1) (C).
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must submit to the Department of Revenue a physician's statement
showing the taxpayer's total blindness. 20
(2) C. 1171, in effect, conforms to the federal provision21 for non-
recognition of gain in case of involuntary conversion of property. The
definition of involuntary conversion is taken from the federal statute.
The provisions as to when partial gain may be recognized are also based
on the federal statute, though here the new chapter omits one clause
of the federal statute.2 2  However, it seems probable that the statutes
may, by construction, be given the same meaning in this respect; and
this conclusion is fortified by an express provision that the Commis-
sioner of Revenue may, in his discretion, "apply the federal rules and
regulations, rulings, and federal court decisions."
The North Carolina statute also contains detailed provisions regard-
ing the posting of bond where a replacement fund is established, and
the making of assessments (including the time limits thereon) when
such a fund is not eventually expended for replacement. These pro-
visions deal with matters not expressly covered in the federal section,
though they are covered in part in the federal regulations. 23
An unusual feature of C. 1171 is that it is made applicable to pend-
ing litigation. However, the Supreme Court has refused to give effect
to this provision.*
Schedule E, Sales Tax
Amendments here principally concern exemptions24 and present little
legal difficulty. First exempted are motor fuels (other than gasoline,
already so treated) which have borne the gallonage tax under sub-
" Ths Act "shall not apply to taxes collectible on or before the date of its
ratification." The ratification date was April 22. Presumably it applies to all
taxes "collectible" after that date. This would make it apply to all taxpayers on
a fiscal year basis whose taxable years ended less than two and one-half months
prior to that date. It is arguable, also, that it would apply to installment pay-
ments due after April 22, but very likely that was not intended.
-'IxT. REv. CODE §112(f). See also INT. Rxv. CODE §§113(a) (9), 117(j).
22 Partial gain may be recognized when part of the money is expended for
purposes within the definition of involuntary conversion and part is not. The
state provision reads: "If any part of the money is not so expended, the gain, if
any, shall be recognized to the extent of the money which is not so expended
(regardless of whether such money is received in one or more taxable years)."
The federal provision adds, within the parentheses, "and regardless of whether
or not the money which is not so expended constitutes gain."
- Reg. 111, §29.112(f)-2. This makes the bond mandatory, whereas c. 1171
provides that the Commissioner "may" require bond. However, the Commis-
sioner, pursuant to the express authority given him to follow federal regulations,
may, if he so desires, also make the bond mandatory.
* Commissioner of Revenue v. "Speizman, 230 N. C. 459, - S. E. 2d -
(1949). It appears from this case that the commissioner has adopted the federal
rules and regulations.
2 Amendments to G. S. §105-169.
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Chapter V. Next are all fuels sold to farmers for other than household
purposes. What difficulty there is here is an administrative one for no
doubt the classification is sustainable. Finally, to supplement the exist-
ing exemption of chattel property sold to non-profit religious, charitable
and educational institutions for their use, there was added a new one
covering sales to contractors of building materials for use in the plants
of these organizations. In its original printed form25 the bill limited
the exemption to non-profit hospital construction and seems to have
been a part of the over-all public health and hospital development pro-
gram so energetically pushed in recent months. The enlargement seems
desirable.
While this limited exemption of construction materials was being
passed, a later section was amended 26 so as to insure that certain build-
ing materials, i.e., cinder, clinker and cement blocks, should get no
general exemption by silence in the act, these items being specifically
added in the list. It would not have been amiss to have prefixed to
this building material section a cross reference to the exemptions above
mentioned, thus: "Except as provided in Section 105-169(g)."
Schedule H, Intangibles Tax
Deposits of outsiders in local banks have long been exempt unless
they are "related to business activities in this state." Now one type of
deposit is made exempt even though it is so related.27 This is the bank
balance of a foreign insurance company which pays the gross premiums
tax levied elsewhere in the Revenue Act. Money to pay local claims
may be attracted to banks in the state by this more lenient policy.
Schedule I, General Administration
This schedule is the subject of five new enactments 2 8 One sets up
procedure for assessment of additional taxes; one requires detailed re-
ports from distributors of coin-operated machines which are subject to
license taxes; one provides for cancelling certain assessments against
killed and disabled members of the armed forces; and two deal with
the lien for state taxes. Both of these latter are of considerable interest.
The second puts a ten-year life on docketed certificates of tax liabil-
ity and gives a right of cancellation after that time. It not only renders
the tax certificate or judgment unenforceable ten years after docketing
but expressly abates the tax upon which it is based. The effect seems
to be to render of little practical consequence the remission of all twenty-
year-old, uncollected inheritance taxes provided for by G. S. §105-404
(which was made retroctive from 1935 this session by C. 605) except
" Committee substitute for H. B. 30.2- G. S. §105-187.
"Amendment to G. S. (1947 Supp.) §105-199.2- C. 392, §B, §6.
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perhaps as to such tax claims not carried through to docketing in past
years, or those if any, which are approximately twenty years old but
which were docketed only recently.
The other calls for more comment. It subordinates the state tax
lien to certain other interests in taxpayers' real estate until the docket-
ing of the tax liability certificate or judgment in the clerk's office and to
such interests in his personalty until a levy. Specifically the people to
whom the state is subordinated are bona fide purchasers and holders of
recorded liens. There is no express requirement of prior recordation
in the case of a bona fide purchaser; nor is there any express require-
ment that holders of recorded liens need be bona fide. Assuming that
bona fide means ignorant of the competing lien, a purchaser so ignorant
literally need not record to prevail over the subsequently docketed lien
of the state; while on the other hand the state would be junior to a
mortgagee who took and recorded knowing of the outstanding but
undocketed tax certificate. If the intent of the legislature is to be
measured as precisely by its literal language here as it was in the
Greensboro franchise case29 the opportunities for fraud on the revenue
are manifest.
At any rate the state seems commendably to intend putting itself
under the rules of the game in its dealing with private individuals here.
A buyer or lender can acquaint himself with the state of the title by a
search he can reasonably be expected to make and no prior state tax
lien can sneak up on him from behind as impressive evidence of the
majesty-or something-of sovereignty. 0
The importance of prompt registration is, however, emphasized by
the fact that priority of record, at least as to lien holders, gives priority
of interest. So far as the language of this amendment goes a lender
whose mortgage ante-dated a state tax lien would be subject to the lien
if he delayed recording his mortgage until after the tax lien came into
existence and was duly docketed.
Local Taxation
Since 1939, G. S. §105-297(10) has purported to exempt from
property taxation "tangible personal property held at any seaport
destined for and awaiting foreign shipment." C. 1268 adds a new sub-
section (13) to the same section, exempting "all cotton, tobacco or
other farm products held or stored for shipment to any foreign country
in any seaport terminals in North Carolina or in any city or town in
North Carolina in which is located any seaport or within ten miles of
the corporate limits of such city or town."
" Duke Power Co. v. Bowles, supra, note 9.
" The lien of property taxes, see Machinery Act, G. S. §105-340, of course
presents no such trap for the unwary.
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The purpose of both subsections is, of course, to encourage use of
North Carolina's ever-struggling ports. The question is whether such
encouragement is attempted in a constitutional manner.
There is no state constitutional question presented to the extent that
these provisions result only in exempting goods present in the state
under circumstances which give them immunity from local taxation
under the provisions of the United States Constitution dealing with
interstate and foreign commerce.31 However, these subsections seem
clearly intended to go beyond mere recognition of the United States
Constitution's limitations. Indeed, no amendment would be necessary
to recognize them.
In their broader aspects, these subsections raise three questions:
(1) Can the classification power, accorded to the legislature by the
State Constitution,32 be utilized to exempt property, as distinguished
from classifying property for the purpose of adopting different rates or
assessment ratios, in the light of the fact that the State Constitution
also contains express limitations on the exemption power ?3 This ques-
tion has, as yet, been given no clear answer.3 4
(2) Is it reasonable to segregate as a class either tangible property
in general, or farm products, when held for export, as distinguished
from all other tangible personalty or farm products? Or to distinguish
between farm products held for export and other property so held?
Here again there is no clear answer, though the basic rule is that a classi-
fication adopted by the legislature is valid unless "capricious, arbitrary,
and unjustified by reason."35 Such a test points in the direction of the
validity of the classification of personalty or farm products held for
export.
(3) Is a classification valid which depends solely upon the geograph-
ical location of the property? It is obvious that both subsections dif-
ferentiate between property in general held for export ,(taxable) and the
same types of property held for export at specified locations (exempt).
This is by far the gravest of the questions raised; and it is entirely
possible that it should be given a negative answer.
If my property is taxable if situated at Location A, but exempt if
situated at Location B, I am constrained to move it to Location B.
Therefore, the taxing policy is designed to give an advantage in the
way of attracting construction of storage facilities and in other respects
to some localities in the state, to the disadvantage of the rest of the
state.
"U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, §§8(3), 10(2). See Empresa Siderurgica, S. A. v.
County of Merced, Cal., 69 S. Ct. 995 (1949) ; Joy Oil Co. v. State Tax Com-
mission of Michigan, 69 S. Ct. 1075 (1949).
" N. C. CoNsT. Art. V, §3. "N. C. CoNsT. Art. V, §5.
" See the discussion of present G. S. §105-297(12) in 19 N. C. L. REV. at p.
523 (1941).
"Snyder v. Maxwell, 217 N. C. 617, 9 S. E. 2d 19 (1940).
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It should be noted that the legislature has not given location merely
evidential value--i.e., it has not said merely that location will be given
special weight in determining a controversy over whether property is
being held for export. It has made location a necessary qualification
for the exemption. It seems possible and, indeed, rather likely, that
such a classification, based upon location alone, is arbitrary and invalid.20
TORTS
Defantation--Broadcasting Stations
C. 262 provides that the owner, licensee or operator of a visual or
sound broadcasting station shall not be liable for defamatory statements
published during a broadcast by one other than himself or his agents or
employees unless he shall be guilty of negligence in permitting such
defamatory statement. Even if guilty of negligence under existing laws,
good faith and a proper retraction will bar any recovery for other than
actual damages.'
Thus, North Carolina has, in those situations coming within the
statute, forestalled the controversy evident in the field of radio defama-
tion as to whether a radio station is liable for damages without fault 2
or only liable for negligence,2 and has by statute aligned itself with those
decisions imposing liability only in the case of negligence.
The Iowa statute4 with which the wording of C. 262 is most similar
places the burden upon the owner, operator or licensee to prove the
exercise of due care; however, the North Carolina act leaves the burden
with the plaintiff to prove negligence as a part of his cause of action.
It should be noted that the act is limited to utterances by those other
than the owner, operator, licensee or agents and employees of the same.
An owner, licensee or operator will still be liable for his own defamatory
utterances but not for those made by political candidates or their sup-
porters in political broadcasts over which he has no power of censor-
ship5 or for the extemporaneous interpolations by persons other than
the station's staff.6 ,
" The situation here presented should be distinguished from the situation pre-
sented by C. 1026 of the Session Laws of 1947, discussed in 25 N. C. L. Rsv. at p.
463 (1947). That chapter apparently delegates to county commissioners the de-
cision as to whether a particular classification shall be made within their respective
counties. Here the classification is fixed by the legislature, and those areas dis-
advantaged thereby cannot protect themselves by local action.
1 G. S. §99-1, 2.
* Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889 (W. D. Mo. 1934);
Sorenson v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82 (1932) ; Miles v. Wasmer, 172
Wash. 466, 20 P. 2d 847 (1933).
'Kelly v. Hoffman, 61 A. 2d 143 (N. C. Law. 1948) ; Summit Hotel Co. v.
National Broadcasting Co., 336 Pa. 182, 8 A. 2d 302 (1939).
' 1OWA CODE §659.5 (1946).
'48 STAT. 1088. 47 U. S. C. §315 (1946); Houston Post Co. v. United States,
79 F. Supp. 199 (S. D. Tex. 1948).
' Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., supra, note 3.
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UTILITIES COMMISSION
Organization
Included in the extensive legislation affecting the Utilities Commis-
sion is C. 1009, which added two new members to the existing commis-
sion of three.1 An eccentricity of the act is that whereas the terms of the
existing members are,2 and are to continue to be, six years, the terms of
the additional members are to be four years. An apparent purpose for
such an oddity is to give each incoming governor control of the com-
mission3 to the extent that such control flows from appointment of a
majority of its members. The term of office of the governor is four
years,4 the new members are appointed for four-year terms which begin
the same year as the term of the governor, and the terms of the three
existing members are staggered at two-year intervals, therefore each
incoming governor is to appoint early in his administration5 three, that
is to say a majority, of the members of the commission. It is to be
noted that the new act provides for the fixing of the salaries of the
additional commissioners, repeals the section of the general statutes
which fixed the salaries of the existing commissioners, 6 but makes no
new provision for fixing their salaries, hence such salaries presumably
will be fixed by the governor with the approval of the advisory budget
commission.7 By section 1 the salaries fixed for the new commissioners
are not to exceed those "now paid" the old.
The familiar plan of authorizing administrative agencies to organize
into divisions each specializing in a particular field of the agency's work
is contained in the new act.
It is difficult to see that the work of public utility control is advanced
much by the addition of two new members to the commission, which
new members, like the old ones, are not required to have any expert
training or experience in this specialized field. Much better calculated
to serve the public interest is a provision of the new act expressly author-
' For a brief sketch of the previous changes in structure of this commission
see A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1941, 19 N. C. L. REV.
435, 440 (1941).2 G. S. §62-1.
' Whether such administrative agencies as this should be thus made subject to
executive control depends upon whether it is desired that they carry out the
policy and program of the newly elected governor, or that they be expert, special-
ized, impartial bodies "charged with the enforcement of no policy expect the policy
of the law." See Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602, 624
(1935). The court in this case found a congressional policy to make the Federal
Trade Commission the latter kind of agency.
I N. C. CONST. Art. Il1, §1.
'The governor takes office January 1. Ibid. Under C. 1009 terms of members
of the commission begin Feb. 1.
' Section 2 repeals G. S. §62-2.
G. S. §138-4 (1947 Supp.) provides that the salaries of administrative officers
whose salaries are now fixed by statute shall be fixed by the governor subject
to the approval of the advisory budget commission.
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izing the commission to employ technically qualified personnel including
a communications engineer, electrical engineer, director of accounting,
and a transportation expert.
Procedure
An important forward step in the administrative law of the state
was taken by the enactment of C. 989, which repealed Article 2 of
Chapter 62 of the General Statutes, providing for procedure before the
utilities commission, and substituted new provisions for such proceduire.
The new law retains some of the provisions of the old, but much needed
improvements are added. Some of the new provisions follow closely
the Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946;1 others are taken
from the Model State Administrative Procedure Act adopted in 1946
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
There are obvious advantages in making use of such materials; the
benefit of extensive research and careful draftsmanship is obtained, law
tends to become more uniform from one jurisdiction to another, and
the precedents from other jurisdictions shed useful light if they center
on statutory provisions which are the same as those in the local
jurisdiction.
The provisions of the new act are too far reaching for full discus-
sion of all of them here, but a few will be selected for illustrative pur-
poses. Examples of distinctive features of the old North Carolina
statute retained in the new are provisions making the commission a
court of record, giving it the power to punish for contempt,2 and making
the rules of evidence in civil actions applicable to its proceedings. How-
ever, the latter provision has been considerably modified; the old statute
provided flatly that "the rules of evidence shall be the same as in civil
actions, except as provided by this chapter," whereas the new act
specifies that "the commission shall apply the rules of evidence applicable
in civil actions in the superior court, insofar as practicable." 4 The same
160 STAT. 237 (1946), 5 U. S. C. §§1001-1011 (1947).
- North Carolina has taken an extreme position upholding the validity of con-
tempt powers in administrative agencies. It has held that the industrial commis-
sion has inherent power to punish a witness who refused to testify for contempt.
In re Hayes, 200 N. C. 133, 156 S. E. 791 (1931). A further statutory provision
giving both the utilities commission and members of the industrial commission
contempt power is to be found in G. S. §5-6 (1947 Supp.). A less extreme pro-
vision makes subpoenas of administrative agencies enforcible by the courts instead
of vesting power to compel testimony by punishing for contempt directly in the
administrative bodies. FEDERAL AnMiNisRATArIvE PROCEDURE ACT §6(c) ; Note 35
COL. L. REV. 578 (1935).
G. S. §62-15.
G. S. §62-18 as set out in the new act. Statutes relating to administrative
agencies commonly take the opposite position, and provide in substance that the
technical rules of evidence shall not be applicable to the administrative hearings.
Note, 24 MIcH. L. REV. 831 (1926) (concerning workmen's compensation).
Reasons why the exclusionary rules of evidence should not be applicable are ad-
vanced by BENJAMIN, REPORT ON ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF
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section contains new provisions concerning evidence before the commis-
sion, among them a requirement that all evidence, including records and
documents in the possession of the commission of which it desires to
avail itself, shall be made a part of the record by definite reference
thereto at the hearing. This requirement should serve the purpose of
enabling the commission to make use of the reports and other data in
its files without having to introduce them in evidence, and at the
same time should forestall abuses arising from consideration of mate-
rials not in the record and therefore not subject to attack or explanation
by the parties affected. 5
Important provisions of the new act authorize the use of affidavits,6
and specify that the commission, by pre-hearing conferences and other
means shall encourage the entry of stipulations for the purpose of
eliminating the necessity of proof of matters which may be admitted,
and to clarify the issues.7 It is interesting to note that in 1941 the
commission was authorized to make use of trial examiners not members
of the commission; in 1943 this authority was withdrawn;8 in 1949 it
was restored, 9 possibly in line with the thought that a much expanded
commission would expand its activity and generate more matters to be
heard. Detailed provisions are made for recommended decisions by
examiners and review by the commission. Especially noteworthy is the
requirement that final decisions of the commission shall include "findings
and conclusions and the reasons or basis therefore upon all the mate-
rial issues of fact, law, or discretion presented in the record."'10 The
new act provides that the commission may, at any time, upon notice
and hearing to the public utility affected, rescind, alter, or amend any
order or decision made by it."' This would appear, to the extent that
the provision is effective, to eliminate the doctrine of res judicata as far
NEw YORK 173-178 (1942). But the provision making such rules of evidence
applicable is not unique. The quoted portion of Section 62-18 as it appears in
the new act parallels the provision of the Federal Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947 (Taft Hartley Act) §10b, 61 STAT. 146 (1947), 29 U. S. C. A. §160b
(Supp. 1948).
'Use by utilities commissions of their expert knowledge and accumulated data
are discussed in Hanft, Utilities Commissions as Expert Courts, 15 N. C. L. REv.
12 (1936).
G. S. §62-20 as contained in the new act.
' G. S. §62-22 as contained in the new act.
' A Survey of Statutory Changes in N. C. in 1943, 21 N. C. L. REV. 323, 329(1943).
G. S. §62-26.1 as contained in the new act.
o G. S. §62-26.3 as contained in the new act, which closely follows part of the
Federal Administrative Procedure Act Section 8(b). Findings of fact must in-
clude the basic facts, not merely such ultimate facts as whether public convenience
and necessity will be served by granting a permit. Saginaw Broadcasting Co. v.
Federal Communications Commission, 96 F. 2d 554 (App. D. C. 1938) ; Singleton
v. Durham Laundry Co., 213 N. C. 32, 195 S. E. 34 (1938) ; Tesch v. Industrial
Commission of Wis., 200 Wis. 616, 229 N. W. 194 (1930).
" G. S. §62-26.5 as contained in the new act.
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as that doctrine would prevent redeterminations by the commission.12
One of the most striking advances in the administrative law of the
state is to be found in changes which have taken place in the law con-
cerning judicial review of utilities commission decisions. Formerly the
statute provided that if there were exceptions to the facts found by the
commission, the appeal to the superior court was to be tried under the
same rules and regulations as are prescribed for the trial of other civil
causes, except that the decision of the commission was made prima facie
just and reasonable.' 3 The court held that appeals went to the superior
court for jury trial de novo. 4 As late as 1940 the supreme court held
that the issue for the jury was the same matter the commission had
passed upon; the provisions making the determination of the commis-
sion prima facie just and reasonable simply put upon the appellant the
duty of going forward with the evidence.' 5 This result substituted the
inexpert judgment of the jury for that of the expert administrative
agency; made any consistent regulatory policy impossible; and made of
the court a super administrative agency. The court recently made a
sounder interpretation of the statute when it held in substance that the
question on appeal was whether the commission's determination was
unreasonable and unjust, and that being prima facie just and reason-
able it was to stand unless there was evidence that it was unreasonable
and unjust.' 6 C. 989 completes the process of discarding jury trial de
novo. The review is by the court on the record and without a jury.'17
Although the review is on the record, it is wisely provided that in
case of alleged irregularities in procedure before the commission not
shown in the record, testimony thereon may be taken in the court.,
Newly discovered evidence may be admitted by remanding the proceed-
ings to the commission.' 9 No party may appeal unless he first petitions
the commission for a rehearing. 20 This provision affords the commis-
12 Discussions of the application of res judicata to administrative decisions are
to be found in Schopflocher, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Administrative Law,
1942 Wis. L. REv. 5, 198; Comment, 29 CALIF. L. REv. 741 (1941). Our supreme
court has indicated that the doctrine is applicable to the decision of a board acting
as a quasi-judicial body. Little v. Board of Adjustment, 195 N. C. 793, 143 S. E.
827 (1928). However, in that case the previous decision of the board had been
supported on judicial review by the supreme court.
"G. S. §62-21.
"State v. Cannon Mfg. Co.. 185 N. C. 17, 116 S. E. 178 (1923).
1 Utilities Comm'n v. Carolina Scenic Coach Co., 218 N. C. 233, 10 S. E. 2d
824 (1940).
10 State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. Great So. Trucking Co., 223 N. C. 687,
28 S. E. 2d 201 (1943); State ex iel. Utilities Comm'n v. Carolina Coach Co.,
224 N. C. 390, 30 S. E. 2d 328 (1944).
G. S. §62-26.10 as contained in the new act.
'- The same provision practically verbatim appears in Section 12(6) of the
Model State Administrative Procedure Act. The possible usefulness of such a
provision is illustrated by what happened in the proceedings reviewed in Inland
Steel Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 109 F. 2d 9 (C. C. A. 7th 1940).
'G. S. §62-26.9 as contained in the'new act.
20 G. S. §62-26.6 as contained in the new act.
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sion an opportunity to correct its own errors. At the same time the
commission may not make a pocket veto of appeals by simply failing
to act on the petition for rehearing, because it is provided that any
application for a rehearing made ten days or more before the effective
date of the commission's order shall be granted or denied before the
effective date of the order is suspended. Any application for rehearing
made less than ten days before the effective date of the commission's
order and not granted within twenty days is deemed denied unless the
effective date is extended.
Pending judicial review the commission is authorized, when it finds
that justice requires, to postpone the effective date of any action taken
by it. Furthermore, to prevent irreparable injury, the court is author-
ized to postpone the effective date of any commission action and to pre-
serve the status or rights of parties pending conclusion of the appeal
proceedings, except in the case of an appeal by a railroad from an order
fixing maximum freight rates.21 These provisions are designed to take
care of situations where commission action, by going into effect pending
appeal, could do irreparable harm meanwhile even though the appellant
succeeded in having the commission reversed in the end.
On the appeal the court shall decide questions of law, interpret con-
stitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning and
applicability of the terms of any commission action.2 2 The court may
reverse or modify the decision of the commission if the substantial rights
of the appellants have been prejudiced because the commission's find-
ings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are: (a) in violation of con-
stitutional provisions; (b) in excess of statutory authority or jurisdic-
tion of the commission; (c) made upon unlawful proceedings; (d)
affected by other errors of law; (e) unsupported by competent, material
and substantial evidence in view of the entire record; or (f) arbitrary
or capricious. 23
Regulation of Crossings of Telephone, Telegraph and
Electric Power Lines
The Utilities Commission by C. 1029 was given detailed authority
to order crossings of the lines and rights-of-way of various types of
public utilities with other such lines and rights-of-way and to order
telephone, telegraph, or electric power lines making crossings to be con-
structed and maintained in a safe manner; also authority to discontinue
and prohibit such crossings where they are unnecessary and can reason-
" G. S. §62-26.11 as contained in the new act.
2- G. S. §62-26.10 as contained in the new act. This provision follows prac-
tically verbatim the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, Section 10(e).
23 G. S. §62-26.10 as contained in the new act. These grounds for reversal
closely follow the Model State Administrative Procedure Act, Section 12(7).
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ably be avoided. The commission, when the affected parties cannot
agree, may apportion the cost of construction of crossings and fix dam-
ages to be paid to one utility for the privilege of crossing its lines by
another.' Nothing is said in the statute to guide the commission on the
question whether, when A utility wants to run its lines across those of
B, the cost of the crossing is to be apportioned between them, or B is
to be awarded damages for having A's lines cross its lines, except that
the act specifies that it shall not limit the power of the commission,
when the commission determines that the crossing has been rendered
dangerous by the presence of high tension electric wires of any electric
power or light company to require the utility owning the high tension
wires to pay the entire cost. Apparently by reason of amendments
inserted after the original drafting of the act, the final phrasing is in
bad condition. Thus at one point the act reads that the commission
shall have power "to order the lines and right-of-way of any utility,
railroad -or electric membership corporation or church or other place
of public worship to be crossed by any other utility, electric membership
corporation or church or other place of public worship." It is a bit
difficult to envisage the commission ordering utility lines to be crossed
by a church. It seems that lines, or perhaps a right-of-way, owned by
a church were in mind.
The Utilities Commission was authorized to require additions, ex-
tensions, repairs, or improvements to or changes in, the plant, equip-
ment, facilities or other property of any public utility or utilities, and
apparently also to order new structures. If two or more utilities are
subjected to such a requirement, and they fail to agree on the apportion-
ment of the expense, the commission may apportion it.2
C. 1029 also provides that the attorney general shall appoint an
'The Utilities Commission already had power to require crossings of telephone,
telegraph, or electrical power lines to be constructed and maintained in a safe
manner, to apportion costs, and to discontinue or prohibit crossings, by G. S.
§62-54, which is rewriten by C. 1029. Analogous power can be found in the
commission's authority to require the raising or lowering of tracks at crossings.
G. S. §62-42.
'This provision rewrites and greatly expands G. S. §62-74. Specimens of
existing authority of the commission to require extended or new facilities are to
be found in G. S. §62-41, under which the commission is empowered to require
establishment of stations and erection of depot accommodations, and of accommo-
dations for loading, unloading, feeding, sheltering and protecting livestock. In
Corporation Commission v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 139 N. C. 126, 51 S. E.
793 (1905), the court held that the commission had power to order a railroad
to install a track scales. By G. S. §62-39 the commission has power to require
transportation and transmission companies to establish and maintain facilities. An
example of the commission's authority to compel two or more utilities to join in
providing a facility is to be found in G. S. §62-43, which empowers the commis-
sion to require union stations. G. S. §62-112 is an example of present power to
prescribe rules under which expenses are shared by utilities. There are, however,
limitations upon the power to require public utilities to extend their lines. Power
to require extensions is discussed in Note, 15 N. C. L. Rxv. 70 (1936).
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additional assistant attorney general to be assigned to the Utilities Com-
mission, to do its legal work but to be under the direction of the attorney
general.
A statutory speciman of coordination of the work of administrative
agencies is to be found in the provision of C. 1029 which specifies in effect
that the Utilities Commission and the State Board of Assessment shall
coordinate their activities and make their facilities available to each
other so that each agency shall receive the benefit of exchange of in-
formation with respect to the valuations of public utility property for
rate making purposes on the one hand and taxation purposes on the
other.3
WILLS
Witness to Will
C. 44 adds a new section to G. S. §31-10 providing that a corpora-
tion named as trustee of a will is not disqualified to act as trustee by
reason of the fact that a person owning stock in the corporation signed
the will as a witness. G. S. §31-10, prior to the amendment, was suffi-
ciently broad to make a stockholder of a corporation named trustee
competent as a witness; but with reference to the validity of the appoint-
ment, quaere.1 This new section precludes questioning the validity of
the appointment and thus forestalls the result reached in Illinois, where
the court held, under statutory provisions similar to G. S. §31-10, that
the stockholder was competent as a witness but that the appointment
of the corporation as trustee was void. 2
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
The Supreme Court in Wilson v. Mooresville held that a police
officer injured in "hot pursuit" of a speeder after they had gotten into
the next county could have no compensation from the town which em-
ployed him even though the claimant had been told by the chief of
police that he had a right to go out of the local county in such pursuit.
'It should not be assumed, however, that value for rate making purposes and
tax value are necessarily the same. See Hanft, Control of Electric Rates in North
Carolina, 12 N. C. L. REv. 289, 301, especially n. 63 (1934).
1 The prevailing view is that the trustee or a stockholder of a corporation named
trustee acquires no beneficial interest in the will. 1 PAGE ON WiLLs §327 (3rd ed.
1941); North Carolina and Illinois follow the minority view and hold that the
trustee or stockholder has an interest in the compensation to be received. Allison
v. Allison, 11 N. C. 141 (1825) (trustee); Olson v. Larson, 320 IlL. 50, 150 N. E.
337 (1925) (stockholder).
- Lawndale Nat. Bank v. Kaspar American State Bank, 288 Ill. App. 555, 6
N. E. 2d 670 (1937).
1222 N. C. 283, 22 S. E. 2d 907 (1942).
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The accident did not arise out of his employment.2 C. 399 seems in-
tended to give compensation in such a case and in other extra-territorial
cases where the injured are employed by any governmental unit includ-
ing the state. In requiring, however, that the official duties beyond the
limits be "pursuant to authorization or instruction from any superior
officer" the amendment may not reach the exact Wilson situation where
there was at most a sort of implied authorization and by a mere chief
of police. Moreover, the court might question whether an officer was
"in the discharge of his official duty" when he, a police officer, was
beyond his local county.
The spinal cord disability provision got some revision this year.3
By insertion of the words, "and other treatment"4 into the sentence
describing what expenses may be paid from the second injury fund as
additional benefits to the class of disabled workers, the purpose to care
for this special class on a more liberal basis than others is the better
carried out.
By allowing the benefits to be paid for old injuries of this nature
where compensation from the employer continued through January 1,
1941, or later (instead of April 4, 1945) the act now retroactively cares
for some added cases-no doubt appealing ones. The section formerly
said that in these cases "such medical, nursing and hospital expenses"
were to be paid only from April 4, 1947, and after the employer's liabil-
ity for compensation and such expenses had ceased. It now substitutes
"compensation" for the quoted expenses above as the thing to be paid
only from April 4, 1947, etc., and allows the quoted expenses5 for the
interim between the end of the employer's payments and the date (April
4, 1947 or later) when the added compensation began. At least that is
what I think it does. The new language is quoted in the margin.0 To
those in daily touch with the cases and the act and fully aware of the
deficiencies of the original section the amendment may be abundantly
clear. To those of us at a distance a re-writing might help.
'Cf. that fireman outside municipal limits on order of "the department" is
covered by the Act. Op. A. G. (Sept. 15, 1942) N. C. W. C. A. Ann. (4th ed.
1948) 16; that city police officer injured in a collision while returning from an
out of the state search for a desperado is not entitled to compensation. Boyd v.
Mooresville, Ind. Comm. Docket 4925 (Jan. 1935), N. C. W. C. A. Ann. (4th
ed. 1948) 31. The Wake Forest Case, 228 N. C. 346, 45 S. E. 2d 387 (1947) is
not in point on this problem.
C. 1017, amending G. S. §97-29 (1947 Supp.).
'This phrase is inserted consistently throughout the section, except once,
wherever the original expenses ("medical, nursing and hospital") are mentioned.
That once is at the end, where these expenses are given priority over compen-
sation if the second injury fund proves insufficient for both. This seems to be
an inadvertance.
Now amplified to include expense for "other treatment" as above indicated.
"But when compensation is allowed in any case under this amendment, the
Commission may authorize payment of medical, nursing, hospital, and other treat-
ment expenses accrued prior to the date compensation was allowed but after the
employer's liability therefor has ceased."
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The list of compensable occupational diseases is expanded by
C. 1078 to include various forms of heart disease when suffered by a
member of the fire department of some governmental unit with five
unbroken years of service theretofore. Other features of the act present
problems of construction. The disease must develop or first manifest
itself while the sufferer is an active member of the unit, yet development
and first manifestation are determined by the date of a physician's advice
that the heart trouble exists. The apparent purpose of this provision is
to soften the rule that notice must be given within thirty days of an
accident 7 (here disablement from the disease s ) on penalty of possibly
losing compensation if it is not.9 But literally it seems to entail the
following consequences. The fireman is disabled by heart trouble and
quits active duty; a week later he has a doctor's diagnosis. The latter
is the time when the disease developed or was first manifested under
the terms of the act yet the development, as so tested, did not occur
while he was an active member, as it must have to be an occupational
disease. This construction can be avoided by confining the provision
to its benign purpose, ignoring some of its language 10 and treating it
as an unnecessary duplication of another seemingly applicable provision
on the subject."
Another subsection which presents a question is the one which re-
quires the fireman to have had a medical examination with negative
results "upon entering said fire service or not less than five years prior
to first manifestation ....." If he was examined and entered the service
less than five years before he would not have served long enough to
come in for benefits, but it seems that if he had been examined ten or
fifteen years before and entered the service five years before he would
have satisfied the statute. This can hardly be what was desired. Lastly,
a subsection lettered (d) was inserted in the bill after its introduction
giving cities the power to "adopt their own plans for the purpose of
carrying out the intent of this act." What the privilege here given
amounts to is not very clear. It might relate to the choice between
purchased insurance and self insurance or to setting up physical ex-
aminations for members or to keeping records of service (especially
important in the case of volunteer firemen who are also covered), but
why it is confined to cities when the act relates to other units is even
less apparent.
G. S. §97-22 carried into §97-58(b) as to occupational diseases.
8 G. S. §97-53.
' Unless there is reasonable excuse and the employer is not prejudiced. G. S.§97-22.
"0 "For the purpose of the foregoing the time of development or first mani-
festation of such diseases shall only be determined by and run from . . ." (time
of physician's advice). (Italics mine.)
' G. S. §97-58(b), last sentence.
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WORLD GOVERNMENT
Limited World Federal Government
Resolution 37 represents as definite political action as it is currently
possible for a state legislature to take toward the objective of a limited
world federal government. It provides: "That application is hereby
made to the Congress of the United States, pursuant to Article V of
the Constitution of the United States, to call a convention for the sole
purpose of proposing amendments to the Constitution which are appro-
priate to authorize the United States to negotiate with other nations,
subject to later ratification, a constitution of a world federal govern-
merit, open to all nations, with limited powers adequate to assure peace,
or amendments to the Constitution which are appropriate to ratify any
world constitution which is presented to the United States by the United
Nations, by a world constitutional convention or otherwise."
The specified Article of the United States Constitution provides that,
upon application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the states, Con-
gress "shall" call a constitutional convention. At this writing, resolu-
tions substantially identical with Resolution 37 have been passed in
Maine, California, and New Jersey-all, in common with North Caro-
lina's, becoming effective in the month of April, 1949. This means that
if similar action is taken by 28 additional states,' the convention will
be called. Several other legislatures currently have the resolution under
consideration.
The Constitution has never been amended by this process. How-
ever, the current attempt really presents a two-fold possibility-either
that two-thirds of the states will act and that a precedent will thus be
set, or that, as has happened in the past, after a substantial number of
states have acted, Congress will submit amendments, thus rendering a
convention unnecessary.
The motivation for the Resolution is well set forth in the Preamble,
which reads as follows:
"Whereas, War is now a threat to the very existence of our civil-
ization, because modern science has produced weapons of war which are
overwhelmingly destructive and against which there is no sure defense;
and
"Whereas, The effective maintenance of world peace is the proper
concern and responsibility of every American citizen; and
"Whereas, The people of the State of North Carolina, while now
enjoying 'domestic peace and security under the laws of their local, state
and federal governments, deeply desire the guarantee of world peace;
and
'29 if Alaska or Hawaii is admitted, 30 if both are admitted.
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"Whereas, All history shows that peace is the product of law and
order, and that law and order are the product of government; and
"Whereas, The United Nations, as presently constituted, although
accomplishing great good in many fields, lacks authority to enact, inter-
pret or enforce world law, and under its present Charter is incapable
of restraining any major nations which may foster or foment war; and
"Whereas, The Charter of the United Nations expressly provides,
in Articles 108 and 109, a procedure for reviewing and altering the
Charter; and
"Whereas, In 1941, North Carolina was the first of many states to
memorialize Congress, through resolutions by their state legislatures
or in referenda by their voters, to initiate steps toward the creation of
world federal government; and
"Whereas, Several nations have recently adopted constitutional pro-
visions to facilitate their entry into a world federal government by
authorizing a delegation to such a world federal government of a portion
of their sovereignty sufficient to endow it with power adequate to pre-
vent war."
Potentially this is the most important measure adopted by the 1949
session of our legislature. And passage of the resolution by four legis-
latures within the single month of April is clearly an event of profound
significance. It may well be that future historians, referring to these
April resolutions, will say, "Here was laid the cornerstone of the system
of law and government which has prevented our world from falling
apart."
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